C2ES will be on the ground at COP30 closely tracking key issues. Explore our resources.
C2ES will be on the ground at COP30 closely tracking key issues. Explore our resources.
COP30 will take place in the context of increasing geopolitical tensions and increasing greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts, a retreat from globalization and international cooperation in many countries, and a decrease in funding for international development.
At the same time, COP30 will be the first COP to be held after a full turn of the Paris Agreement’s ambition cycle, following the completion of first global stocktake as well as the submission of biennial transparency reports and new nationally determined contributions. This provides COP30 with an important opportunity to signal a shift toward implementation and enhanced cooperation in the UN climate regime. It is also an important chance to showcase the achievements of the Paris Agreement ten years after it was adopted.
COP30 must pivot from rule-setting to implementation amid a shifting geopolitical landscape. Read our new paper on why it matters.
The implementation of the Paris Agreement demands new ideas for energy and land transitions. This event will explore how to scale sustainable agriculture and mining through regenerative practices, inclusive governance, enhanced international cooperation, and new technologies. C2ES VP for International Strategies, Kaveh Guilanpour will speak alongside high-level representatives from UNFCCC, Brazil’s COP 30 Presidency, CEBRI, Arapyau Institute, IDDRI, and CSDevNet.
This high-level panel will examine the power and promise of the global stocktake: what it has accomplished, how its outcome has been considered by Parties, and what is needed for a robust GST2. Moderated by Kaveh Guilanpour, Vice President of International Strategies at C2ES.
As the world approaches the second global stocktake in 2028 and the conclusion of the 2030 Agenda, the need to align climate action with sustainable development has never been more urgent. This event explores how the UN climate regime can be strategically recalibrated, not reinvented, to drive stronger, more integrated climate-development outcomes to 2030 and beyond.
Bringing together global experts and practitioners, the discussion will examine how NDCs 3.0 can align with the SDGs, how GST2 can better integrate climate-development synergies, and what a post-2030 development agenda might look like. C2ES VP for International Strategies Kaveh Guilanpour will moderate a conversation around practical examples such as nature-based solutions, biodiversity co-benefits, and efforts to halt deforestation, offering forward-looking insights on strengthening cooperation across the climate and development agenda.
This event highlights both the progress achieved, the tasks that lie ahead and acts as the launch event for the Together4Transpency programme at COP30. Launched at COP27 by the UNFCCC, the #Together4Transparency collaborative initiative unites several groups of stakeholders committed to joining forces in the implementation of the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), recognizing that all actors play a role in ensuring the success of the Paris Agreement. VP for International Strategies Kaveh Guilanpour will share remarks.
This side event at COP 30, organized under the frameworks of the Mountain Partnership and the Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023–2027), will highlight the urgent need to integrate mountain priorities into the UNFCCC process. The discussion will focus on ensuring that mountain issues are reflected in key COP 30 outcomes, including indicators of the Global Goal on Adaptation and other UNFCCC mechanisms such as the Biennial Transparency Reports.
C2ES VP for International Strategies, Kaveh Guilanpour will moderate a panel of speakers including H.E. David Forné Massoni, Secretary of State for Energy Transition, Transportation and Mobility of the Government of Andorra, and other high-level representatives from governments, intergovernmental organizations, civil city and mountain experts.
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SOME HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS OVERALL
Parties at COP30, the “COP of Truth,” adopted the “Belém Political Package,” comprising the following decisions:
For many, the outcome fell short on delivering on key issues and outcomes, including roadmaps to: accelerate implementation of the transition away from fossil fuels; halt and reverse deforestation by 2030; and to close the annual funding gap for tropical forest protection and restoration. In the final plenary, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago recognized the disappointment of those Parties and groups and announced that, under the Presidency’s responsibility, he would support work on two roadmaps: (i) on halting and reversing deforestation and (ii) transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly, and equitable manner. He also welcomed Colombia’s April 2026 summit on fossil fuel phase-out and noted that the future COP30 presidency roadmaps will benefit from it.
COP30 also succeeded in adopting a number of other decisions and conclusions, including on:
Australia and Türkïye will uniquely partner to host COP31 on November 9-20, 2026. While physically hosted in the city of Antalya, Türkïye, there will be two President-Designates: Australia will be the president for the negotiations while Türkïye will appoint the High Level Climate Champion and manage the action agenda. The Pacific Islands will host the Pre-COP, the preparatory event for the sessions.
Mutirão Decision
TOP LINE: Parties adopted the Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change decision—the key consensus political outcome from COP30. Parties worked for close to 24 hours straight to reach hard fought compromises — the main sticking points were in relation to the COP30 response to NDC ambition, trade, and finance. Key outcomes from the decision include:
The decision also sets out, in the spirit of restoring trust among Parties and the process as well as leveraging the spirit of mutirão, “a traditional knowledge inherited by the Brazilian society and born from cooperation,” acknowledgements, calls, and invitations, including:
IN MORE DETAIL: The Belém Political Package and eventual Global Mutirão decision avoided an early agenda fight by addressing proposals for four new agenda items in two weeks of rigorous Presidency consultations with Parties. Those proposals focused on: the implementation of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement on finance; responding to the synthesis report on NDCs and addressing the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gap; promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change related trade-restrictive unilateral measures; and the synthesis of biennial transparency reports. The consultations also faced political pressure to respond to the levels of ambition represented by Parties’ new NDCs and the current tense geopolitical moment. The Global Mutirão signals a collective commitment to cooperation and willingness to compromise.
Global Goal on Adaptation
TOP LINE: Parties agreed to a global goal on adaptation (GGA) package. The agreement includes: adopted indicators under the GGA framework; modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap; and a call to launch of the Belém–Addis vision on adaptation–a two year process to further operationalize the indicators. Parties will continue work on indicators at the subsidiary bodies meeting in June 2026 on the basis of the Belém outcome. As set out in the Global Mutirão decision, Parties called for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 to support adaptation.
IN MORE DETAIL: The Belem Adaptation Indicators are a set of 59 indicators that relate to the targets of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. The indicators are: voluntary; non-prescriptive; non-punitive; facilitative; global in nature; respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances; and country-driven. (Several Parties noted that they could not accept the indicators list because they were modified from those set out in the previous experts’ list of indicators.) Parties agreed to improve metadata and methodologies for the Belém Adaptation Indicators and consider them at CMA9 (November 2027). These indicators will play a key role in measuring adaptation progress for the second global stocktake. Their adoption finalizes the architecture for the global goal on adaptation.
Beyond agreeing to the indicators, the GGA agreement includes the modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, which was launched at COP29, and sets out work for the implementation of the UAE Framework targets toward 2030. Parties agreed that the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Road Map, covering 2026–2028, shall focus on initial implementation of activities regarding implementation of the framework and knowledge exchange through two workshops each year.
Just Transition Work Programme
TOP LINE: In theUAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) decision, Parties agreed to develop a just transition mechanism to enable just transitions and enhance: international cooperation; technical assistance; and capacity building and knowledge sharing. Parties and non-Party stakeholders (NPS) are invited to present their views on the mechanism by March 15, 2026. Parties requested the subsidiary bodies at SB64 (June 2026) to recommend a draft decision in order to operationalize the just transition mechanism at COP31. Parties further requested the subsidiary bodies to develop the terms of reference for the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the JTWP at SB64 (June 2027).
Parties also requested the secretariat to map and prepare a synthesis report on relevant instruments, initiatives and processes under the Convention and Paris Agreement. Parties recognized key messages from the JTWP dialogues and invited Parties and NPS to consider them in designing and implementing just transition pathways. Constituted bodies were invited to integrate just transition elements and outcomes in existing workplans to promote synergies. The JTWP was invited to integrate the outcomes of the first global stocktake relevant to just transition. The JTWP will be reviewed in 2026 at COP31.
IN MORE DETAIL: A decision on the JTWP was due to be adopted at COP29. Parties had disagreed on options for new institutional arrangements for the JTWP, including: a mechanism to enhance international cooperation and enable just transition; an action plan to foster just transition; a policy toolbox for translating just transition principles into national strategies; and/or guidance for UNFCCC constituted bodies on how to implement just transition in their work. Parties also clashed over references to: “unilateral trade-restrictive climate measures” (including a proposal for a dialogue); supply chains, critical/transition minerals, and fossil fuels (including inefficient subsidies).
Mitigation Work Programme
TOP LINE: Parties adopted a decision on the mitigation work programme (MWP) that sends key messages from its global dialogues and investment focused events on forests and the waste sector, including circular economy approaches. Messages include highlighting sustainable development synergies three times—while emphasizing that no solution fits all contexts and addressing the key findings is voluntary. The decision calls for submissions on topics to be discussed in future global dialogues, to which some Parties objected on the basis that the topics of the dialogues for 2026 had already been agreed.
The decision requests the secretariat to: organize future global dialogues and investment focused events to: enhance inclusive participation; increase the number of in-person participants from each Party; and enhance the cooperative matchmaking function of the investment-focused events by inviting more financiers to participate and organizing the events in conjunction with other major investment events.
The decision encourages Parties to record projects identified under the MWP in the Non-Market Approaches (NMA) Platform. Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to make submissions on opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers relevant to the continuation, functioning and effectiveness of the work programme, with a view to discussing them in June 2026.
IN MORE DETAIL: The MWP was established at COP26 (2021) to accelerate ambition and implementation in this critical decade in a manner that complements the global stocktake. It is the only item on the formal agenda specifically dedicated to addressing mitigation. MWP negotiations in 2024 were unable to overcome political divergences and adopted a procedural COP29 decision that sent no specific signals on mitigation action. In negotiations at COP30, Parties continued to clash over how and whether to send messages on mitigation action from its global dialogues and investment focused events; and whether to reference the global stocktake. They also diverged on: topics for the 2026 dialogues; how to improve the work programme, including whether to take up proposals to create a dedicated mitigation digital platform to enhance the programme’s matchmaking function; and whether or not to launch a process to review the work programme in advance of COP31. The MWP is expected to close, with the possibility of extension, in 2026.
Global Stocktake
TOP LINE: Parties agreed to launch the UAE Dialogue on implementing the outcomes of the global stocktake, which will facilitate the sharing of experience and of information on opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs, including key enablers, such as the means of implementation and strengthened international cooperation, in implementing the global stocktake outcomes. The UAE Dialogue will be held at SB64 (June 2026) and SB66 (June 2027) before concluding. Summary reports of each dialogue will serve as inputs to the global stocktake. Parties, observers, and other non-Party stakeholders are encouraged to make submissions three months before each dialogue. The decision also establishes a high level ministerial dialogue to be conducted at CMA9 (November 2027).
IN MORE DETAIL: The global stocktake outcome at COP28 established a dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes, which had been due to be operationalized at COP29. While the decision paragraphs establishing the Dialogue are general, they are situated within the finance section of the COP28 decision, resulting in deep divergence between Parties as to what the focus of the Dialogue should be, delaying its launch. Parties were further divided over whether the UAE Dialogue, which was set to conclude in 2028, should overlap with the final phase of the global stocktake process, which will end in 2028.
TOPLINE: Parties agreed to ask the scientific community, the global stocktake co-facilitators, and the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies to consider or guide keyrefinements to the second global stocktake. The scientific community was invited to provide best available inputs to feed into the global stocktake and consider how to do so in a timely manner, as available. Parties encouraged the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue to enhance consideration of loss and damage, response measures, and international cooperation in the global stocktake’s thematic areas. The Subsidiary Body Chairs were invited to ensure sufficient time for each phase of the global stockstake, including intersessional work, taking into account lessons learned from the first global stocktake and the constraints and limited capacity of Parties and other stakeholders.
IN MORE DETAIL: The COP28 global stocktake decision called for Parties to consider refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process based on experience from the first global stocktake (the second global stocktake will take place from 2026-2028). Parties have been considering refinements since June 2024. Parties had been unable to agree on procedural and logistical elements, as well as whether to request the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as a critical source of “best available science,” to align its Assessment Report cycle (typically seven–nine years,) with the global stocktake’s five-year cycle. Other unresolved issues included: the timeline of the second global stocktake; whether the technical and political phases of the global stocktake overlap; and the length of the political phase.
TOP LINE: Parties considered and adopted conclusions on the2024 and 2025 reports on the annual global stocktake dialogue. The conclusions encourage Parties to draw on the lessons learned and good practices from the 2024 and 2025 summary reports on the annual global stocktake dialogues at the next and final dialogue at SB64 (June 2026), at which it will conclude. Parties will consider the resumption of the dialogue in its consideration of the outcome of the second global stocktake (2028).
IN MORE DETAIL: The global stocktake decision establishes an “annual global stocktake dialogue” to “facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practice on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of Parties’ next NDCs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement.” It was held in June 2024 and June 2025. The secretariat has prepared reports for 2024 and 2025 annual global stocktake dialogues for consideration by Parties. However, Parties had not been able to agree on: whether to set out messages and substantive elements from the reports or whether and when the Dialogue should continue or conclude.
Biennial communications related Article 9.5 on projected finance
TOP LINE: Parties agreed on an update to the types of information to include in biennial reportson their projected financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties per Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement. The reporting guidance, last agreed in 2018, was updated to include information on national circumstances and limitations, as well as relevant methodologies and assumptions used to project levels of climate finance. The reporting guidance will next be reviewed at CMA11 (2029).
IN MORE DETAIL: Developed country Parties are required to report information on projected public finance regularly, with other countries that provide resources are encouraged to communicate the information voluntarily.
The Paris Agreement Article 2, paragraph 1(c) on financial alignment
TOP LINE: Parties extended a dialogue on Article 2.1(c)—which calls for making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and its complementarity with Article 9. This decision established the three-year Veredas Dialogue and its high-level Xingu Finance Talks. Parties requested the COP Presidency convene an annual high-level round table to exchange views among interested stakeholders on the challenges and opportunities of implementing Article 2.1(c). The decision also recognizes safeguards on the implementation related to financial alignment, noting that any efforts to make finance flows consistent with the Paris Agreement’s goals are nationally determined, facilitative, non-punitive and non-prescriptive, among other protections.
IN MORE DETAIL: Parties have been discussing these issues since the inception of the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue in 2023, and the outcome at COP30 builds on the recommendations laid out in thereport on the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue from 2023-2025. The Veredas Dialogue and Xingu Finance Talks will consider the challenges and opportunities presented by Article 2.1(c), though more specific objectives for the meetings were not able to be agreed. Parties also recognized that there is no common interpretation of the scope of Article 2.1(c) or the manner of its implementation. Without extension, discussions related to Article 2.1(c) would have ended after 2025.
Technology Implementation Programme
TOP LINE: Parties adopted a nine-year Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), to conclude in 2034 with the possibility of extension, taking into account the third global stocktake. Parties decided that the TIP shall contribute to the urgent action needed to limit temperature increase to 1.5˚C above pre-industrial levels and be implemented on the basis of principles of the technology framework and the provisions of the Paris agreement in support of the implementation of Parties NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS—noting their importance in implementing the GST outcomes. Its annual reports will feed into the periodic assessments of the Technology Mechanism (TM) as well as the global stocktakes.
The COP30 decision set out elements for the TIP and requested the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), and joint work programmes of the TM to incorporate those elements into their workplans. It also requests: the CTCN to undertake demand-driven capacity building efforts in support of their implementation; the TEC and CTCN to convene annual dialogues, beginning in 2027, on addressing challenges to implementing the technology priorities of developing countries and challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the TM; and CTCN, in collaboration with the TEC, to convene regional dialogues. Parties agreed to convene a high-level ministerial dialogue on technology development and transfer in 2028.
IN MORE DETAIL: The TIP was established by the GST at COP28 (2023) to (i) strengthen support of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and (ii) address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the TM. For two years, Parties struggled to find consensus on how to operationalize the TIP, with a range of ideas of what its scope, timeline, relationship to the global stocktake, and relationship to the existing technology architecture under the UNFCCC should have been.
Gender Action Plan
TOP LINE: Parties adopted a nine-year Belém Gender Action Plan, structured around five priority areas: capacity-building, knowledge management, and communication; gender-balance, participation, and women’s leadership; coherence; gender-responsive means of implementation; and monitoring and reporting. The decision recognizes that the GAP may inform Parties as a tool for implementing climate action, and that pathways and approaches should be nationally determined.
Many of the activities under the new GAP are similar to those agreed under theprevious GAP. Some changes and additions include, but are not limited to:
The Belém GAP aligns its timelines and reviews with that of the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender. Both will run through 2034 and be reviewed in 2029.
IN MORE DETAIL: The Belém GAP is the third iteration of a GAP under the UNFCCC and the implementing plan for the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender, which Parties agreed to extend at COP29. However, Parties were unable to reach a decision on the GAP until COP30. The outcome reflects compromises amongst Parties on key sticking points related to finance and gender language.
National Adaptation Plans
TOP LINE: Parties agreed to the progress assessment for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans (NAPs). The decision acknowledged the financial gaps that developing countries face and the barriers to the effective and timely implementation of NAPs. Parties requested the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to look at how countries are integrating different climate approaches into their NAPs. The next progress assessment for the formulation and implementation of NAPs will take place at COP35 (2030).
IN MORE DETAIL: The first global stocktake called for Parties to have their NAPs in place by 2025 and have them implemented by 2030. So far, 68 countries have submitted NAPs. With Parties unable to reach consensus due to differences over finance for NAP implementation, the progress assessment for the formulation and implementation of NAPs was postponed from COP29 to COP30.
Loss and Damage
TOP LINE: Parties adopted the 2025 joint annual report of the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage Executive Committee (WIM ExCom) and the Santiago Network (SN). Parties welcomed the progress of the WIM ExCom and SN this year but took note of the report.
Parties also adopted the Report of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) and welcomed the pledges made by Governments of Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg and Spain, and the government of the Walloon Region of Belgium to the FRLD. The FRLD established a replenishment cycle for its resource mobilization. Parties agreed on the access modalities for the FRLD, including direct access for all developing countries, and referencing the entirety of the NCQG on climate finance.
Parties agreed to adopt thethird review of the WIMand to publish a regular report on loss and damage to be considered at future sessions. The review of the WIM considered: enhancing implementation; coordination and coherence; accessibility and outreach; finance and other support. Parties also welcomed the additional pledge made of 1 million Swiss francs to the SN by Switzerland, in addition to the 2 million Swiss francs pledged for the implementation of the WIM. Parties also recognized the importance of enhancing complementarity and coherence between the FRLD, SN, and WIM.
IN MORE DETAIL: The joint annual report of the WIM ExCom and SN is produced every year and includes recommendations from the ExCom and SN Advisory Board on their scopes of work. Parties diverged on whether to welcome or take note of the findings of the report.
Following agreement to a fund at COP27 and the establishment of the FRLD at COP28, Parties at COP30 further informed the FRLD’s work, including welcoming the Board’s decision to launch the first replenishment of the Fund in 2027. The FRLD also welcomed the submission of proposals at COP30 to begin financing the first projects for addressing loss and damage in 2026.
Parties first considered the third review of the WIM at COP29 (November 2024) and deferred its consideration to COP30. Parties have diverged on: language addressing finance; NDCs; the global stocktake and the recent International Court of JusticeAdvisory Opinion on climate change. The new report on synthesizing information from Parties and other stakeholders on critical issues and lessons learned, best practices, solutions and policy advice in relation to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change will help inform national policy development.
Article 6 on Carbon Markets
TOP LINE: TheArticle 6.4 decision extended the deadline from December 2025 to June 2026 for host countries to approve the transition of activities from the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). The extension allowed Parties to agree on the transfer of USD 26.8 million from the CDM to fund the PACM until the latter becomes self-financing. Parties requested the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM) to strengthen its stakeholder consultation process. Parties will consider, as part of the review of rules, modalities, and procedures for the PACM, provisions related to the membership terms of the Supervisory Body.
IN MORE DETAIL: The PACM establishes a centralized framework for Parties to issue, use and trade carbon credits. As the SBM continues to operationalize the PACM, Parties and non-Party stakeholders (NPS) are invited to provide continuous feedback on its work, including itsannual report, which the decision welcomed. The COP30 outcome is a result of acknowledging the mismatch between the mandate and reality: the transition deadline for credits from the Kyoto Protocol was established at COP26 but Article 6 was only fully operationalized at COP29 and host Parties are still readying their carbon markets’ strategies. A December 2025 transition deadline for credits would have limited the number of those credits eligible for use under Article 6, while also making CDM funds readily available to be used by a currently underfunded PACM. In negotiations, Party views had diverged on: methodological issues; revision of the SBM’s baseline and permanencestandards; prioritizing methodological developments around scaled up/sectoral/jurisdictional approaches to address risks of emissions leakage; and ways for host countries to benefit from the establishment of buffer pools (whereby a certain percentage of credits have to be aside to compensate for reversals due to, for example, forest fires).
TOP LINE: TheArticle 6.2 decision requested the Article 6 technical expert review teams to explain their findings regarding any inconsistencies in the reporting of cooperative approaches and provide recommendations on how to resolve them. Parties asked the secretariat to provide capacity building, including through relevant training materials, in those areas where inconsistencies are identified. Parties requested the secretariat to provide further guidance to assist Parties in reporting on the implementation of cooperative approaches, including on how to include information on voluntary contributions of resources to adaptation and delivery of overall mitigation in global emissions (which are compulsory under Article 6.4). The decision also welcomes the 2025 progress report and the first completed reviews on cooperative approaches by the technical expert review teams.
IN MORE DETAIL: Article 6.2 sets out the accounting rules for cooperative approaches involving the exchange of carbon credits as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). As of November 15, the UNFCCC received information on 39 cooperative approaches and information on 24 authorizations as at 15 November 2025. In negotiations, Parties highlighted the need for the secretariat to provide more capacity building on different aspects of the guidance, including authorizations, as part of the Article 6.2 capacity building programme (mentioned in decision2/CMA.3, paragraph 12).
TOP LINE: Thedecision on non-market approaches (NMA) under Article 6.8 sets out further guidance on the work of the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approachesin implementing the Article 6.8 work program. The decision requests the secretariat to continue providing capacity building on NMAs and improve the user experience of the NMA Platform by adding new categories, including ecosystems and more sectors, to help users filter across NMAs. The decision invites Parties to record more NMAs onto the Platform. As of November 13, three NMAs have been recorded onto the Platform; 106 national focal points have been nominated; and 31 support providers listed. It also invites Parties to consider national processes for identifying and selecting NMAs. Moreover, it invites Parties and non-Party stakeholders to use the online forum to exchange knowledge and provide support in the design and implementation of NMAs.
IN MORE DETAIL: Article 6.8 establishes a framework for collaborative NMAs to support Parties in achieving their NDC targets through holistic mitigation approaches that include adaptation, technology transfer, finance, and capacity building–but do not involve carbon credits. Parties had diverged on guidance to help identify NMA for NDC implementation, including measuring the mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development impacts of NMA. Parties also diverged on whether to include, for the 2026 meetings of the Glasgow Committee, the topic of how NMA could help address the adverse impacts of “climate change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures.”
Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings
TOP LINE: Parties concluded discussions on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, which considers issues such as efficiency of the UNFCCC process and who will host future COPs. The conclusions express Parties’ appreciation that Ethiopia will host COP32.
IN MORE DETAIL: Parties at COP30 built ontext agreed in June, reflecting efforts to make the UNFCCC process more efficient and inclusive. These efforts include inviting Parties to pursue efficiency in their work and requesting the Secretariat to continue to cluster mandated events where feasible and ensuring they be appropriately budgeted. A number of Parties expressed their frustration that more progress was not made on this issue at COP30. Parties will continue consideration of efforts to increase the efficiency of the UNFCCC process at SBI64 (June 2026).
Mountains and Climate Change
TOP LINE: Parties agreed to host a dialogue to be held in Bonn in June 2026 on mountains on climate change. The dialogue will, inter alia, address the question of whether to establish an annual dialogue. The authors of the summary report for the June Dialogue, which will be presented at COP31, will also address that question.
IN MORE DETAIL: In response to a proposed new agenda item on mountains and climate change, some Parties asked for an annual dialogue on mountains modeled after the annual oceans dialogue, saying that mountain ecosystems and communities are disproportionately affected by climate change. Climate change impacts affect not only mountain communities but also those downstream.
Agriculture
TOP LINE: Parties adopted conclusions for the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food securitythat reflected on the workshop on systemic and holistic approaches to climate action on agriculture, food systems and food security from SB62 (June 2025). Parties agreed to continue work at SB64 (June 2026).
IN MORE DETAIL: The Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security is a four-year joint work under the Subsidiary Bodies to enhance action on agriculture and food security by knowledge sharing, consideration of reports and organization of workshops. It is an agenda item under the Subsidiary Bodies.
Future Sessions
Parties adopted a decision on dates and venues of future sessions that agrees:
SOME HIGHLIGHTS FROM OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS