Climate tipping points—critical thresholds beyond which components of the Earth system undergo rapid and often irreversible change pose a growing challenge for global adaptation action. Reaching climate tipping points would have cascading impacts on water, food, health, and ecosystems. While mitigation must remain the primary means of reducing the risk of crossing climate tipping points, adaptation action will also be necessary for greater resilience to potential impacts. The potential for crossing global tipping points reinforce the case for adaptation as a global public good, going beyond the need for national or local adaptation.
The global climate adaptation architecture—including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement—has made important progress but is not yet fully equipped to address systemic, transboundary, and non-linear climate risks, including climate tipping points. Existing adaptation frameworks are largely national in scope and do not adequately address regional or transboundary risks. Enhanced international cooperation is needed and there is a case for stronger inclusion and consideration of transboundary and transformational adaptation action within the UNFCCC process. Parties could consider the following options:
Thought also needs to be given—including in the context of the UN80 reform process—as to whether the overall UN climate governance structure is sufficient to respond to the possible crossing of planetary boundaries and climate tipping points. In this regard, the notion of a new UN Climate Council, as proposed by President Lula of Brazil, deserves further examination.
10. Adaptation has traditionally been framed as a local challenge because climate impacts are experienced in specific places and adaptation measures are often implemented at the community, municipal, or national level.
11. However, adaptation can and should also be framed as a proactive approach that anticipates future risks and strengthens resilience before impacts occur: “transformational adaptation.”10Center for Climate and Energy Solutions [hereinafter C2ES], Transformational Adaptation for COP29: Issues and Options (Washington, DC: C2ES, November 2024), https://www.c2es.org/document/transformational-adaptation-for-cop29-issues-and-options/. Some definitions of transformational adaptation describe it as a forced response to particularly rapid or extreme climate impacts and a mode for taking action to avoid crossing irreversible or undesirable climate tipping points.11Some definitions of transformational adaptation include both addressing the root causes of vulnerability linked to social equity and environmental sustainability and considering the scale and severity of climate impacts. Additionally, it is important to recognize that some perceive transformational adaptation as a buzzword or a concept primarily rooted in Northern perspectives, viewing it as a potential barrier to accessing funding. This perspective might represent another point on the spectrum. Climate Investment Funds, Principles for Transformational Climate Finance to Advance Just and Equitable Solutions (London, UK: Climate Investment Funds, June 2023), https://www.cif.org/sites/cif_enc/files/knowledgedocuments/principles_for_transformational_climate_finance.pdf.
12. Climate impacts increasingly cross national borders, affecting food systems, trade, migration, water resources, and ecosystems. Transboundary adaptation recognizes that climate risks can cascade across borders and regions through interconnected social, ecological, and economic systems.12Magnus Benzie et. al, Meeting the global challenge of adaptation by addressing transboundary climate risks: A internationales, and Overseas Development Institute Discussion Brief (Stockholm, Sweden: SEI, April 18, 2018), https://www.sei.org/publications/transboundary-climate-risk/. Existing adaptation frameworks are largely national in scope and do not adequately address regional or transboundary risks. NAPs primarily focus on domestic action, leaving a gap in preparedness for regional and interconnected climate impacts.
13. Transboundary and transformational adaptation requires challenging the conventional narrative that adaptation is solely a local concern. While adaptation action may be implemented locally, the drivers, impacts, and consequences of climate change increasingly transcend political and geographic boundaries, requiring broader regional and international perspectives. Below is a list of sectoral examples for transboundary impacts and adaptation approaches.
14. Water scarcity: Many of the world’s major river basins and aquifers are shared across national boundaries, making water availability dependent on decisions taken and climatic conditions occurring beyond a single Party’s control. Climate change is expected to alter precipitation patterns, increase the frequency and severity of droughts, and intensify competition over limited water resources. There is a case to be made that adaptation requires cooperative governance arrangements, information sharing, and coordinated management approaches that recognize the interconnected nature of water systems.13IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group 2 Chapter 4: Water (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter04.pdf.
15. Food: Agricultural production is increasingly vulnerable to rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, and extreme weather events. Climate-related disruptions in one region can affect food availability and affordability elsewhere through global trade networks. As food systems become more interconnected, adaptation strategies should move beyond local production concerns and consider the resilience of regional and global supply chains, trade relationships, and food security systems.14IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group 2 Chapter 5, Food, Fibre and Other Ecosystem Products (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter05.pdf.
16. Health: Changes in temperature, precipitation, and ecosystem conditions can increase the spread of disease and pathogens across regions and national boundaries. New climatic conditions may allow for diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and other illnesses to expand into new geographic areas.15Cory Morin et.al, “Climate and Dengue Transmission: Evidence and Implications,” National Library of Medicine Environmental Health Perspectives 121:1264–1272 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1306556. In addition, climate-related disasters can strain health systems, increase the risk of infectious disease outbreaks, and create health challenges associated with displacement and migration. Consideration could be given to cross-border cooperation in disease surveillance, public health preparedness, and health system resilience.16IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group 2 Chapter 7 Health, Wellbeing and the Changing Structure of Communities (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter07.pdf.
17. Biodiversity/ecosystems: Many ecosystems, such as forests, river basins, mountain ranges, oceans, and species habitats, span borders and provide essential ecosystem services that support livelihoods, food security, and water resources. Rising temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, ocean warming/acidity, and more frequent extreme events are disrupting ecological interactions and increasing the risk of ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss, including deforestation. These changes can have cascading effects across regions, affecting fisheries, pollination services, water regulation, and carbon sequestration. As ecosystems become increasingly vulnerable to climate change, adaptation strategies may need to move beyond site-specific conservation measures and consider the resilience of interconnected ecological systems. Recognizing ecosystems and biodiversity as shared assets that provide benefits across national boundaries reinforces the need for greater international cooperation and integrated adaptation planning.17IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group 2 Chapter 2, Terrestrial and Freshwater Ecosystems and Their Services (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter02.pdf.
18. There is broad recognition that climate overshoot of 1.5 degrees C is increasingly likely.18UNEP, Limiting Overshoot – Navigating exceedance of 1.5°C and pathways towards return. However, it may be politically challenging to discuss climate tipping points within UNFCCC processes. In the context of adaptation, does adapting to climate tipping points represent the next frontier of adaptation policy? While political conditions may not yet support negotiations on climate tipping points, Parties have expressed interest in using transboundary adaptation, systemic risk assessment, and resilience planning as pathways to begin addressing the associated risks.
19. While the global adaptation policy architecture under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement has made important progress, it is not fully equipped to address systemic, transboundary, and non-linear climate risks, including climate tipping points, underscoring the need for enhanced international cooperation. Parties will need to assess institutional gaps and identify how the current adaptation architecture could evolve to better address climate tipping points, overshoot, and transboundary climate risks given overshoot is likely.
20. Parties could consider which existing UNFCCC workstreams and processes could usefully or more explicitly integrate climate tipping point risks and overshoot scenarios into their mandates, planning, and implementation efforts. Below is a list of options for consideration, in no particular order.
21.Under the GGA, at COP31 or beyond, Parties could consider:
22. The NAP process could integrate climate tipping points considerations into the NAP planning process including by:
23. The JTWP could consider:
24. Strengthening science, data systems, and risk assessment is important for adaptation action. Within Research and Systemic Observation, Parties discussed climate tipping points at the 18th meeting of the research dialogue on climate scenarios. At SB64, the Subsidiary Bodies for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) encouraged the scientific community to continue advancing research to address knowledge and research gaps and needs related to climate tipping points.22UNFCCC, Research and Systemic Observation Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBSTA/2026/L.5 (June 2026), https://docs.unfccc.int/documents/10000226. Parties could consider strengthening support for research, monitoring, and early warning systems related to climate tipping points.
25. GST1 highlighted the importance of strengthening international cooperation to accelerate and scale up climate action.23UNFCCC, Outcome of the first global stocktake, Decision 1/CMA.5 (December 13, 2023), https://unfccc.int/documents/637073. Enhancing international cooperation is an important component of the GST mandate and provides an important potential hook to reframe the approach to adaptation under the GST, so as to encourage preparation for potential cross border impacts as a result of crossing climate tipping points.
26. GST1 notably “recognizes that improved understanding of how to avoid and respond to the risk of low-likelihood or high-impact events or outcomes, such as abrupt changes and potential climate tipping points, as well as more knowledge, support, policy and action are needed to comprehensively manage risks of and respond to loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.”24UNFCCC, Outcome of the first global stocktake, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 127 (emphasis added). While this is in relation to loss and damage, this could also be read to have implications for adaptation.
27. GST1 recognized the importance of transformational adaptation, calling for “urgent, incremental, transformational and country-driven adaptation action based on different national circumstances.” Additionally, GST1 recognized that climate change impacts are often transboundary in nature and may involve complex, cascading risks that require knowledge-sharing and international cooperation for addressing them.25UNFCCC, Outcome of the first global stocktake, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶¶ 51-52 (emphasis added).
28. The UNFCCC Secretariat prepared a 2024 technical paper on transformational adaptation, which examined how transformational adaptation is defined and understood across sectors and scales and highlighted the growing need for system-wide responses to escalating climate risks.26UNFCCC, Defining and understanding transformational adaptation at different spatial scales and sectors, and assessing progress in planning and implementing transformational adaptation approaches at the global level (Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC, November 2024), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/tp2024_08.pdf. Building on this work, Parties at the 6th Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA6) took note of the technical paper.27UNFCCC, Global goal on adaptation, Decision 3/CMA.6, ¶41 (March 27, 2025), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024_17a01E.pdf#page=10. No substantial follow up has emerged.
29. An important question is whether and how the risk of climate tipping points, transboundary and transformational adaptation could be incorporated into the GST2 processes and outcomes. The information and collection phase of GST2 will begin at COP31. Parties could consider climate tipping points during the technical assessment phase of GST2, ensuring their meaningful incorporation in GST2 outcomes.
30. The GST2 outcome could send signals or set targets to: strengthen the assessment of transboundary climate risks within adaptation planning processes; integrate these risks into NAPs; support regional adaptation initiatives and cooperative mechanisms; and build on existing frameworks and evidence, including the Adaptation Without Borders28“About,” Adaptation Without Borders. and IPCC assessments of transboundary climate risks.
31. At the 2024 G20 Summit Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed establishing a UN Climate Change Council to strengthen global climate governance and accelerate implementation of the Paris Agreement. The Council would seek to improve coordination across the currently fragmented climate institutions and processes while maintaining the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement as the central fora for climate negotiations.29Kaveh Guilanpour and Lavanya Rajamani, The Proposal for a New Climate Change Council (Washington, DC: C2ES, April 2025), https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/C2ES-Climate-Change-Council-Proposal-FINAL.pdf.
32. Thought needs to be given—including in the context of the UN80 reform process—as to whether the overall UN climate governance structure is sufficient to respond to the possible crossing of planetary boundaries and climate tipping points. In this regard, the notion of a new UN Climate Council, as proposed by President Lula of Brazil, deserves further examination.
33. This idea merits further examination, given that the world will likely exceed the 1.5 degrees Celsius overshoot scenario, and we are one step closer to the crossing of planetary boundaries. It is clear that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement alone cannot coordinate a global response to climate tipping points.
