

INTERNATIONAL

Reflections on Key Mitigation Ambition Outcomes from COP30



Discussion Paper

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The Belém outcome launched two one-year initiatives: the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission to 1.5. Both will enable and accelerate mitigation and adaptation ambition and implementation, as well as enhance international cooperation. While the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme will continue to address mitigation this year, it is up for renewal in November. Parties could usefully consider how to maximize the synergies across these workstreams this year and also consider the longer-term trajectory of mitigation efforts under the Paris Agreement.

Parties and stakeholders emphasize the importance of implementation. The Paris Agreement, with the adoption of the remaining elements of its “rulebook” and key structural elements, is fully operational and has completed its first full “ambition cycle.”

Parties have struggled to find a shared vision on how the outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST1) may be linked to ongoing work. Additional factors, such as geopolitical tension and the slow shift from negotiation to implementation and enhanced international cooperation, have meant that Parties have launched efforts under the leadership of COP Presidencies to complement the formal negotiations, including initiatives for mitigation ambition and implementation.

This paper focuses on prospects and considerations for three of the key COP30 mitigation outcomes: the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (*MWP*), the launch of the Global Implementation Accelerator (*GIA*), and the start of the Belém Mission to 1.5. With the MWP facing a discussion on its renewal and the GIA and Belém Mission to 1.5 ostensibly concluding at the 31st Conference of the Parties (*COP31*), Parties should consider how to maximize their effectiveness through 2026.

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Questions for consideration

- How do these processes relate to one another, if at all? How can synergies between them be maximized while avoiding or reducing redundancy and duplication?
- Set to conclude in 2026, is the MWP achieving its mandate? What could the next phase of the MWP look like?
- What can the GIA effectively accomplish to enhance implementation and international cooperation in 2026?
- How can the Belém Mission to 1.5 build on the Troika’s Roadmap to Mission 1.5, to enhance international cooperation and accelerate implementation of nationally determined contributions (*NDCs*) and national adaptation plans (*NAPs*)?

A. Context

1. The outcomes of GST1, captured in the COP28 United Arab Emirate (*UAE*) Consensus, set out a series of targets and signals that, if achieved by 2030, would support the “deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” needed to align with 1.5 degree C pathways.¹ These outcomes should have informed Parties’ NDCs with an end date of 2035, and Parties are obliged by the GST to enhance international cooperation.² Some Parties have expected that targets and signals from GST1, particularly those on mitigation, be addressed in some form through ongoing work or COP outcomes.
2. Reaching consensus outcomes at COPs have become increasingly challenging. Even more so in the context of rising geopolitical tensions and uncertainty, growing climate impacts, increasing budget constraints, the withdrawal of the United States, and the slow transition from intense annual high level negotiations to implementation of the Paris Agreement and individual country commitments under it.
3. As a result, COP Presidencies have complemented the work of the formal negotiations through creative, innovative efforts and initiatives. Examples include: the UAE COP28 series of declarations; the Troika of presidencies and their Roadmap to Mission 1.5; the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T; and the Brazil Presidency’s special envoys and circles of ministers. One of the most transformational outcomes in this context was the restructuring of the Global Climate Action Agenda (*GCAA*) to align with taking forward the outcomes of the GST.³ This development responds directly to the need to navigate the transition to the implementation.
4. A number of calls for dedicated efforts to deliver on several of the targets and signals from GST1 were unable to gain sufficient consensus at COP30 to be included in formal work. As a result, a number of Presidency initiatives were launched in Belém.
5. In his 12th letter of January 27, 2026, COP30 President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago acknowledged the difficulty of reaching ambitious consensus-based outcomes at COP30. He further noted that “to

keep pace with global warming, multilateralism must learn to operate at more than one institutional speed – to become a two-tier multilateralism.”⁴

6. This paper focuses on three workstreams that will address mitigation ambition this year—one under the formal UNFCCC process and two joint Presidency initiatives—and raises key considerations for how the work should be addressed this year and beyond. Progress on this work in this year presents a critical opportunity to leverage action given that they will conclude at the end of 2026, unless Parties mandate otherwise.

B. The Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme

7. The Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (**MWP**) was established at COP26 (2021) to accelerate mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade in a manner that complements the GST.⁵ Decision 4/CMA.4 (2022) specified that the MWP would start after COP27 and run until 2026, with a possible extension.⁶ Since its launch, Parties have disagreed on: the extent of the MWP’s linkage to the GST; its approach to sectoral discussions; and what the nature of any normative decisions arising from the MWP should comprise. Given these tensions and a number of procedural outcomes, some Parties have questioned whether the MWP has been effective.
8. The COP30 decision on the MWP: (i) sets out key messages from the work in 2025 on forests, synergies, and waste;⁷ (ii) welcomes efforts to encourage the registration of mitigation projects in the web-based Article 7 Non-Market Approaches Platform for recording and exchanging information;⁸ (iii) further requests the secretariat to improve the organization of future global dialogues and investment-focused events; and (iv) invites Parties to share views on improvements to the continuation, functioning, and effectiveness of the MWP.⁹
9. **Key considerations:**
 - Some Parties were disappointed that the MWP decision did not address the transition away from fossil fuels, one of the targets set out by GST1. In the absence of consensus on this point, the COP30 President announced a plan to set out a roadmap on such a transition.
 - The secretariat and Parties have been asked to consider improvements to the MWP ahead of its potential renewal at COP31, making 2026 a critical year to consider the value and the effectiveness of the MWP. Given the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it may send a poor signal if the MWP were not renewed. Parties and non-Parties may benefit from collective, non-prescriptive messages from the MWP work to inspire domestic policies and ideas for initiatives that could attract investment. There could be more of a practical focus on institution building and domestic planning processes that highlights best practice. How can the MWP be strengthened for practitioners on the ground?
 - Will guidance to the secretariat and key partners be enough to improve the matchmaking function of the MWP? More specifically, the occasional function of the “investment-focused events” of the MWP has been to provide space for matchmaking the mitigation projects of developing countries with donors that can finance their implementation.
 - Aside from forwarding the reports from its dialogues and investment-focused events to the GST, Parties may want to consider how the work of the MWP is complementing the GST and whether it can be improved. Parties may further want to consider what other linkages may be important to the MWP’s work, including the UAE Just Transition Work Programme.
 - Given the tension around its relationship to the GST, how can Parties engage in a productive conversation about the future of the MWP in Antalya? What could the next phase of the MWP accomplish?

C. The Global Implementation Accelerator

10. The GIA is “a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative...to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 [degree] C within reach and supporting [sic] countries in implementing their nationally determined contributions and national adaptation plans.”¹⁰ It takes into account COP21 and CMA1-6 decisions, which includes the GST1 outcome.¹¹ The GIA will be guided by the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies, who will conduct open, inclusive information sessions at the 64th Subsidiary Bodies meetings (**SB64**) and SB65 and present a report summarizing their work at the 8th Meeting of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (**CMA8**).¹² The Presidencies will host a high level event in 2026 to exchange experiences and views on “related matters.”¹³
11. In January 2026, the COP30 Presidency emphasized that the GIA fits a science-based reframing of ambition toward accelerated implementation.¹⁴ It also emphasized that perhaps the only way to achieve 1.5 degree C is through positive tipping points and working to accelerate implementation through “sequencing, exponentiality, and cascading transformation.”¹⁵
12. There is an opportunity for the GIA to focus on high-impact initiatives that can buy time and accelerate transformation. The Global Climate Action Agenda, which has been aligned with the targets and signals from the first GST and has set out key tipping points, can support the GIA through this framing.¹⁶ The mandated GIA high level event could be an important bridge between the negotiations and the GCAA.¹⁷
13. At Mumbai Climate Week in February 2026, the COP30 Presidency suggested that “by elevating key dimensions of the Action Agenda, the GIA supports countries in both the design and implementation of their [NDCs] and [NAPs], representing an important step in strengthening multilateralism through delivery.”¹⁸ Key areas of focus of the GIA could include: carbon removal through nature-based solutions,¹⁹ methane and gases other than carbon dioxide, ecosystem restoration, early warning systems, and capacity building for institutions not yet prepared for these tipping points.²⁰
14. **Key considerations:**
 - It is positive that the GIA recognizes that progress is not merely about headline targets, but real and accelerated implementation, but it is currently unclear exactly what the GIA will do or how it will encourage enhanced implementation.
 - There could also be synergies and overlap with other Presidency initiatives, including the roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, the roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation, the Belém Mission to 1.5, and the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T.
 - It is not yet clear what the relationship is between the GIA, the GST, and the GCAA, and how the GIA can enhance international cooperation. A matchmaking component of the GIA could perhaps help drive finance and investment in key initiatives. A well designed engagement strategy that produces better matchmaking could result in better NDCs.
 - Could the GIA assign one or more key intergovernmental organizations (**IGOs**) to lead efforts and/or track progress on one or more of the GST targets or signals? This could be organized much the same way the COP29 Presidency requested that the International Energy Agency and the International Renewable Energy Agency lead on the mitigation targets and signals from the GST. This could also be true of one or more of the international climate initiatives of the GCAA and its new workplan.
 - Given that the initiative will conclude at the end of 2026, what can it reasonably accomplish in less than a year?

D. The Belém Mission to 1.5

15. As noted above, the second part of the GST's mandate is to enhance international cooperation. The COP28 decision adopting the outcomes of the GST also launched a "Road map to Mission 1.5" under the guidance of the Troika (COP28, COP29, and COP30 Presidencies). Mission 1.5's aim was to "significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition in the next round of nationally determined contributions with a view to enhancing action and implementation over this critical decade and keeping 1.5 [degree] C within reach."²¹
16. The Troika sought to build capacity and raise ambition as Parties developed their NDCs ahead of the February 2025 deadline. The Troika's work aimed to strengthen targets and implementation frameworks across all pillars of climate action under a 1.5 degree C framing. From 2024–25, the Troika hosted a series of high-level political convenings, and collaborated with key thematic and political platforms, to channel existing knowledge and resources toward ambitious NDC development.²²
17. The COP30 Global Mutirão decision launched the Belém Mission to 1.5, which is aimed at accelerating implementation, international cooperation, and investment in NDCs and NAPs.²³ The work will be guided by the Azerbaijan, Brazil, and Australia-Türkiye Presidencies, which will produce a report summarizing their work upon the conclusion of the Belém Mission to 1.5 at CMA8 (November 2026).²⁴
18. **Key considerations:**
 - Unlike the Roadmap to Mission 1.5, which largely focused on support for NDCs and biennial transparency reports, the Belém Mission to 1.5's scope is wider, encompassing NAPs, which need significant support.²⁵
 - Given the shift in both context and scope, should the Belém Mission to 1.5 continue the capacity-building events approach or shift to another format?
 - As with the MWP and the GIA, the relationship to the GST is unclear. However, given the focus on international cooperation and the linkage between reaching 1.5 degree C, could one of its aims be to assess progress on enhanced inter-nation cooperation, including progress toward the GST's targets and signals?
 - As with the GIA, the Belém Mission to 1.5 will conclude at the end of the year—what can it reasonably accomplish in 2026?

E. Conclusion

19. In 2026, Parties will consider how to engage with three processes that seek to accelerate and support mitigation ambition and implementation—one of which can be renewed for greater impact, and two of which have yet to be well defined. Parties should bear in mind their real or possible inter-relationships and seek to avoid redundancies and duplication of effort.
20. While these processes could potentially identify practical options to implement GST1, could they also feed into the second GST, which will start at COP31? If effective, these processes might usefully be continued beyond 2026, perhaps following the precedent of the Troika, which, in the spirit of international cooperation, created continuity of efforts and leadership across three consecutive Presidencies.
21. It is important that, in advance of COP31, the COP Presidency soon sets out a vision of how the GIA and Belém Mission to 1.5 will function and complement each other so as to help close the ambition and implementation gaps.

F. C2ES Resources

- Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Conference in Belém, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/COP30-Summary-FINAL5.pdf>
- A Vision for the 2025-2030 Action Agenda, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/C2ES-Vision-for-the-Action-Agenda.pdf>
- Negotiations on the Global Stocktake: State of Play and Key Considerations, <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/20250912-C2ES-Negotiations-on-the-Global-Stocktake-v.2.pdf>
- Achieving a More Effective UNFCCC Process, https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/20250729-C2ES-Achieving-a-More-Effective-UNFCCC-Process_FINAL.pdf



G. References

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- ² UNFCCC, "Paris Agreement," Annex, Art. 14.3, December 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf>.
- ³ "COP30," Climate Action, accessed February 19, 2026, <https://climateaction.unfccc.int/CopsAndSummits/COP30>.
- ⁴ André Aranha Correa do Lago, "Twelfth Letter from the Presidency," COP30, January 27, 2026, <https://cop30.br/en/brazilian-presidency/letters-from-the-president/twelfth-letter-from-the-president>.
- ⁵ UNFCCC, *Glasgow Climate Pact*, Decision 1/CMA.3, ¶ 27 (March 8, 2022), <https://unfccc.int/documents/460950>.
- ⁶ UNFCCC, *Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme*, Decision 4/CMA.4, ¶ 5, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_10_a01E.pdf.
- ⁷ UNFCCC, *Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme*, Decision -/CMA.7, ¶¶ 4, 13 (November 21, 2025), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L08_adv.pdf (Advance unedited version).
- ⁸ UNFCCC, *Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme*, Decision -/CMA.7, ¶¶ 9-12.
- ⁹ UNFCCC, *Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme*, Decision -/CMA.7, ¶¶ 5, 16. Submissions are due by April 14, 2026. "Submission Portal," UNFCCC, accessed February 19, 2026, <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx>.
- ¹⁰ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 41 (November 22, 2025), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L24_adv.pdf (Advance unedited version).
- ¹¹ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 41 (November 22, 2025).
- ¹² UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 41 (November 22, 2025).
- UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 41 (November 22, 2025).
- ¹³ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 41 (November 22, 2025).
- ¹⁴ Climate Home News, "Can climate action beat geopolitical headwinds in 2026?," YouTube, January 15, 2026, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2ZxFhSCINc>.
- ¹⁵ Climate Home News, "Can climate action beat geopolitical headwinds in 2026?," YouTube, January 15, 2026, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2ZxFhSCINc>.
- ¹⁶ Climate Home News, "Can climate action beat geopolitical headwinds in 2026?," YouTube, January 15, 2026, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2ZxFhSCINc>.
- ¹⁷ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 41 (November 22, 2025).
- ¹⁸ "At Mumbai Climate Week, COP30 Presidency Accelerates Shift to Climate Implementation," COP30 Brazil, February 16, 2026, <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/at-mumbai-climate-week-cop30-presidency-accelerates-shift-to-climate-implementation>.
- ¹⁹ "At Mumbai Climate Week, COP30 Presidency Accelerates Shift to Climate Implementation," COP30 Brazil, February 16, 2026, <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/at-mumbai-climate-week-cop30-presidency-accelerates-shift-to-climate-implementation>.
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- ²¹ UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 191.
- ²² "Troika: Mission 1.5," UNFCCC, accessed February 19, 2026, <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/un-climate-change-conference-belem-november-2025/troika-mission-15>.
- ²³ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 42 (November 22, 2025).
- ²⁴ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Draft Decision -/CMA.7, ¶ 42 (November 22, 2025).

²⁵ Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, *Considerations for the Progress Assessment of NAPs at COP30* (Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2025), <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Progress-Assessment-of-NAPs-at-COP30.pdf>.

