International

Climate change is a global challenge and requires a global solution. Through analysis and dialogue, the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions is working with governments and stakeholders to identify practical and effective options for the post-2012 international climate framework. Read more

 

Comparison Chart: International Provisions in Climate and Energy Legislation in the 111th Congress

The following table compares the international provisions detailed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey), the International Climate Change Investment Act (Kerry), and the American Power Act (Kerry-Lieberman).

 

 

Program Category

Design Element

American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454, as passed by the House)

International Climate Change Investment Act of 2009 (S.2835, as introduced)

American Power Act (discussion draft, 5/12/2010)

International Negotiations

Findings and Purposes

  • Calls for constructive engagement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and for all major emitting countries to contribute equitably to global greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions
  • Includes a Sense of Congress encouraging the development of a global framework for regulating GHG emissions from civil aircraft
  • Recognizes the strengths of the UNFCCC as a primary forum for agreement on global climate change
  • Recognizes Article 4 of the UNFCCC calling for developed countries to provide assistance to developing countries
  • Requires the Secretary of State to submit annual report to Congress describing the progress made toward reaching an international agreement in which:
    • Developed countries commit to an economy-wide emission reduction or limitation;
    • Major emerging economies commit to actions which result in substantial, quantified reductions from business as usual(BAU) consistent with achieving 2050 global emission reductions goals;
    • Developed countries and major emerging economies commit to participate in robust measurement, reporting and verification procedures relating to their internationally registered domestic actions; and,
    • There is a mechanism through which parties to the agreement can address cases of non-compliance with obligations
  • Calls on the United States to lead the global community in combating the threat of climate change and reach a robust international agreement under the UNFCCC or a successor agreement; states that it is  critical to engage other countries in an international effort to mitigate climate change
  • States it is U.S. policy to establish binding agreements, including sectoral agreements, committing all major GHG-emitting nations to contribute equitably to the reduction of GHG emissions.
    • Requires the President to inform trading partners of this policy, request appropriate action to limit GHG emissions from partners, and inform partners of the potential applicability of international reserve allowance requirements (described later)
  •  Includes a Sense of the Senate encouraging the development of a global framework for regulating GHG emissions from civil aircraft

Relation to Domestic Emissions Reduction

Linking of emission trading systems

  • Allows unlimited use of allowances from approved, comparable national or sectoral trading systems (i.e. scheme that applies an absolute tonnage limit) for compliance
  • The Administrator  of the EPA may, by rule, change the percentage of a firm’s compliance obligation that can be met with international allowances
  • A covered entity may hold an international emission allowance in lieu of an emission allowance
  • Not specified
  • Allows use of international allowances from a qualifying international program (i.e., run by a national or supranational foreign government, imposes a mandatory absolute tonnage limit and is at least as stringent as the U.S. program) for compliance
  • A covered entity may hold an international emission allowance in lieu of an emission allowance

Relation to Domestic Emission Reduction

Competitiveness and emissions leakage

  • 2% of allowance value to eligible energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries in 2012-2013, increasing to 15% 2014-2025. President assesses whether to continue or phase out (decreasing by 10% per year) after 2025. Allowances will be used to provide compensation for both direct and indirect compliance costs, on a product output basis
  • Beginning in 2020, unless a binding international agreement is in effect that requires all major emitters to contribute equitably to reducing GHGs and addresses imbalances in competitiveness, importers would have to purchase international reserve allowances to cover emissions associated with imported covered goods in energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors
  • The reserve program would be established automatically unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest and Congress concurs  
  • It would not apply if at least 85 percent of imports in a given sector are from countries that: have emission targets as stringent as the US; are parties to a sectoral agreement; or have energy or GHG intensities in that sector not higher than in the US. It would also not apply to imports from least developed countries (LDC)
  • State Department and U.S. Trade Representative are required to prepare, publish, and publicize a yearly report on whether China and India have enacted GHG emission standards at least as strict as those of this Act
  • Any measures to combat leakage should be consistent with World Trade Organization rules
  • Allowance value used to compensate energy intensive trade-exposed industries
  • Secretary of State, working with the Strategic Interagency Board, required to prepare a biannual interagency report on climate change and energy policy for the 5 highest GHG emitting countries not in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  (OECD)
  • Requires submission of reports by relevant federal agencies  to the Strategic Interagency Board on Planning on International Climate Change Investments assessing whether any assistance undermined the protection of intellectual property rights for clean technology
  • 2% of allowance value to eligible energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries in 2012-2013, increasing to 15% 2014-2025. President assesses whether to continue or phase out (decreasing by 10% per year) after 2025. Allowances will be used to provide compensation for both direct and indirect compliance costs, on a product output basis
  • Beginning in 2020, unless a binding international agreement is in effect that requires all major emitters to contribute equitably to reducing GHGs and addresses imbalances in competitiveness, importers would have to purchase international reserve allowances to cover emissions associated with imported covered goods in energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors
  • The reserve program would be established automatically unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest and Congress concurs.  
  • It would not apply if at least 85 percent of imports in a given sector are from countries that: have emission targets as stringent as the US; are parties to a sectoral agreement; or have energy or GHG intensities in that sector not higher than in the US. It would also not apply to imports from least developed countries (LDC)
  • State Department and U.S. Trade Representative are required to prepare, publish, and publicize a yearly report on whether China and India have enacted GHG emission standards at least as strict as those of this Act
  • Any measures to combat leakage should be consistent with World Trade Organization rules
  • Allowance value used to compensate energy intensive trade-exposed industries

Direct International Support

Federal Oversight Board

  • Establishes an International Climate Change Adaptation Program under the supervision of the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
  • The Strategic Interagency Board on Planning on International Climate Change Investments is established to assess, monitor, and evaluate the progress and contributions of relevant departments and agencies of the U.S. government in supporting funding for international climate change activities and efforts and the goals and objectives on the UNFCCC
  • The Board is composed of the Secretaries of Energy, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, the Administrators of EPA and USAID, and such other relevant officials as the President may designate
  • The Strategic Interagency Board on Planning on International Climate Change Investments is established to assess, monitor, and evaluate the progress and contributions of relevant departments and agencies of the U.S. government in supporting funding for international climate change activities and efforts and the goals and objectives on the UNFCC
  • The Board is composed of the Secretaries of Energy, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, the Administrators of EPA and USAID, and such other relevant officials as the President may designate
  • Establishes an International Climate Change Adaptation and Global Security Program, which is headed by the Secretary of State

Direct International Support

Funding

  • International Adaptation program (described later) allocations:
  • 1% of the total of emission allowances for 2012-2021, 2% 2022-2026, 4% 2027-2050
  • International Clean Technology Deployment program (described later) allocations:
  • 1% of the total of emission allowances for 2012-2021, 2% 2022-2026, 4% 2027-2050
  • Administrator to consider, as appropriate, multi-year funding arrangements (Source or scale of funding not specified)
  • International Adaptation and Global Security program (described later) allocations are:
  • 0.75% of the total of emission allowances for 2019-2020, 1.1% 2021, 1.6% 2022-2025, 1.75% 2026
  • 2% of the total of emission allowances for 2027, 2.5% 2028, 2.75% 2029, 3% 2030-2034

Direct International Support

International Offsets

  • 1 billion tons of international offsets are allowed for compliance in the emission reduction program
  • This level may be increased to 1.5 billion tons with Presidential determination
  • Beginning in 2018, 1.25 international offset credits must be submitted for each equivalent allowance
  • Sectoral crediting for absolute sector-wide reductions, avoidance or sequestration in eligible countries/sectors identified by the Administrator as having high emissions, a relatively high GDP, and the comparable sector is covered under U.S. compliance obligation
  • Administrator may allow offset credits from developing countries issued by an international body established under the UNFCCC. After 2016, for sectors in countries identified by the Administrator mentioned as above, only sectoral crediting will be allowed
  • National and sub-national crediting (at the state, province, or project level where appropriate). Sub-national crediting phased out in 2017, except for activities in least developed countries, where sub-national crediting  may be extended up to 8 years
  • Administrator has discretion to include forest soil carbon and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands
  • International offset credits and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) tons must come from countries with which the United States has either a bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement on these issues
  • Not specified
  • 0.5 billion  tons of international offsets are allowed for compliance in the emissions reduction program
  • This level may be increased to 1 billion tons with Administrator determination
  • Beginning in 2018, 1.25 international offset credits must be submitted for each equivalent allowance Sectoral crediting for absolute sector-wide reductions in sectors/countries identified by the Administrator as having comparatively high GHG emissions, comparatively greater levels of economic development and of that sector has been in the United States, it would be subject to a compliance obligation
  • Administrator may allow international offset credits issued by an international body established under the UNFCCC that meet certain conditions. After 2016, for sectors in countries identified by the Administrator mentioned as above, only sectoral crediting will be allowed
  • National and sub-national crediting (at the state, province, or project level where appropriate). Sub-national crediting phased out in 2017, except for activities in least developed countries, where sub-national crediting  may be extended up to 8 years
  • Administrator has discretion to include forest soil carbon and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands
  • International offset credits and REDD)tons must come from countries with which the United States has either a bilateral or multilateral agreement or arrangement on these issues

Direct International Support

Adaptation support

  • Establishes International Climate Change Adaptation Program within USAID; 1% of allowances from 2012-2021; 2% from 2022-2026; and 4% from 2027
  • The allowances shall be distributed in the form of bilateral assistance, multilateral assistance, or some combination of the two, to help developing countries adapt
  • Not later than 180 days after enactment, the Administrator shall submit an initial report to the President and Congress that identifies the developing countries, including the most vulnerable communities and the populations of such communities, that are most vulnerable and in which assistance may have the greatest and most sustainable benefit in reducing vulnerability to climate change
  • Provide at least 40% and up to 60% of the assistance available  to carry out the International Climate Change Adaptation and Global Security Program to one or more eligible multilateral funds or international organizations Bilateral support may be provided:
    • For the development of national or regional climate change adaptation plans; programs and activities to support the development of associated national policies; planning, financing, and execution of adaptation programs and activities
    • To support investments, capacity building activities and other assistance
    • To support climate change adaptation research
    • To support the deployment of technologies
    • To encourage the engagement of local communities, and
    • To carry out other programs and activities as appropriate
  • Not more than 10% of bilateral assistance made available in any year may be distributed to support activities in any single country 
  • Establishes a International Climate Change Adaptation and Global Security Program to provide new and additional assistance to most vulnerable developing countries:
    • To support the development and implementation of climate change adaptation programs and activities that reduce vulnerability and increase the resilience for communities to climate change impacts,
    • In a manner that protects and promotes the national security, foreign policy, environmental, and economic interests of the US
  • Not later than 180 days after enactment, the Administrator shall submit an initial report to the President and Congress that identifies the developing countries, including the most vulnerable communities and the populations of such communities, that are most vulnerable and in which assistance may have the greatest and most sustainable benefit in reducing vulnerability to climate change
  • Provide at least 40% and up to 60% of the assistance available  to carry out the International Climate Change Adaptation and Global Security Program to one or more eligible multilateral funds or international organizations Bilateral support may be provided:
    • For the development of national or regional climate change adaptation plans; programs and activities to support the development of associated national policies; planning, financing, and execution of adaptation programs and activities
    • To support investments, capacity building activities and other assistance
    • To support climate change adaptation research
    • To support the deployment of technologies
    • To encourage the engagement of local communities, and
    • To carry out other programs and activities as appropriate
  • Not more than 10% of bilateral assistance made available in any year may be distributed to support activities in any single country.
  • Administrator to consider, as appropriate, multi-year funding arrangements, particularly if the risk of political, economic, or social instability due to climate change impacts poses a threat to the national security of the US; or, to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to climate change impacts in the context of carrying out long-term development objectives
  • Establishes an International Climate Change Adaptation and Global Security Program within USAID; 0.75% of emission allowances allocated to international adaptation in 2019, increasing to 3% in 2034
  • The allowances shall be distributed in the form of bilateral assistance, multilateral assistance, or some combination of the two, to help developing countries adapt
  • At least 40% and up to 60% of the assistance available will be used to carry out the International Climate Change Adaptation and Global Security Program through one or more eligible multilateral funds or international organizations Bilateral support may be provided:
  • For the development of national or regional climate change adaptation plans; programs and activities to support the development of associated national policies; planning, financing, and execution of adaptation programs and activities
    • To support investments, capacity building activities and other assistance
    • To support climate change adaptation research
    • To support the deployment of technologies
    • To encourage the engagement of local communities, and
    • To carry out other programs and activities as appropriate 

Direct International Support

REDD support

  • 5% of allowance value from 2012-2025, 3% from 2026 - 2030, and 2% from 2031-2050 dedicated to reduce deforestation and degradation, build capacity and forest conservation (where vulnerable to international leakage) activities in developing countries
  • Goal of achieving supplemental reductions of at least 720 million tons in 2020, and at least 6 billion tons cumulatively by 2025
  • Administrator shall modify allowance value (5%) as necessary to achieve the supplemental reductions goal
  • The Administrator is required to promulgate standards to ensure that reductions in deforestation are additional, measurable, verifiable, permanent, and monitored, and that they account for leakage and uncertainty
  • These standards require the establishment of a deforestation baseline that is national in scope, takes into consideration the average annual historical deforestation rates of the country during a period of at least 5 years and other factors to ensure additionality, establishes a trajectory that will result in zero gross deforestation no later than 20 years after the baseline is established, is designed to account for all significant sources of GHGs from deforestation in the country, and can be adjusted over time
  • Administrator has discretion to include forest soil carbon and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands
  • Proceeds from strategic reserve auctions used to buy forest carbon tons
  • Forest carbon tons eligible as international offset credits
  • Establishes a program within two years after the date of enactment to provide assistance to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation in developing countries, build capacity to reduce deforestation at the national level (including preparing countries to participate in international offset markets), and forest conservation activities in developing countries. Administrator has discretion to expand to include forest soil carbon and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands
  • Goal of achieving emissions reductions of at least 720 million tons in 2020, and at least 6 billion tons cumulatively by 2026, and additional reductions in subsequent years. Reported in a publically accessible registry
  • Eligible countries are those determined by the administrator to be experiencing or are at risk of deforestation or degradation; to have legal regimes, standards and safeguards in place to ensure the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities are protected; and has entered into a bilateral or multilateral arrangement agreement or arrangement with the US (except when a country may receive assistance to build capacity in order to meet the above requirements)
  • National and sub-national activities. After 8 years, determination by the Administer on continued assistance for sub-national activities, with provision for support for an additional 5 years  
  • The Administrator is required to establish an International Deforestation Reduction Program Insurance Account for Noncompletion or Reversal of GHG emissions that were not, or are no longer, sequestered, and may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a portion of the support allocated
  • Establishes a program to provide assistance to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation, build capacity, preserve existing forest carbon stocks, and reduce vulnerability and increase resilience in forest -dependent communities in developing countries
  • Funds made available (source or scale not specified) to achieve goal of supplemental reductions of at least 720 million tons in 2020, and at least 6 billion tons cumulatively by 2025 and additional reductions in subsequent years
  • The Administrator is required to promulgate standards to ensure that reductions in deforestation are additional, measurable, verifiable, permanent, and monitored, and that they account for leakage and uncertainty
  • These standards require the establishment of a deforestation baseline that is national in scope, takes into consideration the average annual historical deforestation rates of the country during a period of at least 5 years and other factors to ensure additionality, establishes a trajectory that will result in zero gross deforestation no later than 20 years after the baseline is established, is designed to account for all significant sources of GHGs from deforestation in the country, and can be adjusted over time
  • Administrator has discretion to include forest soil carbon and degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands
  • Proceeds from strategic reserve auctions used to buy forest carbon tons
  • Forest carbon tons eligible as international offset credits

Direct International Support

Assistance for Clean Technology Activities

  • Establishes International Clean Technology Fund, 1% of allowances from 2012-2021; 2% from 2022-2026; and 4% from 2027-2050. Eligible countries are developing countries that have entered into an international agreement under  which the countries agree to have national policies to measure, report, and verify changes in GHG emissions.
  • The President is required to establish an Interagency group to administer the distribution of International Clean Technology Deployment  allowances
  • Qualifying clean technology activities include:
    • Assistance in retrofitting existing electric generating units or large industrial sources with CCS technologies or the incremental cost of purchasing and installing such technologies at new facilities;
    • The deployment of renewable electricity generation from wind, solar, sustainably produced biomass and biochar systems, geothermal, marine, or hydrokinetic sources;
    • Substantial increases in the efficiency of electricity transmission, distribution, and consumption;
    • Deployment of low- or zero emissions technologies that are facing financial or other barriers to their widespread deployment;
    • Reduction in transportation sector emissions through increased transportation system and vehicle efficiency or use of transportation fuels that have life cycle greenhouse gas emissions that are substantially lower than those attributable to fossil fuel-based alternatives;
    • Reduction in black carbon emissions; and
    • Capacity building activities
  • Authorizes the Secretary of State, or other federal Agency head that the President designates, to provide assistance, through the distribution of allowances for activities that occur in eligible countries
  • Allowances shall be distributed to multilateral funds or institutions, for bilateral assistance, or for a combination of the above mechanisms
  • Establish the International Clean Energy Deployment Program, Expert Panel on Technology Deployment and an interagency group, to provide assistance to qualifying entities to carry out qualifying clean technology activities in eligible countries, and leverage private resources
  • An eligible country is a most vulnerable developing country that:
    • Has entered into an international agreement to which the US is a party,
    • Agrees to take nationally appropriate mitigation actions to achieve substantial reductions, sequestration, or avoidance relative to BAU, to produce measurable, reportable, and verifiable GHG emissions mitigation or is determined to be capable of measurement, reporting and verification,
    • And the President determines meets other criteria, including robust compliance with and enforcement of intellectual property rights
  • Qualifying clean technology activities include:
    • Assistance in retrofitting existing electric generating units or large industrial sources with CCS technologies or the incremental cost of purchasing and installing such technologies at new facilities;
    • The deployment of renewable electricity generation from wind, solar, sustainably produced biomass and biochar systems, geothermal, marine, or hydrokinetic sources;
    • Substantial increases in the efficiency of electricity transmission, distribution, and consumption;
    • Deployment of low- or zero emissions technologies that are facing financial or other barriers to their widespread deployment;
    • Reduction in transportation sector emissions through increased transportation system and vehicle efficiency or use of transportation fuels that have life cycle greenhouse gas emissions that are substantially lower than those attributable to fossil fuel-based alternatives;
    • Reduction in black carbon emissions; and
    • Capacity building activities
  • Assistance shall be distributed bilaterally or to multilateral funds or institutions under the UNFCCC or a combination. No more than 15% of bilateral funding in any year may be used to support activities in a single country
  • Establishes a Reserve Fund for LDCs by annually holding 15% of assistance in reserve for access by least developed countries with GHG emissions below 0.5 percent of global emissions
  • If the President determines that a multilateral agreement has been reached, he may direct the Administrator to allocate not more than 5% of allowances to undertake capacity-building, clean-energy deployment activities among others
  • States the support of the export deployment of clean energy technologies (but does not explicitly outline assistance for clean energy technology activities)

Congressional Testimony of Elliot Diringer: Climate Change Finance and Providing Assistance for Vulnerable Countries

Testimony of Elliot Diringer 
Vice President, International Strategies 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change 

Submitted to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
U. S. House of Representatives 

July 27, 2010

Climate Change Finance: Providing Assistance for Vulnerable Countries

Click here to download a PDF of the testimony. 


Chairman Faleomavaega, Ranking Member Manzullo, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the critical challenge of ensuring U.S. financial support for climate change efforts in developing countries.  My name is Elliot Diringer, and I am the Vice President for International Strategies at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

The Pew Center on Global Climate Change is an independent non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to advancing practical and effective policies to address global climate change.  Our work is informed by our Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC), a group of 46 major companies, most in the Fortune 500, that work with the Center to educate opinion leaders on climate change risks, challenges, and solutions.  The Pew Center is also a founding member of the U. S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) , a coalition of 23 leading businesses and five environmental organizations that have come together to call on the federal government to enact strong national legislation to significantly reduce U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Mr. Chairman, the Pew Center believes that providing sustained financial support to developing countries is in the U.S. national interest and an essential ingredient for a meaningful global response to the urgent challenge of climate change.  While some developing countries have adequate resources to finance their own climate efforts, most do not.  They need our help both in mitigation (deploying policies and technologies to reduce their rapidly rising greenhouse gas emissions) and in adaptation (coping with the unavoidable impacts of a warming climate).  Delivering adequate support will require decisions here in Washington to mobilize the United States’ fair share of the necessary resources.  And it will require effective multilateral agreements ensuring that in return, all major economies – both developed and developing – contribute equitably to the global climate effort.

In my testimony, I would like to outline some of the reasons we believe it is in our strong national interest to provide sustained climate support to developing countries; suggest principles to guide a U.S. climate finance strategy at home and abroad; and recommend domestic and international policy frameworks to generate and effectively deploy climate finance.

My principal points are as follows:

  • There are strong environmental, security, economic, humanitarian and diplomatic rationales for supporting developing countries’ climate efforts.  Developing countries are unlikely to commit to strong climate action without assurances of sustained finance, severely weakening prospects for an effective global response to climate change.  Providing this support will reduce the United States’ exposure to climate impacts and related security risks, and will help ensure strong markets for U.S. clean energy technologies.
  • In both domestic policy and multilateral negotiations, U.S. strategy on international climate finance should promote reliability, accountability, coherence, efficiency and the preservation of national sovereignty.
  • Key international objectives should be the establishment of a new multilateral climate fund, as agreed in the Copenhagen Accord; creation of a finance body to promote coherence and coordination among multilateral and bilateral finance efforts; and adoption of clear guidelines for the verification of financial flows and supported actions.
  • These steps should be agreed only in the context of a balanced package that includes effective international procedures to verify the mitigation actions of all major-emitting countries.
  • Domestically, Congress should approve the Administration’s request for increased international climate appropriations in FY 2011; establish a dedicated funding source, such as a set-aside of emission allowances, to sustain higher levels of finance in the future; and establish an interagency trust fund board to allocate these funds, subject to Congressional oversight.     


Why the U.S. Should Provide Sustained Climate Assistance to Developing Countries

Climate change is a global predicament in which causes and effects are distributed unequally.  All countries face the consequences of a warming climate.  However, some countries, including the United States, have far greater capacity to cope with them.  These same countries, by and large, also bear far greater responsibility for the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions that have begun to alter our climate.

For these reasons, the world’s developed countries, including the United States, have committed to lead the global climate effort and to support the mitigation and adaptation efforts of developing countries.  These general commitments are contained in the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate (UNFCCC), signed by President George H. W. Bush and unanimously ratified by the Senate.

Responsibility, however, is only one rationale for fulfilling these commitments.  Sustained U.S. support for developing countries is in our national interest from multiple perspectives:

  • Environmental – Dangerous climate change can be averted only with the concerted efforts of all major emitting countries.  While some have begun to take action, and such unilateral efforts are likely to grow, achieving a critical mass of effort on a global scale will require durable multilateral agreements through which countries can be confident that all are undertaking their fair share.  For developing countries to sign on to such agreements, they will need reasonable assurance that developed countries will significantly scale up their financial support.  Sustained U.S. support is therefore essential for the global deal we need to reduce our exposure to potentially catastrophic climate risks.
  • National security – The U.S. military now recognizes that unabated climate change poses rising risks to our national security and new demands on our military resources.  In its latest Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon says climate change may act as “an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world.”[1]  In strained regions, chronic drought, rising seas, extreme weather and other climate impacts could undermine weak governments, induce mass migrations, and trigger or heighten resource competition, contributing to social instability and, potentially, armed conflict.[2]  U.S. support would mitigate these risks, first, by helping to reduce global GHG emissions, thereby limiting impacts, and second, by helping poor, highly vulnerable countries anticipate and manage the stresses of climate change.
  • Economic – China, Germany and other countries are taking a lead in a global clean energy market projected to attract more than $1.5 trillion in investment over the coming decade.[3]  As the United States positions itself to compete, it has a vested interest in ensuring that developing countries have the technical, institutional and financial capacity to adopt clean energy technologies.  U.S. finance can help establish, and ease the entry of U.S. firms into, these new markets.   
  • Humanitarian – An important dimension of U.S. leadership is our readiness to assist those in need, whether the victims of Haiti’s tragic earthquake or the millions in Africa suffering HIV/AIDS.  Within 10 years, global warming may reduce crop yields in parts of Africa by as much as half; by 2050, rising seas could displace as many as 30 million people in Bangladesh, and receding glaciers could leave a billion others across Asia facing chronic water shortages.[4]  Increasingly, the United States’ humanitarian record will be seen against a backdrop of worsening climate impacts.
  • Diplomatic – A willingness to assist vulnerable countries is among the strongest levers available to the United States to secure meaningful climate commitments from China and other major developing countries. In Copenhagen, China showed flexibility on U.S. demands for transparency only after Secretary of State Clinton proposed a long-term finance goal, which fractured the developing country bloc by drawing support from many least developed and small island countries.  With further progress on finance, this dynamic can be expected to continue as negotiations go forward.

Policy Context and Challenges

The Copenhagen Accord represents an important step toward an effective international climate framework.  Although nonbinding, the Accord reflects a political consensus among world leaders on key elements, including: a goal of limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius; a balanced but differentiated approach to mitigation, with economy-wide emission targets for developed countries and nationally appropriate actions for developing countries; and agreement in principle on how these efforts are to be verified.[5] To date, 109 countries have associated with the Accord.  Fifty-six countries accounting for more than 80 percent of global emissions – including China and the other major emerging economies – have pledged specific targets or actions.[6] 

In the area of finance, the Accord calls for a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund; sets a goal of $30 billion in mitigation and adaptation assistance from developed countries in 2010-2012; and sets a goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, in the “context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency in implementation.” 

Fulfilling the Copenhagen Accord requires action at home by the United States and other countries and further agreement among parties on operating rules and mechanisms.  With respect to finance, the immediate priority is delivering on the goal of $30 billion in “fast-track” support.  At President Obama’s request, Congress increased international climate appropriations more than three-fold in FY 2010, to $1.3 billion.  The President has proposed a further increase, to $1.9 billion, in FY 2011.  These funds would help address urgent needs and, as an important signal of Congress’ intent, would help advance U.S. negotiating objectives.  The Pew Center strongly urges Congress to fully fund this request.

The broader challenge on climate finance is two-fold.  First, the United States must establish a domestic strategy to generate and effectively manage its share of the long-term finance envisioned under the Accord.  Second, the United States must work with other countries to establish multilateral financial arrangements compatible with this domestic funding strategy.  I will offer recommendations in both of these areas later in my testimony.

The upcoming U.N. Climate Conference in Cancún presents a major opportunity to begin elaborating the international financial architecture.  Any further agreement on finance, however, should come in the context of a balanced package also advancing other key issues.  Chief among these is the issue of transparency.  Having agreed in Copenhagen that all parties’ actions are to be verifiable – and that developing country actions are to undergo “international consultation and analysis” – parties must now begin to establish this system of accountability.

We believe that in the long run the goal must be a comprehensive treaty with binding commitments for all major economies.  We will likely get there, however, only in stages.  For now, the objective should be to build on the Copenhagen consensus with nuts-and-bolts decisions on finance, transparency, and other key operational areas.  As the architecture takes shape, and countries move forward with domestic implementation, they will hopefully gain the confidence needed to convert their current political pledges into more ambitious binding commitments.

Objectives of a U.S. Climate Support Strategy

The Copenhagen Accord, as noted, envisions a mix of public and private finance for developing countries.  While there is no consensus on the appropriate mix, there is broad acceptance that the carbon market and other private finance will comprise a substantial portion.  Indeed, with a strong carbon market, private finance could generate a substantial majority of needed flows.  There is also broad recognition, however, that a significant increase in public finance is needed to build mitigation capacity, so that countries can establish the policies and practices necessary to attract private investment, and to support adaptation.  Our recommendations focus primarily on the public finance portion.

We believe that U.S. strategy on international climate finance, both in domestic policy and in multilateral negotiations, should reflect the following objectives:

  • Reliability – To be politically credible and effective, new support must be steady and predictable.  Strong, stable climate agreements will not be feasible without reliable financial flows.  Nor will developing countries be able to build the capacities needed to become more self-reliant in meeting the climate challenge.
  • Accountability – Clear, workable guidelines are needed to verify the delivery of support and the performance of supported actions.
  • Coherence – Support will flow through multiple channels – public and private, bilateral and multilateral – to address a wide range of needs.  Mechanisms are needed to set priorities and to promote coordination and consistency.
  • Efficiency – Rapidly scaling up support calls for fully leveraging, and not replicating, the capacities of existing institutions and for deploying public finance in ways that maximally leverage private flows.
  • Sovereignty – National prerogatives must be respected and preserved.  Donor countries should retain discretion on the means of generating, and avenues for delivering, increased finance.  Recipient countries should be able to access finance directly (through national, rather than multilateral, implementing entities).

An International Climate Finance Architecture

Climate support is presently provided through an array of bilateral and multilateral channels, including a number of funds established under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.  In this largely ad hoc structure, funding levels are erratic and well below assessed needs, there is little coordination among the various funding entities, and developing countries frequently complain of difficulty in accessing those funds that are available.

A major aim of the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations is the establishment of new financial arrangements to ensure stronger, predictable flows and improved access to funding.  Many developing countries have advocated a comprehensive new apparatus under the UNFCCC to centrally gather and disburse funding for the full range of mitigation and adaptation needs.  We believe a more practical and politically viable approach is a finance framework that promotes adequate, reliable flows by encouraging a variety of funding mechanisms and channels, while ensuring greater consistency, coordination and accountability.  The major elements of this enhanced architecture should include: a new multilateral climate fund, as agreed in the Copenhagen Accord; a new finance body to advise the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP); and clear guidelines for the verification of financial flows and supported actions.

A New Climate Fund – Principal issues in the design of a new climate fund include its intended uses, its governance structure, and how it will be funded.

We believe a new multilateral climate fund should serve as a principal, but not exclusive, mechanism for delivering public finance to developing countries.  It could support any or all of the following activities: capacity building (to help countries analyze mitigation potentials, develop national policies, and institute measurement and verification systems); adaptation planning and implementation; technology deployment; forestry-related measures; and other types of mitigation programs.  In determining the fund’s scope, countries must assess and modify existing UNFCCC funds accordingly to avoid funding gaps and redundancies.

The new fund should be governed by an independent board operating under the guidance of, and accountable to, the COP, but not under its direct authority.  This would allow the COP to set broad policy directions and maintain oversight, while reducing the risk of procedural delays and political interference.  For this arrangement to be acceptable to developing countries, many of which prefer that the fund be under the direct authority of the COP, it is essential that the board’s composition and decision-making provide for balanced representation.   These could be modeled on the provisional Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) formed in 2008 by the United States and other major economies.  The CIFs’ Trust Fund Committees include equal representation from contributor and recipient countries and operate by consensus.

Another concern is the new funds’ relationship to existing multilateral financial institutions, in particular the World Bank.  Many developing countries object to the Bank’s donor-weighted governance structure and feel it has been unresponsive to their concerns; stakeholder groups are critical of its historic support for carbon-intensive energy development.  While both sets of concerns warrant continued reforms at the Bank, they should not preclude it from an appropriate role in a new climate fund.  Given the urgency and scale of the climate finance challenge, countries must take full advantage of available capacities and expertise.   The Bank should be a candidate to serve as the new fund’s trustee, a strictly fiduciary role.  And parties should explore seconding staff from the Bank and from other multilateral development banks and agencies to form an independent secretariat supporting the new climate fund.

A wide range of proposed funding sources are being examined by the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, but near-term agreement on any particular revenue mechanism, particularly one at the international level, appears unlikely.  In the absence of such a mechanism, countries should agree on an indicative scale of assessment establishing their relative contributions to the new climate fund and set funding targets through periodic pledging (every three to five years); each should decide for itself how to generate its respective contribution.  This scale of assessment could take into account factors such as a country’s total and per capita emissions and GDP, and should be evolving, so that emerging economies also contribute as they achieve higher levels of development.

A UNFCCC Finance Body – As noted, a new climate fund would be one among many means of delivering climate support.  This disaggregated architecture has the advantage of encouraging multiple bilateral and multilateral channels, thereby achieving the highest feasible overall flow.  A mechanism is needed, however, to promote some degree of coordination and coherence among these efforts.

We believe this role is best served by a new UNFCCC body appointed by the COP to advise it on finance-related issues.  Specifically, this finance body, comprised of parties and independent experts, could:

  • Recommend broad funding priorities to guide the allocation decisions of multilateral funds and bilateral donors;
  • Continually assess finance needs and progress toward meeting finance objectives;
  • Review the performance of, and recommend further guidance to, UNFCCC funds;
  • Provide a forum where multilateral and bilateral donors could seek to coordinate their efforts;
  • Promote harmonization of application procedures; and
  • Recommend guidelines for the measurement and verification of finance.

Verification – Parties have agreed in principle that their mitigation actions – and that support for developing country actions – are to be measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV).  A goal for Cancún should be agreement on the basic parameters of an MRV system so that detailed guidelines can then be developed.

Verification of finance will require stronger tracking and reporting of financial flows and some form of UNFCCC review.  For the system to be credible, there must be some further delineation of what flows, both public and private, qualify as “climate finance.”

Developing countries agreed in Copenhagen that “supported” mitigation actions would be subject to “international verification.”  In the case of bilateral finance, the United States and other donors can be expected to apply their own verification standards.  But COP guidance is needed to ensure some consistency among them and to define how MRV applies to multilateral support.

A balanced agreement must also address MRV of the mitigation actions taken by developing countries without international assistance, which under the Copenhagen Accord are subject to “international consultations and analysis.”  This includes a substantial majority of the actions pledged by China and other major emerging economies.  We believe that effective MRV of these unilateral efforts will require: biennial GHG inventories and implementation reports from developing countries; a technical review and report by experts; an open peer review based on the expert report and parties’ inputs; and publication of all reports and the peer review conclusions.  Similar MRV procedures should apply to the mitigation actions of developed countries as well.

Domestic Policy Issues

In the domestic policy context, there are two principal needs: a stable funding base enabling the United States to provide sustained support for developing country efforts; and a mechanism to allocate and coordinate those resources and ensure strong Congressional oversight.

A Stable Funding Base – Unless it is prepared to support some form of international revenue-generating mechanism, the United States must rely on domestically generated resources for its share of future international climate finance.  Past U.S. climate support has come through appropriations by Congress to multiple agencies, including the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, Commerce and Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The core climate assistance budget averaged $237 million a year from 2001 to 2009,[7] before rising to $1.3 billion in FY 2010.

We urge Congress to approve the President’s request for increased appropriations in FY 2011, and to consider a further increase in FY 2012, enabling the United States to provide a reasonable share of the $30 billion in “fast-start” resources pledged collectively by developed countries in Copenhagen.  However, looking toward 2020, with competing demands on the federal budget and the growing imperative of deficit reduction, there is no certainty that appropriations alone can provide the level of sustained support that is needed.  We believe that the United States will prove a more reliable partner in the global climate effort, and that the prospects for effective climate agreements will be greatly enhanced, if Congress establishes a dedicated source of funding. 

Ideally, this source should derive from GHG-generating economic activities, and thereby help to correct the market failures that contribute to climate change.  Our first choice would be a set-aside of emission allowances in an economy-wide cap-and-trade system regulating U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  While there now appears little prospect of cap-and-trade legislation in this Congress, we continue to believe strongly in the value of a market-based approach to reducing U.S. emissions.  Properly designed, a cap-and-trade system can minimize the costs of meeting our environmental goals, create an ongoing incentive for technological innovation, and generate resources for critical climate investments, including international finance. 

We commend the House for its approval of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, and the inclusion of specific set-asides to support adaptation, reduced deforestation and technology deployment in developing countries.  At projected allowance prices, these set-asides would generate about $8.5 billion in public finance for developing countries in 2020.[8]  According to EPA’s analysis, the purchase of international emission offsets authorized under H.R. 2454 could also generate on the order of $20 billion of private investment in developing countries in 2020.[9] Combined, these set-asides and offset purchases would meet or exceed the presumed U.S. share of the $100 billion goal set under the Copenhagen Accord.

Other potential sources of public finance that we believe may be worth exploring include:

  • International shipping and aviation – Two sectors drawing particular attention from the international community because of their trans-boundary nature and rising emissions are international shipping and aviation.  A number of the proposals by countries to limit or reduce their emissions could serve simultaneously to generate finance for developing countries.  Some parties have proposed international levies on bunker fuels or other forms of emission charges.  Alternatively, countries could agree to apply such charges nationally and to dedicate a portion of the proceeds to international climate finance.  In such an approach, the United States would directly administer any charges at domestic ports and decide how to apportion the resulting revenues.        
  • Fossil fuel subsidies/royalties – Another option is to redirect some of the federal tax subsidies provided for fossil fuel production, or of the federal royalties it generates.  The United States and other G20 countries agreed last year in Pittsburgh to phase out “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.”[10] The President’s proposed FY 2012 budget calls for ending a number of oil and gas subsidies, generating an estimated $39 billion in revenue through 2020.[11]
  • Levy on international offsets – Another potential source, assuming the establishment of a federal cap-and-trade system, would be a levy on international emission offsets entering the domestic market.  A similar levy on the international Clean Development Mechanism presently supports the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol.


Coordinating U.S. Support – Regardless of the source of finance, a coherent strategy for sustained U.S. support requires a mechanism to coordinate across federal entities.  Ideally, Congress should establish a trust fund to receive appropriated or dedicated funds and a board to oversee it.  The board would develop a long-term climate support strategy and, on that basis, make annual allocations to bilateral and multilateral programs.

To best align the funding strategy with broader U.S. diplomatic objectives, the board should be chaired by the Secretary of State.  Other members should include the Secretaries of Treasury, Energy, Agriculture and Commerce, and the Administrators of USAID and EPA.  The board should report regularly to Congress, its executive director should be Senate-confirmed, and Congress should use other means at its disposal to ensure strong oversight

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we believe sustained U.S. support for climate efforts in developing countries is a sound and prudent investment in the environmental, economic and national security of the United States.  We strongly urge Congress to increase appropriations for “fast-track” finance, and to establish the means for providing long-term support in the context of agreements ensuring that all major economies contribute equitably to the global climate effort.  I would be pleased to answer your questions.

 


Footnotes

[1] Department of Defense, 2010. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Page 85.  Available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

[2] Fingar, T., 2008. Testimony Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 25 June 2008 and; Center for Naval Analyses, 2007. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, Military Advisory Board, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), April 2007. Available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf.

[3] Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2010. Clean Energy Markets: Jobs and Opportunities, April 2010 Update. Available at http://www.c2es.org/publications/brief/clean-energy-markets-jobs-and-opportunities.

[4] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Summary for Policy Makers. Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.

[5] Copenhagen Accord.  Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=.4.

[6] The 27 Member States of the European Union are counted here as a single entity.  Emission reduction targets pledged by developed countries are available at http://unfccc.int/home/items/5264.php.  Mitigation actions pledged by developing countries are available at http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php.

[7] Office of Management and Budget, Federal Climate Change Expenditures, Report to Congress for Fiscal Years 2003-2008 and 2011.

[8] Purvis, N. and Stevenson A., 2010. International Provisions in U.S. Climate Legislation. Available at http://www.climateadvisers.com/pdf/International%20Provisions%20in%20U.S.%20Climate%20Legislation.pdf.

[9] Environmental Protection Agency, 2009. EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009—H.R. 2454 in the 111th Congress, 23 June 2009. Available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis.pdf.

[10] G20 Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, 24-25 September 2009.  Available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.

[11] Office of Management and Budget, 2010. Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2011. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/budget.pdf.

Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV)

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MRV
These papers are part of ongoing work by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions to help clarify issues and options in the international climate change negotiations.

June 2010

Click to download the following papers.

  • MRV: Design Issues and Options
    This paper aims to provide a high-level overview of issues and corresponding options related to measurement, reporting and verification in three areas: 1) developed country mitigation, 2) developing country mitigation, and 3) the provision of finance and implementation of supported NAMAs.

Related Content

 

International Climate Finance

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International Climate Finance
These papers are part of ongoing work by the Center to help clarify issues and options in the international climate change negotiations.

June 2010

Click to download the following papers.

  • Finance: Design Issues and Options
    This paper aims to provide a high-level overview of issues and corresponding options related to new financial arrangements under the UNFCCC. It focuses on: 1) the structure of a new climate fund; and 2) broader architectural issues, including the matching of support with action.

Related Content

Bonn Side Event - MRV: Lessons from Other Regimes

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Presentations and discussion of review processes under various international regimes (including the WTO, IMF and OECD) and lessons they may hold for elaborating a system of "international consultation and analysis" in the post-2012 climate framework.

Pew Center on Global Climate Change presents:

MRV: LESSONS FROM OTHER REGIMES
UNFCCC Negotiations in Bonn, Germany
Tuesday, June 8, 7:45 – 9:15pm
Ministry of Environment, Room SOLAR

                                                                                                          

Presentations and discussion of review processes under various international regimes (including the WTO, IMF and OECD) and lessons they may hold for elaborating a system of "international consultation and analysis" in the post-2012 climate framework.

Overview Document: Key Features of Selected Multilateral Review Processes

Presenters:

Moderator:

  • ELLIOT DIRINGER, Vice President International Strategies, Pew Center on Global Climate Change

Back to Bonn ... Again

It’s off to Bonn again, this time for the first substantive negotiations under the UN Climate Convention since Copenhagen.  That’s the hope, at least.

Climate negotiators last gathered in Bonn (home base for the UN climate secretariat) for a few days back in April.  That time the agenda was strictly “procedural,” although in truth the main issue – whether the Copenhagen Accord could enter into the formal negotiations going forward – had rather broad substantive implications.

The Accord, you’ll recall, was the political agreement struck by a few dozen world leaders in the final hours of the chaotic Copenhagen summit last December.  To date, 130 countries have associated themselves with the agreement, and 79 of them, including all of the world’s major economies, have listed nonbinding targets or actions to reduce their emissions.

The Case for Action: Creating a Clean Energy Future

Download the report (pdf)

 

The Case for Action: Creating a Clean Energy Future
May 2010

The United States needs strong action now to reduce the risks of climate change, strengthen our energy independence, protect our national security, and create new jobs and economic opportunities. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change believes that the case for action has never been stronger. With a strong energy and climate policy the United States can lead the 21st century clean energy economy.

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Designing a Deal

Click here to download the article (PDF).

May 2010

By Elliot Diringer

This article originally appeared in Carbon Finance.

 

The aftermath of December’s Copenhagen talks shows that a new approach to international climate policy is needed to reach a post-2012 climate deal, says Elliot Diringer.

The popular view around the world is that the Copenhagen climate conference last December was a failure. In truth, it was a victim of false expectations. From the very start of the negotiations in Bali in 2007, there was little reason to believe that Copenhagen could deliver a binding climate agreement. Yet that was the expectation governments set, and maintained, through round after round of fruitless negotiations. When in the end a non-binding Copenhagen Accord materialized in place of a treaty, the common perception, unsurprisingly, was one of failure.

One obvious lesson is that expectations matter. Less obvious, but far more critical, are the lessons for next steps in the international climate effort.

Copenhagen calls for a new vision of the way forward. While a binding treaty should indeed be the goal – it is essential we keep that in sight – it is time to rethink when and how we get there. More frenzied high-level summitry is not likely to be the route. Rather, an ambitious and binding framework for global climate action will have to be built over time. No treaty is likely this year, or perhaps next year, either. How much longer it will take is impossible to say.

While a binding treaty should indeed be the goal – it is essential we keep that in sight – it is time to rethink when and how we get there. Probably the most practical course for now is to put aside more intractable issues such as burden-sharing and focus instead on the nuts and bolts. The Copenhagen Accord lays out the bare essentials of a post-2012 framework. The goal for talks in Cancún later this year should be a package of decisions that begins fleshing out this architecture, particularly in the areas of transparency and support for developing countries.

Even incremental progress is by no means assured, however, owing in part to the peculiar origins and status of the Copenhagen Accord, and the political and procedural complications left in its wake.

On one hand, the accord represents the most substantial climate consensus among the largest group of world leaders since the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. This consensus includes: a goal of limiting warming to 2°C; a balanced but differentiated approach to mitigation, with economy-wide emissions targets for developed countries and nationally appropriate mitigation actions for developing countries; agreement in principle on how these efforts are to be verified; new mechanisms to support mitigation and adaptation in developing countries; and clear goals for climate finance out to 2020.

But, on the other hand, having surfaced at the eleventh hour from behind closed doors, the accord was promptly rejected by a handful of countries as a backroom deal by a powerful few. They succeeded in blocking the accord’s formal adoption, leaving it a purely political outcome with no formal standing in the UN process. The emergence of this small but vocal bloc has injected a fractious new dynamic into the negotiations.

In the first negotiating session since Copenhagen, in Bonn in April, parties managed a procedural compromise indirectly acknowledging the accord as one basis for drawing up a new negotiating text. The next session, in June, may reveal more about what that means substantively – and what could be in store for Cancún.

For concrete decisions to be feasible in Cancún, they must reflect progress across a range of issues balancing both developed and developing country needs. In Copenhagen, parties appeared closest to agreement on adaptation, technology, and forestry. The accord touches on these only lightly. But decisions in these areas will likely be possible only with further progress on the core issues of transparency and finance, two areas where the accord has more to say.

On transparency, the accord calls for developing countries to report on their mitigation actions every two years, followed by “international consultations and analysis”. In Cancún, parties must at least make a start on the guidelines needed to operationalize these, and on parallel processes to verify support from developed countries.

On finance, the $30 billion in prompt-start funding promised in the accord can and should begin flowing this year through established channels. But further decisions are required on the structure of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, and on the broader arrangements that will be needed to achieve the accord’s goal of $100 billion a year in public and private resources by 2020.

A central issue for Cancún is not simply whether operational progress on these fronts is possible – a challenge in itself – but whether all parties would deem it sufficient. Some will also want to address more difficult political questions, including the adequacy of the 2020 actions pledged thus far and the fate of the Kyoto Protocol. Insisting on decisions on these in Cancún, however, could mean no outcome at all.

An incremental approach may seem a paltry response to a desperate challenge growing only more urgent. What is urgent, however, is the need for action. And, for the time being, we have no binding treaty to deliver it. Too many countries – not only the US – are not ready to sign on. The immediate drivers for action – and for the carbon market – must be domestic.

At the international level, we must look for practical outcomes that, step by step, erect a functioning multilateral framework. As the post-2012 regime takes shape, and parties begin working within it, they will grow more comfortable and confident. As they move forward with domestic actions, their confidence will grow – confidence in their ability to confront the challenge at home, and confidence that others are acting, too. In time, this will hopefully translate into a willingness to assume more ambitious – and binding – commitments.

A new binding treaty is not, in this vision, an essential foundation for near-term action. Rather, it will be the culmination of this next critical stage in an evolving international effort. Modest successes, each contributing to the next, will likely get us there sooner than grand but false expectations. That, hopefully, is the message we take from Copenhagen.

Elliot Diringer is Vice President for International Strategies at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

by Elliot Diringer, Vice President for International Strategies-- Appeared in Carbon Finance, May 2010
Elliot Diringer
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Targets and Actions under the Copenhagen Accord

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Targets and Actions under the Copenhagen Accord

The Copenhagen Accord, a political agreement struck by world leaders at the 2009 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, calls on participating countries to pledge specific actions they will undertake to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.  This represents the first time ever that all of the world’s major economies have offered explicit international climate pledges.

In the case of Annex I (developed) countries, the nonbinding Accord calls for quantified economy-wide emission targets for 2020.  In the case of non-Annex I (developing) countries, it calls for “nationally appropriate mitigation actions,” but does not specify what form they should take.  (Least developed and small island countries “may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.”)   

As of May 24, 2010, 99 parties (counting the 27 member states of the European Union as a single party) had filed submissions with the U.N. climate change secretariat :

  • 16 Annex I countries submitted 2020 emissions targets ;
  • 37 non-Annex I countries submitted mitigation actions; and 
  • 46 other non-Annex I countries associated with the accord.

The following is a summary of information submitted to date. Please check back regularly for updated information or visit the UN Climate Change Convention website.

Click here for a full summary of targets and actions under the Copenhagen Accord (pdf).

Click here for a side-by-side comparison of main provisions of the Copenhagen Accord, the draft core decision texts carried forward from Copenhagen in the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), and the text prepared by the AWG-LCA Chair in May 2010 to facilitate further negotiations.

 

Mitigation Pledges Under the Copenhagen Accord

In the Copenhagen Accord, countries agree that “deep cuts in global emissions are required… so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius…”  To date, nearly 50 parties (counting the European Union as a single party) have submitted specific mitigation pledges under the Accord. Several analyses (summarized here) have assessed whether these pledges are consistent with the goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius.

Our review of these analyses finds that:

  • Most show the pledges are inadequate to achieve a 2-degree goal, and instead imply a global emissions pathway leading to 3 to 3.9 degrees of warming.
  • Collectively, the pledges would reduce global emissions between 4 percent and16 percent below business as usual (BAU) in 2020.  (All projections of the pledges’ impact on emissions show ranges of reductions because many of the pledges specify ranges, with the more ambitious end of the range applying if stipulated conditions are met. ) A 2-degree pathway requires reductions of 21 percent to 26 percent below BAU. 
  • Pledges by developed countries would reduce their emissions 10 percent to 13 percent below BAU in 2020, and pledges by developing countries would reduce their emissions 6 percent to 9 percent below BAU.

Click here for more analysis of how countries' pledges may affect global temperature increases.

 

Further Resources

Our Policy Viewpoints and Statements:

 More COP15 resources available here.

Adding up the Numbers: Mitigation Pledges under the Copenhagen Accord

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March 2010

DOWNLOAD FULL ANALYSIS (pdf)

In the Copenhagen Accord, countries agree that “deep cuts in global emissions are required… so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius…”  To date, nearly 50 parties (counting the European Union as a single party) have submitted specific mitigation pledges under the Accord. Several analyses (summarized here) have assessed whether these pledges are consistent with the goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius.

Our review of these analyses finds that:

  • Most show the pledges are inadequate to achieve a 2-degree goal, and instead imply a global emissions pathway leading to 3 to 3.9 degrees of warming.
  • Collectively, the pledges would reduce global emissions between 4 percent and16 percent below business as usual (BAU) in 2020.  (All projections of the pledges’ impact on emissions show ranges of reductions because many of the pledges specify ranges, with the more ambitious end of the range applying if stipulated conditions are met. ) A 2-degree pathway requires reductions of 21 percent to 26 percent below BAU. 
  • Pledges by developed countries would reduce their emissions 10 percent to 13 percent below BAU in 2020, and pledges by developing countries would reduce their emissions 6 percent to 9 percent below BAU.

 

Key findings of the individual analyses can be found here.

Click here for more information about the Copenhagen Accord.

 

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