

INTERNATIONAL



Considerations for the Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation

Discussion Paper

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Parties need to operationalize the Belém Adaptation Indicators adopted at the 30th Conference of the Parties as soon as possible for them to function as a source of input into the second global stocktake. COP30 also set out the Belém–Addis Vision on adaptation to operationalize the indicators. However, its mandate is unclear. To avoid delaying the operationalization of the indicators, Parties will need to consider and engage on these elements at the 64th Subsidiary Bodies, including launching the Subsidiary Body Technical Taskforce.

At the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (*UNFCCC*) 7th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (*CMA7*), Parties adopted the Belém Adaptation Indicators, a set of 59 indicators to measure progress toward the targets of the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience (*UAE Framework*). Their adoption marked the formal conclusion of the UAE–Belém Work Programme and established a global framework for assessing adaptation progress under the Paris Agreement. At the same time, the adoption process revealed significant political and technical divisions among Parties. **Concerns were raised regarding the scientific robustness of the indicators, the lack of clear metadata and methodologies (specific country information reporting the indicator), the treatment of means of implementation (MOI), and procedural issues linked to the adoption of the decision itself.**

Despite these concerns, Parties agreed to operationalize the indicators through further technical and political work under the Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation (*BAVA*). **The BAVA is a two-year policy alignment process under the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) aimed at developing guidance for operationalizing the Belém Adaptation Indicators and integrating them into adaptation planning and reporting.** Work related to operationalizing the indicators will involve technical discussions on how Parties can “test” the indicators, how they can be integrated into existing reporting vehicles, how they can be included in guidance from related constituted bodies, and what “policy alignment” should entail in practice.

Parties also mandated the SBs Technical Task Force to improve the metadata and methodologies for the Belém Adaptation Indicators ahead of CMA9 in 2027. Parties will need to agree on the composition of the SBs Task Force, including whether to retain experts from the UAE–Belém Work Programme to preserve institutional memory and technical continuity. Parties will also need to: address coordination arrangements, as well as reach out to national institutions, Indigenous peoples, and local communities. Expanding the mandate of the SBs Task Force to support operationalizing the BAVA could make the work of these two parallel workstreams more efficient, strengthen coherence across adaptation processes, and better support preparations for GST2 and the future review of the UAE Framework and the Belém Adaptation Indicators.

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Questions for consideration

- How can the BAVA be structured to ensure that the Belém Adaptation Indicators are operationalized effectively?
- How can the BAVA process build on related parallel processes (e.g., the Baku Adaptation Road Map (**BAR**), the SBs Technical Taskforce, guidance from related constituted bodies) while simultaneously avoiding duplication of work?
- What does “testing” of the Belém Adaptation Indicators entail for Parties?
- What does “policy alignment” mean in the context of the Belém Adaptation Indicators and the BAVA?

A. Context

COP30 Outcome

1. At CMA7 (November 2025), the COP30 President gavelled the Global Goal on Adaptation (**GGA**) decision adopting a list of 59 indicators (**Belém Adaptation Indicators**). With that, the two-year UAE–Belém work programme on developing indicators for measuring progress achieved towards the GGA targets (**UAE–Belém Work Programme**) officially ended.¹
2. Some Parties had several issues with the Belém Adaptation Indicators. The CMA7 decision introduced new wording and concepts that differed from the September 2025 list of 100 indicators developed by the expert groups of the UAE–Belém Work Programme.² For this reason, some Parties argued that the Belém Adaptation Indicators lacked scientific robustness or clear methodologies and metadata.
3. Some Parties also took issue with the rules of procedure and the validity of the decision. Several Parties placed reservations on the adoption of the decision citing concerns regarding the process and substance.³

Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation

4. To ensure the operationalization of the Belém Adaptation Indicators, the CMA7 decision established the BAVA, a two-year Party-driven “policy alignment process” aimed at developing guidance to operationalize the Belém Adaptation Indicators.⁴ This policy alignment process will continue until CMA9 (November 2027).
5. The BAVA will be under the SBs and be based on:
 - the technical work by the SBs and their Technical Task Force on improving metadata and methodologies for the Belém Adaptation Indicators
 - the experience Parties have in testing the Belém Adaptation Indicators



- integration of the targets under the UAE Framework and the Belém Adaptation Indicators in adaptation reporting for the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.⁵
6. The BAVA runs in parallel to and overlaps with many other processes and mandates and risks duplication of work and discussions (see Annex I: Additional Work on the Global Goal on Adaptation for more information). In addition, the BAVA has a broad and unclear mandate as well as an undefined structure and process.
 7. At SB64, Parties will reconvene on several of the elements in the CMA7 GGA decision as substantive agreement among Parties have not been reached on both technical and political issues.⁶ The BAVA would benefit from additional technical and structural/procedural recommendations for consideration at SB64.

B. Technical Considerations

8. There is lack of clarity on the technical work to be undertaken under the BAVA. Parties could use SB64 to unpack the vision's technical elements. Below is a short overview of the technical elements, including: (i) testing of the indicators; (ii) integrating the indicators in Parties' adaptation reporting; (iii) defining and developing guidance for policy alignment; and (iii) the scope of the Secretariat's report related to the use and mapping of the indicators.

Testing

9. What does "testing" of the Belém Adaptation Indicators entail for Parties? What are the implications of the potential lack of experience in testing them? At CMA7, Parties were mandated to begin testing the indicators.⁷ Parties are required to integrate the indicators into their national adaptation planning processes. However, the testing could be done through one-off projects or processes that are not meant to become standard processes.
10. At the same time, it is unclear how Parties could undertake testing of indicators without first introducing them through the usual processes that underpin all adaptation planning at national, sub-national, and local levels. Further, even if Parties intend to test the indicators through national implementation, there might not be sufficient time for the lessons learned in using them to inform the BAVA.
11. Going forward, Parties should inform each other whether and when they intend to test the indicators. In light of this, Parties should have an open and frank discussion on how a potential lack of experience with testing the indicators will affect the work under the BAVA.

Reporting

12. At CMA7, Parties were encouraged to integrate the targets under the UAE Framework and the Belém Adaptation Indicators in their adaptation planning and reporting processes under the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement. In his context, how can the BAVA process benefit from and feed into the parallel work on integration of the targets under the UAE Framework and the Belém Adaptation Indicators? In other words, how can Parties avoid duplication of discussions and instead use these existing workstreams to inform the work under the BAVA? And how can the BAVA be used to take the work under these parallel processes further?
13. Parties have different reasons for reporting on adaptation and weigh the benefits differently. Adaptation reporting will be an input to GST2. For some Parties, the GST's key purpose for adaptation is to highlight transboundary risks (such as shared water resources or food security) and solutions to address them. There are Parties who have their own national adaptation indicators that they utilize for reporting on adaptation.

14. Different reporting tools cater to different needs. For example, reporting under the national adaptation plans (**NAP**) technical guidelines is more focused on the iterative policy cycle and how to ensure strong national adaptation action within developing country Parties. Adaptation reporting through the biannual transparency reports (**BTRs**) is meant to be used as input into the GST, which will assess progress towards achieving the GGA. Adaptation reporting on nationally determined contributions (**NDCs**) focuses perhaps more on the adaptation finance gaps and the overall political commitments to support adaptation action.
15. The Adaptation Committee (**AC**),⁸ Least Developed Countries Expert Group (**LEG**),⁹ and Consultative Group of Experts (**CGE**)¹⁰ are already mandated to assist with the integration of the UAE Framework across reporting vehicles, particularly the BTRs and the NAP technical guidelines (see “Guidance” below). Parties could consider whether the integration should be tailored to the different reporting vehicles instead of a one-size-fits-all solution. Parties could further consider whether it could be helpful to widen the mandate’s scope to include all adaptation reporting vehicles and to develop draft guidelines to be reviewed by the Parties.

Defining Policy Alignment Process

16. The BAVA has been called a “policy alignment process.”¹¹ What is meant by a policy alignment process for developing guidance for operationalizing the Belém Adaptation Indicators? Parties need to define policy alignment process to advance the implementation of BAVA’s mandate. A policy alignment process is often understood as deliberate and systematic alignment of national laws, regulations, policy instruments, strategies, and governance structures with the relevant political goals or targets.¹² Such a reading would imply that the guidance is to cover how Parties’ national policies and structures can become aligned with the Belém Adaptation Indicators.
17. However, Parties at this stage are only required to develop the guidance for the policy alignment process. That is, Parties are *not* required to undertake the policy alignment process for operationalizing the indicators.¹³ However, Parties could use the BAVA process to discuss what policy alignment should entail and how Parties can undertake it. The guidance to be developed could therefore address: how Parties could undertake the policy alignment, the benefits of policy alignment with the indicators, and the support available for undertaking policy alignment.
18. The guidance document could also include user-friendly examples from Parties on how the GGA, and its targets and indicators have enhanced their work on adaptation, including how and/or whether they have integrated and aligned the outcomes from the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement on adaptation with their national laws, regulations, policy instruments, strategies, and governance structures. This should include examples of how and/or whether the GGA and its targets and indicators could be made more useful going forward. Further, Parties could ensure that the guidance document is aligned with and used as input for other guidance documents for adaptation developed under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

Guidance

19. Knowing that the Belém Adaptation Indicators are voluntary, non-prescriptive, respective of national sovereignty, country driven, should not create additional reporting burdens, globally standardized methodologies or data-collection processes, nor imply acceptance of elements inconsistent with national circumstances,¹⁴ what “guidance” could the BAVA set out? Parties will need to unpack how the guidance for a policy alignment process could be developed in line with the need to safeguard national and local ownership and engagement.
20. Guidance is also expected from the AC, LEG, and CGE, which are mandated to support the implementation of the UAE Framework into reporting frameworks, particularly the transparency framework.¹⁵ In Belém, the mandate was expanded to request that the AC, the LEG and the CGE: (i) develop tabular formats for BTR reporting; and (ii) integrate the UAE Framework into the NAP technical

guidelines.¹⁶ The AC was also tasked with analyzing Parties' UNFCCC/Paris Agreement reporting against the targets in the UAE Framework, including those for MOI. This mandate does not have a deadline.¹⁷

21. It is imperative, therefore, that the AC, LEG, and CGE's work informs the BAVA in the development of guidance. Their mandates could be expanded so that the BAVA outcome includes an assessment of useful types of guidance for Parties. Or the bodies could be mandated to develop the draft guidelines for approval by the Parties.

UNFCCC Secretariat Report

22. The Secretariat has been requested to prepare a report that will: consider the use of the Belém Adaptation Indicators; map existing adaptation reporting relevant to the GGA; identify synergies, gaps, and ways to fill the gaps; and analyze guidelines, tools, and methodologies for aggregating the Belém Adaptation Indicators.¹⁸ The report is due by the end of September 2026.
23. Parties could request that the report also address the technical considerations raised under the BAVA.

C. Process Considerations

24. To move forward, Parties could usefully consider how Parties should arrange the BAVA discussions. The process is to be carried out at the SBs over a two-year period, and there are four SB sessions for Parties and non-Party stakeholders to undertake the work.
25. There are several parallel processes occurring at the technical level in relation to the GGA. A more comprehensive overview of key parallel processes relevant to the Belém–Addis Vision is listed in Annex I: Additional Work on the Global Goal on Adaptation.

Process Structure

26. The BAVA could utilize formal discussions or more informal settings such as roundtables of world cafés. Parties could arrange break-out groups on specific topics, with report backs. Parties should also consider whether to include elements for Heads of Delegation discussions and the timing of discussions. In addition, Parties may usefully consider the following at SB64:
- planning a BAVA high-level event
 - expanding the mandate of the SBs Technical Taskforce to cover all additional elements of the BAVA, which could be addressed in dedicated workshops
 - ensuring synergies and coherence with the work of the AC, LEG, CGE, and the Secretariat by agreeing to adjust their mandates to fully support the BAVA process.
27. In order to get insights on preferred modalities, it could also be helpful to ask Parties as well as non-Party stakeholders for submissions prior to the SB65 (November 2026).

SBs Technical Taskforce

28. At SB64, Parties are likely to consider how to structure and undertake the SBs Technical Taskforce work. Considerations include the composition of members, coordination, type and timing of output(s) and its relation to the BAVA.
- **Membership:** Parties will need to agree on the members of the SBs Technical Taskforce. Additionally, Parties will need to consider whether it should include all or some technical members from the UAE-Belém Work Programme's expert group to ensure continuation of institutional memory and expertise. Parties should ensure coherence and linkages with other frameworks, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (*SDGs*), the Sendai Framework, and the UN Convention on Biodiversity.

Parties should consider whether to nominate/select experts from these frameworks to the SBs Technical Taskforce or instead include them in the outreach from the SBs Technical Task Force. The SBs Technical Task Force experts could be mandated to undertake extensive outreach to ensure the coherence, clarity, user-friendliness, and scientific robustness of the Belém Adaptation Indicators.

Parties will need clarity on the level of involvement of national institutions and experts working on the ground regarding operationalization of the indicators, including at local levels. Parties also need to agree on how to include representatives of Indigenous peoples and local communities.

For the taskforce to be effective and cohesive, Parties could agree on a limit on the number of members. Alternatively, the taskforce could be divided into smaller thematic groups, the way the work under the UAE-Belém Work Programme was organized.

- **Organization of work:** Parties will also need to agree on how the work should be undertaken and coordinated. These considerations include: appointing co-leads/co-facilitators, clarifying the role of the UNFCCC Secretariat, and defining the role and decision-making powers of the SB Chairs. Should the SBs Technical Taskforce itself coordinate the overall process or should this work be tasked to the UNFCCC Secretariat? And how should the SBs be utilized to ensure input and guidance to the work undertaken by the taskforce?
- **Outputs:** Parties will also have to consider the type and the timing of the output(s) to be delivered by the SBs Technical Taskforce, including how and/or whether output(s) should be reviewed and agreed upon. Given the technical nature of this work, it should be noted that Parties will find adopting very detailed spreadsheets or lengthy documents challenging. Therefore, the output could be user friendly and give Parties the necessary information about the metadata and methodologies for the successful implementation of the indicators.

29. Parties could consider whether the taskforce should produce a draft decision text (including an annex) for consideration at CMA9. Parties could also consider mandating guidelines for voluntary use. In addition, Parties could clarify that the taskforce steer clear of the political sensitivities, such as the rules of procedure and the validity of the decision. These issues could instead be considered by Parties during the SBs prior to November 2027. Doing so will ensure greater trust and control of the process and outcome as well as reduce the risk of political backlash.¹⁹

30. Parties should also consider how the BAVA process can complement the ongoing technical work by the SBs and their Technical Task Force on improving metadata and methodologies for the Belém Adaptation Indicators in Parties' adaptation reporting.

GST2

31. Once operationalized, the information through reporting on the Belém Adaptation Indicators will be an important source of input for GST2, supporting a meaningful assessment of global adaptation progress.²⁰

32. Parties can also use the BTRs and other adaptation reporting vehicles to submit relevant information on adaptation progress. The second round of BTRs is due by the end of December 2026. Given the mandate for Parties to test the Belém Adaptation Indicators, Parties can use their BTRs as a means to test the UAE Framework for assessing progress on adaptation.

D. C2ES Resources

- Next Steps for the Belem Adaptation Indicators (March 2026) <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Next-Steps-for-the-Belem-Adaptation-Indicators.pdf>
- What Comes After COP30? A Look at the Global Goal on Adaptation (November 2025) <https://www.c2es.org/2025/11/a-look-at-the-global-goal-on-adaptation-cop30/>
- Considerations for the Progress Assessment of NAPs at COP30 (November 2025) <https://www.c2es.org/document/considerations-for-the-progress-assessment-of-naps-at-cop30/>
- Issues and Options: Centering Adaptation Finance at COP30 (October 2025) <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Center-Adaptation-Finance-at-COP30.pdf>
- Considerations for Selecting Indicators for the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (May 2025) <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250502-C2ES-GGA-indicators-principles-v5.2.pdf>

E. Annex I: Additional Work on the Global Goal on Adaptation

1. Several parallel work processes in addition to the BAVA could influence the content and work of the BAVA, and vice versa. The work includes the:
 - Baku Adaptation Roadmap (**BAR**)
 - Baku high level dialogue on adaptation
 - review of the terms of reference for the UAE Framework (**ToRs**).
2. The **BAR**: At CMA6, Parties launched the BAR to elaborate on elements relevant for progress on the implementation of the GGA and the enhancement of the UAE Framework.²¹ The elements include those listed in paragraph 38 of Decision 2/CMA5 on the GGA; in essence, the following:
 - exchange of knowledge, experience and information related to implementing the UAE Framework
 - identify inputs to the GST and consider how the UAE Framework can be used to assess progress toward the GGA
 - enhance the understanding of risks and impacts arising from different temperature increases across different regions
 - opportunities for building on best available science and collaborate with science organizations on how to facilitate the implementation of the UAE Framework and its targets; to develop indicators, metrics, and methodologies; and to identify adaptation capacity gaps, challenges, and the needs of developing countries
 - develop the ToRs for review of the UAE Framework and timeline for the review.
3. There will be two workshops per year in the first phase of the BAR, from 2026 to 2028. The above elements will be part of the discussion in the workshops.
4. The CMA7 decision sets out additional elements to guide the BAR, including:
 - aligning adaptation action with adequate responses in the context of the Paris Agreement's temperature goal
 - strengthening implementation of the targets under the UAE Framework
 - enhancing knowledge-sharing
 - ensuring access to MOI for adaptation for adequate, predictable and accessible support from developed country Parties to developing country Parties in accordance with Article 9.1 under the Paris Agreement.²²
5. These four elements, and in particular the element that links the GGA with the financial obligations under Article 9.1, were opposed by several Parties who expressed concerns and/or reservations in the closing plenary. Thus, there is currently no consensus on the elements to be discussed under the BAR and Parties have submitted their views for discussion at SB64.
6. It is likely that the BAR will touch upon issues related to questions relevant to the Belem-Addis Vision on Adaptation. However, whether the BAR will be used for in-depth discussions on these elements, including MOI, will be decided at SB64.
7. The UNFCCC Secretariat is also preparing a report is aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement (hereafter called the **UNFCCC Secretariat paper on Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement**).²³
8. **The Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation (Baku high-level dialogue)**: At CMA6, Parties established the Baku high-level dialogue, which will be organized by the current and former COP Presidencies, including the UNFCCC Secretariat, in the margins of the CMA (for example this year the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies this year will convene the Baku high-level dialogue), in order to identify ways to enhance the implementation of the UAE Framework.

9. **ToRs:** At CMA7, the UAE-Belém Work Programme was concluded, and considerations the ToRs for the review the UAE Framework will take place under the SBs in 2026–27.²⁴ The review of the framework itself is scheduled to take place after the GST2 in 2029.²⁵ The Belém Adaptation Indicators will be part of this review. At SB64, Parties are likely to initiate the discussion about the ToRs for the review of the UAE Framework including the indicators adopted in Belém.
10. However, it is not clear whether Parties will be ready to implement the indicators into national planning processes before the review. This leaves the question of which indicators Parties will use, if any, for input to GST2.

F. References

¹ UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter UNFCCC], *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶¶ 5–6 (March 30, 2026), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_19_a02.pdf.

² UNFCCC, Final list of potential indicators, UAE-Belém work programme on indicators, September 9, 2025, <https://unfccc.int/documents/649629>.

³ Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador had raised their flags to try to signal a point of order to voice their concerns before gaveling of the global goal on adaptation decision. The EU, the Environmental Integrity group, Sierra Leone, Canada and Japan were among other Parties that also raised concerns. It is currently not clear which Parties have made reservations to the decision or parts of the decision.

⁴ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶21.

⁵ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶¶ 21–22.

⁶ Center for Climate and Energy Solutions [hereinafter C2ES], *Next Steps for the Belém Adaptation Indicators* (Washington, DC: C2ES, March 2026), <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Next-Steps-for-the-Belém-Adaptation-Indicators.pdf>.

⁷ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 11.

⁸ "Adaptation Committee," UNFCCC, accessed May 27, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/Adaptation-Committee>.

⁹ "Least Developed Countries Expert Group," UNFCCC, accessed May 27, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/LEG>.

¹⁰ "Consultative Group of Experts," UNFCCC, accessed May 27, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/CGE>.

¹¹ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶¶ 11, 12, 21.

¹² "Policy Alignment," Climate.Sustainability-director.org, accessed June 3, 2026, <https://climate.sustainability-directory.com/term/policy-alignment/>.

¹³ There will be many more steps in between that Parties will have to agree on before the indicators will be "required" to be aligned with national policies. In implementing the Paris Agreement nationally, it has to go through democratic processes, including Parliamentary hearings and so on. These processes differ from country to country. The same is true when it comes to internationally developed indicators that are meant to be used for national reporting on national and local adaptation. It will most likely require most countries to undertake national processes to implement these requirements. The work on the guidance could assist with understanding which national policy hurdles are common for many countries when it comes to implementing the indicators.

¹⁴ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶¶ 7, 9.

¹⁵ UNFCCC, *Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation*, Decision 2/CMA.5, ¶¶ 44–45 (March 8, 2022), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2021_10_Add3_E.pdf.

¹⁶ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 14.

¹⁷ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 15.

¹⁸ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶¶ 16.

¹⁹ Timo Leiter, "Operationalizing the Belém Adaptation Indicators" (presentation, C2ES' From Belém to Bonn: Operationalizing the Global Goal on Adaptation Indicators, Virtual, May 28, 2026), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bawy-j6jleo>.

²⁰ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 3/CMA.6, ¶ 7 (March 27, 2025), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024_17a01E.pdf#page=10.

²¹ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 3/CMA.6, ¶ 29. UNFCCC, *Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation*, Decision 2/CMA.5, ¶38.

²² UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 28a–d.

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- ²³ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶129.
²⁴ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 32.
²⁵ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation* Decision 3/CMA.6, ¶138.

