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Beyond Kyoto Presentations

Promoted in Energy Efficiency section: 

Beyond Kyoto Workshop
In partnership with the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Beijing, China
September 19-20, 2003

Climate Commitments: Assessing the Options
Daniel Bodansky

A Long-Term Target: Framing the Climate Effort
Jonathan Pershing and Fernando Tudela

Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice
John Ashton and Xueman Wang

Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies
Steve Charnovitz

Addressing Cost: The Political Economy of Climate Change
Joseph E. Aldy, Richard Baron and Laurence Tubiana

Development and Climate: Engaging Developing Countries
Thomas C. Heller and P.R. Shukla


Climate Change: Then and Now

Climate Change: Then and Now

Remarks by Eileen Claussen
President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change

Environmental Council of the States

AUGUST 11, 2003

Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here in Salt Lake City and among so many friends. And I thank ECOS for inviting me here today.

I understand that a lot of you will be visiting the Utah Olympic Park this evening for some bobsledding and a ski jump aerial show. And I was interested to see that those of you who are actually interested in doing some bobsledding on your own have to pay an additional fee. As if your copayments at the emergency room will not be enough à

Seriously, I think it is quite fitting, here at the site of the 2002 Winter Olympics, to discuss a topic that calls on all of us, both inside and outside of government, to exert and push ourselves and to test the limits of what we can achieve. That topic, of course, is global climate change. And today, I want to talk with you about what we have achieved looking six years back, and about the future work that must be done.

I know what you are thinking. You are probably thinking that I am here to talk about everything we are not doing. And, I will surely get to some of that, or else I would not be doing my job. I believe that the past six years have been a time of real and legitimate progress in how we think about the problem of climate change, and in what we are doing to address it. And I want to celebrate some of that with you today.

Think about it. In 1997, the debate on this issue was about whether to do anything. There were many, in the scientific, environmental and government community saying we had a very serious problem, and others, in industry, in the States, and in the Congress who either didn't believe that it was a problem or who believed that there was no rush to deal with it.

Fast forward to 2003, and you see how the debate has shifted. Now it is not about whether to do something but about what to do and when to do it. Even President Bush had to revisit his prior assumptions after he assigned a committee of the National Academy of Sciences to look into the matter--and they came back to him reporting that, and I quote "GHGs are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise." Temperatures are, in fact rising. The changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities. The report goes on to say that we can't exclude the possibility that natural variability has contributed as well--but the main point remains--the earth is warming, and humans must accept some responsibility for that warming.

Back in 1997, the nations of the world gathered in Kyoto, Japan, to negotiate the outlines of a treaty that would for the first time establish binding limits on worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases. At the time, the Kyoto Protocol was derided by some in the United States as a fantasy itself--impractical to implement and even unfair in that it did not enlist developing countries in this "global" effort.

And, while some of the criticisms of the Protocol were and remain well founded, we can fast forward to today and see that 111 countries have so far ratified this watershed agreement, and its entry into force awaits the action of only one nation, Russia. What's more, now that the focus has shifted from negotiating Kyoto to implementing it, we are seeing the beginnings of a serious discussion about what comes after the first budget period in Kyoto--and how to engage developing countries, as well as the United States, in the global effort to reduce emissions.

We also are seeing the countries that are part of Kyoto starting to get serious about achieving its goals. The European Union, for example, has adopted a carbon dioxide emission trading program. And Prime Minister Tony Blair has committed Great Britain to a 60 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050--the first instance of a world leader taking an ambitious and long-term view on how to address this problem.

Back in 1997, the perception was that business was adamantly opposed to doing anything about climate change. And then things started to change. Lord John Browne, the CEO of British Petroleum (BP), made an announcement that his company accepted the science that global warming is a problem--and that it is caused in large part by the burning of fossil fuels. Browne went on to pledge that BP would voluntarily reduce its global greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent below 1990 levels before 2010, and they have met that target already, eight years ahead of schedule. In the six years since making its pledge, BP has joined with 37 other companies as part of the Pew Center's Business Environmental Leadership Council, a group that is committed to achieving real progress on this issue. Twenty-three of these companies, BP included, now have specific targets for reducing their emissions, and several more will be announcing targets in the coming months.

These companies have moved from acknowledging the science about climate change to showing what can be done to create a climate-friendly future while still maintaining our economic competitiveness, to becoming advocates for strong government requirements to address this issue.

Back in 1997, the issue of global climate change was not much of a concern at the state level, where other environmental priorities held sway. But today, we know that a majority of states have programs that, while not necessarily directed at climate change, are achieving real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

Back in 1997, if you mentioned the problem of global climate change on Capitol Hill, you were either laughed at or told to leave the premises. The only congressional action on this issue came in the form of requirements that the United States do nothing. Thus we had the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which passed unanimously in the Senate, laying out strong reservations about the Kyoto Protocol negotiations without offering any alternative. And we also had an array of other amendments and so-called "riders" to appropriation bills that sought to prohibit the State Department, the EPA and other agencies from doing anything whatsoever on the issue of climate change.

Fast forward to 2003, and you see that instead of Byrd-Hagel, we now have Byrd-Stevens, a measure establishing a White House office dedicated to formulating a national strategy to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations.

In 1998, Republican Senator John Chafee and Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman were blasted by climate skeptics for writing legislation that would give companies credit for early reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Last year, we had Senators Hagel and Voinovich, offering credit for early reductions, and Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman offering an economy wide cap and trade bill.

The McCain-Lieberman proposal brings together several features that would be critical to the success of a national climate change strategy.

The bill would establish ambitious and binding targets for reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Equally important, it would provide companies with the flexibility to reduce emissions as cost-effectively as possible-thanks to the creation of a rigorous nationwide system allowing emissions trading and providing some credit for carbon storage. Last but not least, the bill would recognize those reductions that are being made now by the companies that are taking the lead on this issue and provide additional flexibility for these early actors.

In another couple of years we will look back and realize that the McCain-Lieberman proposal was pretty moderate.

Of course, I am not a Pollyanna on this issue. I know - and you know - that there are still a small number of skeptical scientists, and there are still those that prefer to do nothing. And some of these people have loud megaphones, and they continue to argue that the science is uncertain, and that action to deal with climate change will ruin the economy. And I also know - and you know - that these individuals are working very hard to see that we do not have a legitimate national policy on this issue.

But I do not believe that they will prevail. I believe strongly that there are also many certainties in the science; that there are many actions that can be taken with no negative economic impact, and that, with careful planning and execution, and with continued technological development, we can address this problem and still have a growing global economy. Which is precisely what we need to do.

So what happens now? Well, the first thing that must happen is for the United States to get a better handle on how we will supply and use energy in the decades ahead. The electric power and transport sectors account for over 80 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The extent to which we weigh the climate impacts of our energy choices will therefore be the key determining factor in whether we can and will achieve progress in reducing our emissions.

The current Capitol Hill debate on U.S. energy policy does not come close to the kind of hard-nosed assessment we need. In this year's House-floor debate over energy policy, congressmen were not even allowed to bring up climate change amendments, perhaps a sign that the House leadership was concerned about an amendment passing.

And the Senate ducked a robust debate on energy and climate policy by simply passing last year's Senate energy bill. Of course, that's not all bad - that Senate bill included the Byrd-Stevens provision, as well as a Brownback-Corzine provision establishing national reporting of greenhouse gas emissions. While the much-heralded vote on the McCain-Lieberman proposal was delayed, an agreement was reached that it will come up for a vote this fall.

In an effort to develop a clearer sense of the future energy picture for the United States, the Pew Center recently teamed up with Peter Schwartz and the Global Business Network to convene relevant experts from the business, academic and NGO sectors. Their charge was to envision a suite of future energy scenarios for the country and to describe the implications of these scenarios for U.S. policy on climate change, going out to 2035.

The group settled on three future energy scenarios:

  • The first was titled Awash in Oil and Gas. In this scenario, as you might suspect from the title, oil and gas remain cheap and abundant. Oil and gas production technology continues to improve, OPEC collapses, and a highly competitive global oil market emerges. Concerns about U.S. oil import dependence are rarely mentioned, so there is little incentive to improve energy efficiency, and carbon emissions rise rapidly. Seventy percent of the coal plants operating in 2000 are still operational in 2035.
  • The second scenario, Turbulent World, is one in which energy supply disruptions and threats to energy facilities lead to aggressive U.S. energy policy measures. The House of Saud falls, leading to oil price spikes and a federal focus on energy security, including tough vehicle efficiency standards of 50 miles per gallon by 2020, and a crash "moonshot" program to develop and commercialize hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. Threats to nuclear facilities and transmission failures lead the public and policy makers to prefer alternative energy systems. Because of its domestic abundance, coal is favored -- it continues its dominant role in electricity generation and becomes an increasingly important source of hydrogen.
  • The third scenario, Technology Triumphs, envisions a future in which a convergence of four forces -- state policies, technological breakthroughs, private investment, and consumer interest -- push and pull climate-friendly technologies into the marketplace. Significant advances in renewables, distributed generation, and efficiency -- especially combined heat and power, building-integrated photovoltaics, and fuel cells -- result from the convergence of these four forces. In this scenario, many states adopt greenhouse gas standards for vehicles, move forward with initiatives to control greenhouse gases from powerplants, and continue to implement renewable portfolio standards.

Using an economic model developed by Argonne National Laboratory, we were able to project how each of these scenarios would affect the United States' energy technology mix and annual CO2 emissions over the next 30 years. Since the key purpose of scenario planning is not to predict the future, but rather to facilitate strategic planning in the face of deep uncertainty, it is useful to identify commonalities among the scenarios.

For example, natural gas use and distributed electric generation increase in all three hypothetical futures, continuing current trends. But another commonality across all three scenarios is that even by 2035 we are still using a lot of the same technology we use today because of significant inertia in the energy sector.

National climate policy was deliberately excluded from each of these "base case" scenarios. The most striking finding of the analysis was that even when we modeled the most optimistic assumptions about the future cost and performance of energy technologies, emissions rise. In Technology Triumphs, emissions rise by a total of 15 percent over 2000 levels by 2035; by 20 percent in Turbulent World, and by 50 percent in Awash in Oil and Gas.

Each of the three scenarios we looked at envisions a future when the only national policy measures in place to protect the climate, are voluntary measures. And the fact that none of these scenarios--even the most optimistic--resulted in any reduction in our carbon emissions highlights the fundamental need for a mandatory carbon emissions policy to address climate change. To state it more clearly, no combination of voluntary programs and research and development incentives will put us on a path that sustains economic growth, enhances economic security, and allows the U.S. to participate appropriately and proportionally in protecting the global climate.

But back to right now, a voluntary effort is all we have. Here I am, near the close of my remarks, and I have yet to offer a critique of the climate policies of the current occupant of the White House. I cannot let him and his Administration off the hook, even if he is trying to enjoy a few weeks of vacation in the parched Texas plains, where I would think the appeal of doing something--anything--to arrest global warming would be great. And if you think I am being partisan, I will be happy to offer a critique of the Clinton Administration's all talk no action policy as well.

But seriously, rather than establishing an absolute target for emission reductions-as many of the companies I have talked about have done-the Bush administration's climate strategy sets a voluntary "greenhouse gas intensity" target for the nation. The idea is to reduce the ratio of greenhouse emissions to U.S. economic output, or GDP. And the funny thing about the White House target--an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity by 2012--is that it would allow actual emissions to grow by 12 percent over the same period.

That's not what I call progress. Progress would mean adopting a real-world domestic energy policy. It would mean engaging the full spectrum of business and society in the effort to reduce the U.S. contribution to this problem. It would mean adopting a clear, mandatory goal for emission cuts, along with sensible, business-friendly rules that give companies the flexibility they need to help meet this goal as cost-effectively as possible.

That would be progress. And it would put the federal government in the company of many businesses throughout the world, as well as entire countries and U.S. states that already are moving forward to address this issue.

In closing, allow me pay special tribute to the work that many of you are doing at the state level. In 2002, we released a report entitled Greenhouse and Statehouse: The Evolving State Government Role in Climate Change, that surveyed the current level of state activity on this topic. And we found that a variety of measures that have proven controversial at the federal level, such as renewable portfolio standards and mandatory reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, have been implemented at the state level, often with little dissent.

Texas and 13 other states, for example, now require utilities to generate a specified share of their power from renewable sources. Five states have carbon sequestration programs in place. Three have established reporting programs for greenhouse gas emissions, and two of these are mandatory programs. In addition, two states have overall caps on their emissions, and one state, California, is working on direct controls on emissions from motor vehicles.

And then there is the story of the efforts of New York state, under Governor Pataki, to create a regional market in which power plants can buy and sell carbon dioxide credits. To date, nine of ten states contacted by the governor have indicated that they are interested in working together to reduce emissions across the region.

The work that all of you are doing in your states is vitally important, both in reducing emissions and in showing that progress is possible--that we can protect the climate while at the same time promoting economic growth. Over the last six years, we have seen that climate change is an issue where solutions bubble up from below. Businesses, states, and localities begin to take it seriously, and they begin to take action to reduce their contribution to the problem. And, in the process, they create a climate that is more hospitable and more conducive to broader changes at the national and international levels.

As you gather here in this Olympic city, I encourage all of you to keep the torch burning for climate solutions--both within your states and at the federal level. You may not get a medal for your performance, but future generations will surely reward you with their admiration and their thanks.

Thank you very much.

Beyond Kyoto Workshop Presentations

Promoted in Energy Efficiency section: 

Beyond Kyoto Workshop
Cocoyoc, Mexico
July 25-26, 2003

A Long-Term Target: Framing the Climate Effort
Jonathan Pershing and Fernando Tudela

Climate Commitments: Assessing the Options
Daniel Bodansky

Equity and Climate: In Principle and Practice
John Ashton and Xueman Wang

Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies
Steve Charnovitz

Addressing Cost: The Political Economy of Climate Change
Joseph E. Aldy, Richard Baron, and Laurence Tubiana

Development and Climate: Engaging Developing Countries
Thomas C. Heller and P.R. Shukla


A Vision for a Climate-Friendly Future

A Vision for a Climate-Friendly Future

Remarks by Eileen Claussen
President, Pew Center on Global Cliamte Change

Air & Waste Management Association Annual Conference and Exhibition

June 23, 2003

Thank you very much.  It is a pleasure to be here in San Diego.  And I thank the Air & Waste Management Association for inviting me here today. 

While looking at the website for this conference, I was surprised to see that the plenary presentation this morning coincides with a recreational opportunity for attendees at the-- conference -- that is, a visit to several of San Diego’s historical sites that is billed as the “step back in time tour.”  Let me say, first, that I appreciate the fact that so many of you opted out of that event, preferring to remain in the here and now. 

In my speech today I intend to offer a tour of both the past and the future. I want to talk about the need for a vision of what the world might look like 50 years from now -- what the world must look like -- if we finally accept our responsibility to protect the global climate. And I want to talk about how the lessons from the past can help us get there.

Let me start with a brief “step back in time tour” of my own,  and reflect for a minute on some advice that I was given when I was working on waste management issues back in the 1970’s.  I can clearly remember being berated by a vice president of a major US corporation for my foolish ideas on reuse and recycling.  After the critique was over, the VP went on to offer me some counseling.  “Eileen,” he said, “be careful that you don’t try to become a monument.  Monuments attract pigeons.”  Well, I didn’t listen to that advice, and while the pigeons are sometimes a problem, I would be delighted if pigeons were all I had to worry about. 

Unfortunately, what I do worry about is whether we have what it takes to create the vision of where we need to be, and then achieve it – whether we are all willing to take the risk of becoming monuments.  Because the task at hand is not an easy one:  we must wean ourselves away from our reliance on fossil fuels, and begin in earnest to develop the technologies and the alternative energy sources that will help us achieve real and steady reductions in worldwide emissions of the greenhouse gases that cause climate change. 

There are a lot of good things happening right now.  Individuals, companies and governments are taking important and worthwhile steps to address this problem, and I want to talk with you a little bit about what they are doing.  But what is happening now is not nearly enough.  And the priority looking ahead must be to marry a long-term vision of a climate-friendly future with the short-term strategies that will get us there.

In this, we must remember the words of Eleanor Roosevelt: “The future is literally in our hands to mold as we like. But we cannot wait until tomorrow. Tomorrow is now.”

Of course, the reason we are having this discussion -- and the reason I am laying out this vision -- is that we have a real problem.  The earth’s climate is undergoing important and potentially hazardous changes, and human activities are largely to blame.  Of this there is no doubt.  Even our President (previously referred to as skeptic-in-chief), revised his prior assumptions after he assigned a committee of the National Academy of Sciences to look into the matter -- and they came back to him reporting that, and I quote "GHG's are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean  temperatures to rise.  Temperatures are, in fact rising.  The changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities."  The report goes on to say that we can't exclude the possibility that natural variability has contributed as well  -- but the main point remains - the earth is warming, and humans must accept some responsibility for that warming.

How significant is this warming trend?  The earth’s temperature has always fluctuated, but ordinarily these shifts have occurred over the course of centuries or millennia, not decades.  Over the last century, we have seen a one-degree increase in global temperatures.  And the increase appears to be accelerating.  The 1990s were the hottest decade on record.  The last five years were among the seven hottest on record.  Scientists project that over the next century, average global temperature will rise between two and ten degrees Fahrenheit.  The higher-end figure of ten degrees would be the largest swing in global temperature since the end of the last ice age 12,000 years ago. 

What will be the effects of this warming?  In the short term, there will be both winners and losers as farms and forests, for example, become more productive at some latitudes, but less productive at others.  In the long term, though, any possible benefits from global warming will likely be far outweighed by the costs -- and the consequences may be irreversible.  Consequences such as increased flooding and increased drought, as well as extended heat waves, more powerful storms, and other extreme weather events.  And I have not even mentioned the problem of rising sea level, which has potentially far-reaching effects on coastal areas throughout the world.

Global warming, in other words, is not an idle concern.  Unfortunately, however, it is a concern that has become overly politicized and polarized, and the main reason for this is that addressing this issue effectively requires us to change.  There is no way around it.  Responding to climate change will fundamentally alter the way we meet many of our most basic needs. 

But a lot of people don't like change; change is hard, it requires effort, and it makes things, well…different.  Many would rather keep the status quo.  Those who are against the changes that are needed, argue that they would imperil our economy and our way of life.  But let me tell you something: those who oppose practical steps to deal with the issue of climate change are misguided, because we can address this issue effectively while still growing our economy. In fact, if we fail to address it, the costs are likely to be greater.  Our emissions will have grown; the amounts we will have to reduce will be greater; the time available to make these reductions will be shorter; and the costs for damage control and remediation will increase.   In making this argument I am not suggesting that taking the necessary steps will be either free or easy.  But I believe strongly that with a long-term vision of where we want to go, we can design reasonable, cost-effective strategies to get us there -- one step, one decade at a time. 

Looking 50 years ahead, the questions then become: How will we power our economy?  How will the nations of the world -- developing and industrialized countries alike -- achieve reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions while at the same time achieving their goals for growth?  And, at a more every-day level, how will we get to work?  What kind of office buildings will we work in?  What kind of cars and trucks will we drive?  And, if we plug in our hot tubs, our refrigerators, and our TVs and computers, where will the power come from? 

This isn’t the Jetsons of cartoon fame that I am talking about -- with people rocketing around in space cars and taking ultra-sonic showers.  Rather, it is real life.  And there are real changes that need to happen -- and that can happen -- if we give this issue the attention it so desperately deserves. 

And now, if you will permit me, I would like to give you a second little “step back in time tour.”  The location isn’t San Diego in 2003 but Montreal in 1987.  That was the place and the time, as all of you know, when the nations of the world stepped up to the challenge of ozone depletion and negotiated a treaty, The Montreal Protocol, to begin to phase out the production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals. 

In the years leading up to 1987, there was a great deal of skepticism about whether the depletion of the ozone layer was indeed a problem -- and, more importantly, whether it was a problem we could solve.  At first, many people denied that the problem existed, but then the argument shifted to one where many in industry said that replacing the CFCs that were causing the problem was impossible, particularly in the short term. These chemicals, it was said, are in such wide use in everything from refrigerators to aerosol antiperspirants that there is no way that society is going to be able to do without them.  But then governments began to work seriously on a framework for action, and industry initiated a major effort to work on alternative chemicals and processes.  Soon it became clear that we could develop less harmful substitutes.  The Montreal Protocol was agreed and then strengthened over time as industry became more and more comfortable with alternatives.  And the rest is history.  

I tell this story because it is about reaching for a vision that might not seem immediately attainable but that can indeed become reality with a lot of hard work and imagination.  Fast forward to today, and you see that getting rid of CFCs has not stood in the way of our ability to keep our yogurt cold or our ability (indeed, our need) to use antiperspirant -- and for that we can all be very thankful.  We were able to change to protect the planet.  And, today, we need to start thinking about the changes we have to make in order to protect the climate. 

Do we have a climate-friendly vision for the future?  I believe we have some of the pieces, but are far from having a complete vision.  Let’s look at what the Bush Administration has offered.  It seems to consist of three parts:  a greenhouse gas intensity target for the next decade; a strategy of voluntary measures to achieve that target; and a set of research efforts to assist in bringing about long-term technological change. 

There are a number of fundamental problems with this approach.  First, rather than establishing an absolute target for emission reductions – as many of the companies we are working with at the Pew Center have done and as the international community has done with the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration’s climate strategy sets a voluntary “greenhouse gas intensity” target for the nation.  The idea is to reduce the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to U.S. economic output, or GDP.  But the biggest problem with the White House target – an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity by 2012 – is that it would allow actual emissions to grow by 12 percent over the same period.

What’s more, the Administration’s strategy relies entirely on voluntary measures.  This despite the fact that U.S. climate policy has consisted primarily of voluntary measures for more than a decade.  And what have these voluntary measures achieved?  As of 2001, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions were up 12 percent over their 1991 levels. 

And, finally, while the Administration is putting significant effort into long-term research and development, it is not tied to specific longer term emission reduction goals. It is absolutely clear that technological research and development must be a critical element in any vision of a climate-friendly future.  It is also clear that without a specific, binding target that creates the demand for these new technologies, we are unlikely to succeed in our efforts to protect the global climate. 
We can do better than that.  We have to do better than that.  In the months and years ahead, we as a nation need to think more seriously about the short- and long-term steps we should be taking to reduce our contribution to climate change.  

And we can learn from many of the promising activities that are taking place all around us starting with the efforts of the members of the Pew Center’s Business Environmental Leadership Council.   The council’s 38 members represent nearly 2.5 million employees and have combined revenues of $855 billion.  They include mostly Fortune 500 firms, and they are committed to economically viable climate solutions.  What are they doing?  

  • Alcoa, for example, is developing a new technology for smelting aluminum that, if successful, will allow the company to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to half their 1990 levels over the next nine years.  
  • Similarly, Shell recently met its target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent from 1990 levels -- and it did this in part by revamping its disposal of the waste gases resulting from oil and gas production. Shell also is planning a long-term transition into the renewable energy market, having invested $1 billion in renewables to date.
  • Shell is not the only company we are working with that is venturing into new markets or shifting its business focus.  ABB is a $25 billion Swiss business-to-business supplier that has divested itself of traditional, large-scale power generation businesses.  Instead, the company now supplies distributed energy solutions, such as combined heat and power technology, fuel cells, microturbines, and wind power plants.  
  • And then there is the case of Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., which entered into an agreement to provide the waste stream from one of its chemical plants for use as a fuel source for a neighboring company.  Air Products and Chemicals also has numerous operations that recover hydrogen molecules and other waste gases from the industrial processes of other companies.  Not only are these waste gases used as a fuel source for cogeneration plants, but the recovery of hydrogen reduces the need for natural gas to create hydrogen anew -- creating a double climate benefit.

All of these are important developments—and they show how increasing numbers of leading companies see a clear business interest both in reducing their emissions and in helping to shape a climate-friendly future. 

Even more encouraging is the fact that elected leaders in the states are working to shape that future now -- and they are doing it, in part, by recognizing that climate change is an air and waste management issue.

  • Massachusetts, for example, has established a multi-pollutant cap requiring six older power plants to reduce their CO2 emissions by 10 percent. 
  • In neighboring New Hampshire, lawmakers have adopted a similar, multi-pollutant approach in an effort to require the state’s three fossil fuel-fired power plants to stabilize their CO2 emissions at 1990 levels.  
  • Elsewhere, states have developed innovative waste management programs that will protect the climate.  These include a mandatory statewide recycling program in New Jersey that helped the state avoid 8.7 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 1995; and a program in Missouri that provides financing for a project to capture methane from a 70-acre sanitary landfill for use as fuel for the boilers of a local high school. 

That is what I call vision.  And it is a quality that is desperately needed as the United States sets out in the years ahead to reduce greenhouse gas emissions nationwide.  Clearly, we have a ways to go.  How far?  Well, right now, we have a national climate strategy that says it is fine and good for our emissions to continue to grow.  So obviously the road ahead is a rather long and probably a winding one.  But first we must decide what the future should look like.

Let's take a look at a  couple of specific sectors, the power sector and the transportation sector -- which together account for about 2/3 of our nation's energy use.

How do we envision the power sector?  With no silver bullet on the horizon, we can  expect a future with greater use of natural gas (if we can increase supply and meet our infrastructure needs); with a steadily increasing use of renewables (and the progress of wind energy over the last decade should give us a glimmer of hope); with an increased emphasis on distributed generation and combined heat and power; with nuclear at least maintaining its current level of electric generation; and finally with coal, if we are able to master carbon capture and sequestration and make it economically viable.  

Meeting the challenge of the transportation sector will not be easy, but the rewards will yield energy security dividends as well as environmental ones. If we start now by investing and deploying  existing technologies and investments, it is possible to reduce carbon emissions by about 20 to 25% by 2015 and 45 to 50% by 2030, compared to business as usual.    The transportation sector is a perfect example of the need for both short and longer-term efforts.  It typically takes 10-15 years to turnover a vehicle fleet, so if we start making new vehicles more efficient today,  it will take more than a decade for these efficiency gains to be realized in all vehicles on the road.  At the same time we should be working toward the low-carbon transportation future that we ultimately need, with advanced hybrids, advanced diesel, hydrogen fuel cells and the infrastructure that will be needed to support hydrogen. 

But simply having a vision gets you nowhere.  You have to be able to achieve it.  Starting right now, we have to identify the steps necessary to transition to a new, climate-friendly economy.  We know that there are short-term strategies that significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions without radical changes in technologies or lifestyles.  These are the low-hanging fruit in the effort to create a climate-friendly future: the efficiency and management improvements that will save money and reduce emissions.    And we have a vision of our longer-term needs.    But most important, we know that we cannot achieve our vision for the future, or even take advantage of the myriad of shorter-term improvements that are environmentally and economically advantageous without a strong national policy. 

This policy must be focused on four specific areas: 

  • One: We need to create a system where reporting and disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions becomes the rule -- at the very least, for major sources -- and where companies that are acting now to reduce their emissions are assured of credit under future mandatory regimes.
  • Two: We need to use a combination of standards, tax credits and other incentives to expand the use of energy-efficient motor vehicles, appliances and buildings; renewable energy; and alternative fuels and technologies.  We need to send the market the right signals in order for change to happen.
  • Three: We need to expand our natural gas supply and infrastructure and promote advanced coal technologies with carbon capture and disposal.
  • And four: We need to adopt a comprehensive national strategy that couples mandatory reductions in emissions with flexible, market-based approaches such as emissions trading.

Just last month, the Pew Center released a report taking a detailed look at six diverse emissions trading programs.  The aim was to draw general lessons for the development of trading programs for greenhouse gases.  And the conclusion?  A so-called “cap-and-trade” program -- which couples trading with a mandatory goal for reducing emissions -- would be an especially attractive way of reducing the U.S. contribution to climate change. Among the reasons: trading allows for greater efficiency than other approaches, given that the cost of reducing emissions varies widely by source.

Of course, we already know how a market-based strategy such as trading can contribute to environmental progress.  We have seen it happen.  The year in this case was 1990, and the place was Washington, D.C., where lawmakers, as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments passed that year, set out to mandate significant reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from electric utilities.  The results of this program are clear – the goals have been met, and the costs have been far less than anticipated.  

The same kind of cap-and-trade system can achieve the same kind of progress in our effort to protect the climate.  It is this kind of system, in fact, that is at the heart of national climate change legislation introduced earlier this year by Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain.  This landmark measure for the first time brings together several features that would be critical to the success of a national climate change strategy.  The bill would establish ambitious and binding targets for reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  Equally important, it would provide companies with the flexibility to reduce emissions as cost-effectively as possible – thanks to the creation of a rigorous nationwide system allowing emissions trading, the provision of credit for carbon storage, and the ability to use credits earned abroad  Last but not least, the bill would recognize those reductions that are being made now by the companies that are taking the lead on this issue and provide additional flexibility for these early actors. 

Of course, the Lieberman-McCain measure has no real chance of becoming law any time soon. But it does give us a starting place on the policy vision that we so desperately need. 

As we begin building a workable strategy to reduce U.S. emissions, we can at the same time begin demonstrating leadership internationally. As the producer of fully one-fourth of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, we have to show the world, first, that we are stepping up to this problem domestically, and, second, that we can contribute in important and substantive ways to the development of a global framework for action. 

Despite the Bush administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, it is in the United States’ best interests to forge an effective, long-term international climate agreement – one ensuring that all major emitting countries do their fair share to meet this challenge.  Whether you support it or not, the Kyoto Protocol is a reasonable first step and provides an important framework for the continuing evolution of the world’s energy mix. 

But in the same way that the United States should be guided by a long-term vision as it works domestically to protect the climate, so too must the global community be looking beyond Kyoto.  Because an agreement that’s going to work – an agreement that can bring in not only the United States, but developing countries as well – will in all likelihood be something other than Kyoto.  And it’s going to take some time to get there.

The more immediate challenge, though, is here at home.  And the longer U.S. policy makers wait to address the climate issue in a serious way, the greater the risk to the climate and to America’s standing in the world. 

A “step back in time” is important for learning what works.  But Eleanor  Roosevelt was right: “Tomorrow is now.”  And we need right now to be shaping a vision of a better tomorrow for our climate, for our economy, and for all of us. We need to get on with solutions.

Thank you very much. 

Tackling Climate Change: 5 Keys to Success

Tackling Climate Change: 5 Keys to Success

Remarks by Eileen Claussen
President, Pew Center on Global Cliamte Change

4th Annual Dartmouth Student Science Congress

May 2, 2003

Thank you very much.  It is a pleasure to be here at Dartmouth for the Fourth Annual Student Science Congress.  I understand that as part of these proceedings, students will be voting on a series of ballot questions.  I have not yet seen these questions, but tonight I am nevertheless going to try to influence your answers.  

For example, if one of the questions is “How serious a problem is global warming?” I encourage you to answer that it is a very serious problem indeed.  And, if one of the questions is “Who was your favorite speaker during the Congress?” . . . well, just keep in mind that Claussen sort of rhymes with awesome. 

Seriously, I appreciate this opportunity to address your Student Science Congress, and I applaud the organizers of this event for taking on a topic of such pressing importance.  Whether we like it or not, global warming is shaping up as one of the most important  challenges of the 21st century.  It is going to drive far-reaching changes in how we live and work, how we power our homes, schools, factories and office buildings, how we get from one place to another, how we manufacture and transport goods, and even how we farm and manage forests.  It touches every aspect of our economy and our lives, and to ignore it is to live in a fantasy land where nothing ever has to change – and where we never have to accept what the science tells us about what is happening to our world.

My goal tonight is to give you a clear idea of where we stand today in the effort against global climate change. To do that, I’d first like to offer you an insider’s look at how the world and the United States have responded to this challenge over the last decade.

Then, after the history lesson – and don’t worry, there will not be a test – I want to look forward.  And I’d like to suggest to you five keys to success – five things we need to do if were are to successfully meet the challenge of climate change.

So, to begin with, let’s travel back in time to 1992, when another George Bush was our President, and when the nations of the world gathered in sunny Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, affectionately known as the Earth Summit.  This was the event, you may recall, where more than 150 countries signed an agreement called the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 

The UNFCCC, as it is known, set an ambitious long-term objective: to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would – and I quote – “prevent dangerous anthropogenic (or human-caused) interference with the climate system.”  This is a goal that the United States, and virtually every other nation, has embraced.  

As a first step, industrialized countries agreed to a voluntary emissions target:  they aimed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.  Before long, however, it became clear that the targets would not be met and that voluntary commitments could not deliver genuine action.  So the United States and others countries began to negotiate a new agreement, one with binding targets, and they agreed at the outset that these new commitments would extend only to the industrialized countries, which so far have contributed the most to the problem. 

The result, negotiated five years after the Rio summit in Kyoto, Japan, is the Kyoto Protocol.  The Protocol requires countries to reduce or limit their emissions of greenhouse gases in relation to 1990 levels, with different countries agreeing to different targets.  The agreement also includes a number of features advocated by the United States to ensure countries a high degree of flexibility as they work to achieve their targets.  They can make actual emission reductions at home, trade emission credits with others who have made reductions, and use “sinks” such as farms and forests to remove carbon from the atmosphere. 

During the negotiations in Kyoto, Vice President Al Gore flew to the ancient Japanese capital to help hammer out the deal.  And what the U.S. negotiators ultimately agreed to was a binding 7-percent reduction in emissions below 1990 levels by 2012. 

The problem was that it was already 1997, and U.S. emissions had already risen over 1990 levels by more than 8 percent.  In other words, we had pledged to reduce our emissions by nearly 14 percent and we didn’t have any kind of program in place to do this, nor any will to put such a program into place. 

Another problem was that the United States Senate, under the Byrd-Hagel resolution, had recently voted unanimously that the United States should not sign any climate treaty that – quote – "would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States" or that did not impose some type of commitment on developing countries as well. 

Of course Kyoto did not include commitments for developing countries, because the parties, including the United States, agreed at the outset that it would not.  And the target agreed to by the United States was portrayed by those who wished to kill the treaty as clearly harmful to our economy, a charge that was not effectively countered by the Administration.  So the fact of the matter is that the Kyoto Protocol negotiated by the Clinton administration was about as welcome in the Senate as the proverbial skunk at a lawn party – and senators had no intention of holding their noses so they could tolerate this thing.  They just plain didn’t want it anywhere near them. 

The Clinton administration, for its part, did nothing to try to bring about the ratification of this treaty that its people had made such a big deal of signing.  Granted, the President at the time was caught up in a scandal, and Vice President Gore was gearing up for a presidential run of his own and surely wanted to avoid being publicly associated with anything that could be said to pose a threat the economy.  But still, the whole episode of U.S. participation in Kyoto -- and, before that, the UNFCCC -- was enough to recall the line from Shakespeare: “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”  The bottom line: We clearly were not prepared to deliver at home what we were promising abroad. 

But the story does not end there.  To fast forward to 2000, American voters elected another President – another Bush – and within months of entering office his administration made a unilateral decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol out of hand, instead of working to change it and make it better.  Needless to say, this decision was not received warmly by other nations that had persevered through years of difficult negotiations and that had acceded to U.S. demands early on that the treaty include trading and other business-friendly mechanisms. 

As an aside, I think it is interesting to note that in the recent run-up to the war in Iraq, it was hard to find an article about other countries’ perceptions of the United States that did not mention the impolitic way in which this Administration rejected Kyoto.  It was perceived as a real slap in the face – a confirmation of global fears that the United States, which is responsible for almost one-fourth of global greenhouse has emissions, had no intention of acting seriously on this issue.

As if to confirm these fears, the Bush administration last year announced a climate strategy that was big on rhetoric but not-so-big on results.   Here is what this strategy does: It sets a voluntary “greenhouse gas intensity” target for the nation.  The idea is to reduce the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to U.S. economic output, or GDP.  But the funny thing about the White House target – an 18 percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity by 2012 – is that it would allow actual emissions to grow by 12 percent over the same period.

What’s more, the Administration’s strategy relies entirely on voluntary measures.  This despite the fact that U.S. climate policy has consisted primarily of voluntary measures for more than a decade.  And what have these voluntary measures achieved?  As of 2001, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions were up 11.9 percent over their 1991 levels.  And so now we are more than ten years removed from the Earth Summit, and we still – still – have no real plan in place to reduce the U.S. contribution to the problem that we and other countries identified back then as – quote – “a common concern of humankind.”

The reason I have presented this history lesson is to show that, as the world has set out in the last decade to respond to the problem of climate change, the United States has been both a driver and a drag on the process, a driver in terms of development of a framework for action, a drag because we have made no serious attempt to implement that framework.  We are like the boyfriend or girlfriend who says sweet things all the time but will never truly commit.  And lately we aren’t even saying sweet things any more. 

The reality is that it is long past the time for playing these sorts of games.  We should have committed long ago to serious action on this issue and, having failed, it is all the more urgent that we get serious now.  What does that mean?  What principles should guide these efforts?  I’d like to offer five – five keys to success in meeting the challenge of climate change. 

Key Number One: We must forge a global response to the problem of  climate change.  As I already said, the United States is responsible for one-fourth of global greenhouse gas emissions.  The 15 countries of the European Union are responsible for another one-fourth.  The remainder is divided among other developed nations and rapidly developing countries such as China and India.  And, while developed countries clearly are responsible for a majority of these emissions, that will not be the case in the future as emissions continue to grow more rapidly in developing countries than anywhere else.

It is one of the most contentious issues in the debate over global climate change – that is, the perceived divide between the interests and obligations of developed and developing countries.  Equity demands that the industrialized world—the source of most past and current emissions of greenhouse gases—act first to reduce emissions. This principle is embedded in both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, which sets binding emission targets for developed countries only. However, with the Protocol expected to enter into force sometime this year or next, it is now time to turn our attention to what happens next.  And as we do this, we need to think broadly of a framework that will include not only the countries that will be implementing the Kyoto protocol, but also the United States, Australia, and the major emitting countries in the developing world.   

I do not claim to know what form this framework should take.  But here’s what I do know:  It must be effective; over the coming decades, it must significantly reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases.  It also must be fair.  We must recognize who bears responsibility for climate change, and who will bear the brunt of its impacts; and we must arrive at an equitable sharing of responsibility for addressing it.  That probably means different kinds of measures for different countries at different times, but all the major emitting countries must do their part.  Finally, this new framework must marry our environmental goals with our economic and development objectives.  In the developing world in particular, commitments that are not consistent and compatible with raising standards of living and promoting sustainable economic growth have little chance of success.  And even in the developed world, all countries will have to be convinced that the environmental goals they agree to, the carbon limits they accept, will not impede their efforts to sustain economic growth.  This will mean not only ensuring that countries are given flexibility in how they meet their goals, but also that they can turn over the existing capital stock and acquire more climate friendly technology at prices that they can afford.    

This brings us to the second Key to Success in our efforts to address the climate issue: We need to think in terms of both short-term and long-term actions.  There is a great deal we can do now to reduce our emissions.  At the same time, we need to be looking ahead to longer-term, and potentially more far-reaching, reductions in the years and decades to come. 

At the Pew Center, we are developing a plan we call the 10/50 Solution.  The idea is to think ahead to where we need to be 50 years from now if we are going to meet the challenge of climate change, and then to figure out decade by decade how to do it.

Why look 50 years out?  Because achieving the necessary reductions in our greenhouse gas emissions will ultimately require innovation on a level never before seen.  It will require a massive shift away from fossil fuels to climate-friendly sources of energy.  And, as I said at the start of my remarks, it will require fundamental changes in how we live and work and grow our economies. 

The 10-50 approach doesn’t just look long-term, though.  It recognizes that in order to realize that 50-year vision, we have to start right now.  We can start with the low-hanging fruit – the countless ways we can reduce greenhouse emissions at little or no cost by simply being more efficient: everything from more fuel-efficient cars and trucks, including hybrids, to energy-efficient appliances and computers, efficiency improvements in industry, and even better management of animal wastes.

In the medium to long term, the challenge is to begin what we have called a second industrial revolution.  The Pew Center is just now completing a scenario analysis that identifies several technologies as essential to our ability to create a climate-friendly energy future for the United States.  Among them:

· Number one: natural gas.  Substituting natural gas for coal results in approximately half the carbon emissions per unit of energy supplied, but we need policies to encourage the expansion of natural gas supply and infrastructure.
· Number two: energy efficiency.  We have the ability to dramatically improve the fuel economy of cars and light trucks right now and in the very near future through a combination of advances in the internal combustion engine or through hybrid electric vehicles.
· Number three: renewable energy and distributed generation.  The potential here is enormous, but policy support will be essential in promoting investment and breaking barriers to market entry for these technologies.
· Number four: nuclear power.  Despite its problems, the fact remains that our carbon emissions would be much higher without nuclear power.
· Number five: geological sequestration.  Sequestration holds the potential of allowing for the continued production of energy from fossil fuels, including coal, even in the event of mandatory limits on carbon emissions. 
· And number six: hydrogen and fuel cells.  The President’s recent announcement of a new federal commitment to fuel cell research was a welcome one, but we must have policies that will help pull these vehicles into the market.

Looking down this list, it is hard not to see that most, if not all, of these technologies would be important even in a world where we did not have this pressing obligation to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  For energy security and economic growth reasons, and a wide range of environmental reasons as well, these are simply smart things to do.  The second industrial revolution is not just about responding to the challenge of climate change; it’s about creating a common-sense energy future. 

And, in order to create that energy future, we are going to have to keep in mind Key to Success Number Three: Industry must be a partner in shaping and implementing climate solutions.   The Pew Center serves as a convenor of leading businesses that are taking practical steps to reduce their contribution to the climate problem. The 38 members of our Business Environmental Leadership Council represent nearly 2.5 million employees and have combined revenues of $855 billion.  They include mostly Fortune 500 firms, and they are deeply committed to climate solutions:

· There is DuPont, for example, which made a voluntary pledge to reduce its global emissions of greenhouse gases by 65 percent by the year 2010.  And guess what?  Late last year, they announced they had achieved this target eight years ahead of schedule.
· Also ahead of schedule in meeting its target is BP, which in 2002 announced it had reduced global greenhouse emissions by 9 million metric tons in just four years.  This marked a 10-percent reduction in the company’s emissions – and, like DuPont, BP had originally intended to achieve this goal in 2010.

Over the past several years, it has become clear that there are three types of companies when it comes to the issue of climate change: those that do not accept the science; those that accept the science and are working internally to reduce their contribution to the problem; and those that accept the science, are working internally and are advocating for strong government action to address this issue. 

BP, DuPont and the other companies we are working with at the Pew Center clearly fall into this latter group.  And I hope that our government – as well as other governments throughout the world – will take full advantage of their expertise and commitment.

The benefits of active involvement by industry in environmental policy making first became clear to me during negotiations on the Montreal Protocol – the agreement that set out to address the man-made threat to the Earth’s protective ozone layer.   An important reason for the success of that agreement, I believe, is that the companies that produced and used ozone-depleting chemicals—and that were developing substitutes for them—were very much engaged in the process.  As a result, there was a factual basis and an honesty about what we could achieve, how we could achieve it, and when. And there was an acceptance on the part of industry, particularly U.S. companies, that the depletion of the ozone layer was an important problem and that multilateral action was needed.  

I am happy to report that we are seeing the same kind of acceptance and determination to act on the climate issue among the companies we work with at the Pew Center.  Their involvement should serve as a reminder that it is industry that will develop the technologies and the strategies that will reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases.  It is industry that will have to deliver on government requirements and goals.  To ignore this as we try to structure a global response to this enormous challenge is to fail.

Speaking of government, let me introduce a fourth Key to Success in responding to climate change: We have to adopt real, mandatory goals.  Voluntary approaches, as I have said, simply have not worked to address this problem.  In order to engage the full spectrum of industry and society, we need to set clear, mandatory goals for emission cuts, and at the same time provide sensible, business-friendly rules that give companies the flexibility they need to help meet those goals as cost-effectively as possible. 

This is the approach embodied in recent legislation introduced by the bipartisan duo of Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman.  This landmark measure for the first time brings together several features that would be critical to the success of a national climate change strategy.  The bill would establish ambitious and binding targets for reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  Equally important, it would provide companies with the flexibility to reduce emissions as cost-effectively as possible – thanks to the creation of a rigorous nationwide system allowing emissions trading and providing some credit for carbon storage.  Last but not least, the bill would recognize those reductions that are being made now by the companies that are taking the lead on this issue and provide additional flexibility for these early actors. 

Of course, the McCain-Lieberman measure has little chance of becoming law any time soon, but it is an encouraging development nonetheless to see our policymakers in Washington finally coming to grips with exactly what it is going to take to yield real progress toward a climate-friendly future.  And what it is going to take is a set of real, enforceable commitments.

This leads us finally, and forgive me if this seems redundant, to Key to Success Number Five: The United States must be an integral part of the climate solution.   Despite having 4 percent of the world’s population, we have contributed nearly a third of worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases in the last century, and we continue to be the largest source of these emissions worldwide.  And still, we have decided to sit on the sidelines while the world moves forward with a plan to begin addressing this challenge.  Even worse, we have yet to develop anything resembling a domestic program to reduce our own emissions and protect the climate.  

This problem, quite simply, will not be solved without us.  We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to other nations, and we owe it to future generations, to commit American ingenuity and American leadership to meeting this challenge.  I think the job begins at home: We must achieve a national consensus on how best to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions.  And from there, we must engage constructively with other nations in the searching for a lasting global solution. 

So there you have it.  Five keys to success:  We need to address this issue globally.  We need to think and act both short-term and long-term.  We need to involve industry.  We need mandatory goals.  And we need the United States to do its part both at home and abroad. 

Yet another key to success, as I have learned over the years, is to keep your remarks to a reasonable length.  So I will stop there, and I welcome your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

COP 6 The Hague

Conference of the Parties 6 (COP 6)
Climate Talks in The Hague, The Netherlands

November 13-24, 2000

Climate Negotiations

November 13-24 at the 6th Conference of the Parties (Cop-6) in The Hague. This section of the Web site provides pertinent background materials and coverage of the conference.

On the Table at COP 6

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol includes binding emission reduction targets for developed countries, and general provisions for how the Protocol will operate. But there are few specifics on what rules will govern Protocol operations, and these rules raise many policy and technical issues.

The 1998 Buenos Aires Plan of Action specifies in some detail the particulars that remain to be delineated. It also lists issues from the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change that require action. All of these issues are "on the table" at the 6th Conference of the Parties (COP6).

For background on the issues, check out the following:

  • Getting It Right: Climate Change Problem Demands Thoughtful Solutions
    Op-ed by Eileen Claussen to be published in The Washington Post on Nov 15 and The International Herald Tribune Nov 18
  • "Getting Kyoto Right"
    Speech delivered by Eileen Claussen at The Earth Technologies Forum October 30 Washington DC
  • Atlantic Monthly Roundtable
    Eileen Claussen, Gregg Easterbrook of The New Republic and The Atlantic Monthly; Mary A. Gade, an adviser to George W. Bush; and Bill McKibben, the author of The End of Nature participated in an Atlantic Monthly interactive roundtable discussion in September. View transcripts of the discussion, hosted by The Atlantic's Jack Beatty.


More coverage of the proceedings:

COP 6 Bis

Conference of the Parties 6 (COP 6) Bis
Bonn, Germany

July 16 - 27, 2001

To the surprise of most observers, international climate change negotiators meeting in Bonn, Germany, reached agreement on Monday on most of the key political issues relating to implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The decision by the Sixth Session (part two) of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, known as COP-6, covers four principal areas: operating rules for emissions trading and other market-based mechanisms established under the Protocol; how the sequestration of carbon by forests and other "sinks" will be credited toward Kyoto emission targets; funding to help developing countries combat and cope with climate change; and mechanisms to encourage and enforce compliance with the Kyoto targets.

Although the agreement resolves most of the high-profile issues, it does not address many more technical issues that will play a significant role in determining the practicability and efficiency of the emissions trading system and Kyoto's other flexibility mechanisms. The negotiation of these more detailed, technical rules will continue during the remainder of the conference and is likely to spill over to COP-7 this fall in Marrakesh. The Protocol will take effect only when ratified by at least 55 countries accounting for at least 55 percent of developed country emissions in 1990.

All countries except the United States, which has announced that it does not intend to ratify the Protocol, hailed the agreement as a major breakthrough. Many countries in their concluding statements spoke of the need to leave the door open for U.S. participation at a later date.

Key Elements


The Protocol establishes three market-based mechanisms aimed at achieving emissions reductions as cost-effectively as possible. They are emissions trading (the buying and selling of emissions credits among Annex I countries, which are those with binding emission targets); joint implementation (allowing one country with a target to receive emissions credit for a specific project undertaken in another country with a target); and the Clean Development Mechanism, or CDM (allowing developed countries to receive emissions credit for financing projects that reduce emissions in developing countries). Key decisions reached this week include:

  • · No quantitative limits on the use of the mechanisms. Instead, the agreement provides simply that domestic action shall constitute "a significant element" of the effort made by Annex I Parties to reach their targets.
  • A 2% levy on CDM projects to support developing country efforts to cope with the impacts of climate change. (The agreement does not place a levy on emissions trading or joint implementation.)
  • Nuclear projects under joint implementation and CDM not specifically excluded, but "Annex I parties are to refrain from using" credits generated from such projects.
  • Sinks projects will be allowed under the CDM, but will be limited to afforestation and reforestation projects during the first target period (2008-2012). Sinks credits under CDM will be capped at 1% of a country's base-year emissions.
  • Simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale CDM projects (including renewable energy and energy efficiency projects).
  • A prompt start for CDM through nominations for the CDM Executive Board prior to COP-7, with a view to election of the Executive Board at COP-7.
  • To address the risk of overselling emission credits, each Annex I party must hold back from the market 90% of its allowable emissions, or five times its most recently reviewed emissions inventory, whichever is lower. The former test allows countries whose emissions are higher than their target and who will be net buyers to sell up to 10% of their allowable emissions. The latter test allows countries whose emissions are projected to be below their target to sell their excess credits, but not to sell credits they are expected to need to cover their projected emissions.
  • Key issues such as fungibility (allowing credits under all three mechanisms to be treated equally) and unilateral CDM (allowing developing countries to generate credits for projects undertaken on their own) are not addressed in the agreement, and will presumably be taken up in the "technical" negotiations that will resume this week.


The Protocol establishes the principle that countries potentially may receive credit toward their emissions targets for carbon absorbed by forests, soils and other so-called "sinks." However, the Protocol left unresolved precisely what sinks activities would be recognized and how the credits would be calculated. Key decisions this week include:

  • Broad activities eligible for sinks credits, including forest management, cropland management and revegetation.
  • No overall cap on sink credits. Instead, the compromise agreement establishes specific limits on the various categories of sink activities.
    • For forest management, Appendix Z sets forth country-specific caps for each Annex I country. Japan's forest management cap is 13 million tons (about 4% of its base-year emissions) and Canada's is 12 million tons (about 10% of its base-year emissions). The Appendix Z caps include sinks credits generated through joint implementation.
    • Credits for cropland management, grazing land management and revegetation are not capped, but countries may receive credit only for increased sequestration over 1990 levels.


Under both the Convention and the Protocol, developed countries agreed to provide financial resources to developing countries to help them meet their obligations under the treaties and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Key elements of this week's agreement include:

  • Establishment of three new funds, two under the Convention and one under the Protocol. Contributions to the Convention funds are voluntary. The new funds are as follows:
    • A special climate change fund, to provide assistance for the full gamut of climate change purposes.
    • A least developed country fund to support National Adaptation Programmes of Action.
    • A Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund to be funded by the CDM levy as well as voluntary contributions.
  • An acknowledgment of the "need" for "new and additional" funding under the Convention, but no specific funding level identified and no new legal requirement on countries to provide funds.
  • A political pledge by the European Union and several other developed countries to contribute $410 million per year. (This figure includes contributions toward replenishment of the Global Environment Facility). Canada joined this political pledge, but not Japan or Australia.
  • Establishment of a new expert group on technology transfer.


The Protocol calls for establishment of procedures and mechanisms to address non-compliance with its provisions. This was one of the most contentious issues in Bonn. While final action on a compliance regime was deferred, major elements were defined:

  • The legal character of the compliance regime deferred. At the earliest, a compliance agreement establishing a binding regime would be adopted at the first meeting of Kyoto Protocol parties following the treaty's entry into force.
  • Consequences for failing to meet an emissions target include the following:
    • Restoration of tons at a rate of 1.3 to 1 (a country must make up its shortfall, plus 30 percent, in the next target period).
    • Suspension of eligibility to sell credits
    • A compliance action plan (CAP).
  • Developing countries to hold majority of seats on both the enforcement and facilitative branches of the Compliance Committee. In the absence of consensus, decisions must be approved by a majority of both of developed country and developing country representatives.

COP 7 Morocco

Conference of the Parties 7 (COP 7)
Climate Talks in Marrakech, Morocco

October 29 - Novomber 9, 2001


International climate change negotiators in Marrakech, Morocco, reached agreement today on a complex set of decisions spelling out rules for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. The decisions by the Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, known as COP-7, provide detailed "legal" text elaborating on the broad principles of the Bonn Agreement, reached in July at COP 6.5 in Bonn, Germany.

Major areas covered in the Marrakech Accords include:

  • Operating rules for international emissions trading and the Protocol's two other flexibility mechanisms (the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation) and rules defining a party's eligibility to participate in the mechanisms.
  • A compliance regime that sets consequences for failing to meet an emissions target but defers until a later Conference the question of whether the consequences are legally binding.
  • Accounting procedures that provide for fungibility - meaning that emissions units under all three mechanisms can be transferred several times as equal units.
  • Creation of a new type of emissions unit for sinks credits that cannot be banked for future commitment periods.
  • A decision to consider at COP-8 how to proceed at COP-9 with a review of commitments that could frame discussion of future developing country efforts.

In addition, the Conference appointed 10 members and 10 alternates to the CDM Executive Board, nearly doubled Russia's allocation for forest management sinks credit, and approved a declaration to the World Summit on Sustainable Development next September in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The Marrakech Accords effectively complete the work under the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, adopted at COP-4, and set the stage for countries to ratify the Protocol and bring it into force. The Protocol will take effect only when ratified by at least 55 countries accounting for at least 55 percent of developed country emissions of carbon dioxide in 1990. Many countries expressed the hope that entry into force will be achieved by the time of the Johannesburg summit.

The United States participated in the Conference but reaffirmed that it does not intend to ratify the Protocol.

Key Decisions in Marrakech

Mechanisms and Accounting

The Protocol establishes three market-based mechanisms aimed at achieving emissions reductions as cost-effectively as possible. They are emissions trading (the buying and selling of emissions credits among Annex I countries, which are those with binding emission targets); Joint Implementation (allowing one country with a target to receive emissions credit for a specific project undertaken in another country with a target); and the Clean Development Mechanism, or CDM (allowing developed countries to receive emissions credit for financing projects that reduce emissions in developing countries).

Key decisions include:

  • Fungibility, allowing emissions units under all three mechanisms to be treated equally. This allows for a more liquid market in emissions units, making the mechanisms more viable and enhancing opportunities for cost-effectiveness.
  • Creation of a new Removal Unit (RMU) to represent sinks credits generated in Annex I countries (including through JI). RMUs can be used only to meet a party's emissions target in the commitment period in which they are generated. They cannot be banked for a future commitment period.
  • Banking of any remaining emission allowances beyond those needed to meet a Party's target is permitted. Banking of credits generated under CDM or JI is limited to 2.5%, respectively, of a Party's initial assigned amount.
  • Unilateral CDM is allowed, enabling a developing country to undertake a CDM project without an Annex I partner and market the resulting emissions credits.
  • Annex I Parties that cannot meet the Protocol's inventory requirements can still host JI projects through a project design and approval process similar to the CDM.
  • The CDM Executive Board is authorized to approve methodologies for baselines, monitoring plans and project boundaries; accredit operational entities; and develop and maintain the CDM registry. The COP/MOP (the Conference of the Parties meeting as the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, following entry into force) will oversee rules of procedure for the Executive Board; accreditation standards for, and designation of, operational entities; and a review of regional/sub-regional distribution of CDM project activities.
  • The requirement in the Bonn Agreement that each Annex I party hold back from the market 90% of its allowable emissions (or five times its most recently reviewed emissions inventory, whichever is lower) is deemed mandatory. The provision addresses the risk of overselling emission credits that a party might need to meet its target. In essence, oversold units become the buyer's liability.


The Protocol establishes the principle that countries may receive credit toward their emissions targets for carbon absorbed by forests, soils and other so-called "sinks." The Bonn Agreement defined the kinds of sinks activities that are eligible and, for forest management, set country-specific caps for each Annex I country. The Marrakech Accords:

  • Russia, which had registered an objection at the time of the Bonn Agreement, sought and received an increase of its ceiling for forest management credits to 33 million tons of carbon annually. The Bonn Agreement had allocated Russia no more than 17.63 million tons.
  • Require Annex I parties to report on their sinks activities in order to be eligible to participate in emissions trading and the other mechanisms. Parties that report can participate in the mechanisms but their inventories will be adjusted at the close of the commitment period if their reports are deemed inadequate.
  • Require reporting by Annex I parties on efforts to protect biodiversity in the context of sinks activities.


The Bonn Agreement defined the broad outlines of a compliance regime overseen by a Compliance Committee with facilitative and enforcement branches. The agreement also set consequences for failing to meet an emissions target, including: restoration of tons at a rate of 1.3 to 1 (a country must make up its shortfall, plus 30 percent, in the next target period); suspension of eligibility to sell credits; and development of a compliance action plan. Parties took conflicting positions in Marrakech on the legal character of the compliance regime - specifically, whether the consequences for non-compliance should be legally binding. The Marrakech Accords:

  • Defer a decision on the legal nature of the compliance regime until the first meeting of Kyoto Parties (the COP/MOP) following the treaty's entry into force.

Other Decisions

Review of Adequacy of Commitments

The agenda for each of the last three COPs has called for a review of the adequacy of commitments under the Framework Convention, but each time the item has been deferred, in part because developing countries are not prepared to discuss the question of whether they should take on binding commitments. In Marrakech, the parties agreed to consider at COP-8 how to frame the issue for discussion at COP-9. A workshop is to be held next year to review the most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as guidance for future discussions.

Input to the World Summit on Sustainable Development

The Conference adopted a Marrakech Ministerial Declaration providing input to the summit, which will be held in September 2002 in Johannesburg. The declaration emphasizes linkage between sustainable development and climate change; reaffirm development and poverty eradication as the overriding priorities of developing countries; and calls on countries to explore synergies between the Framework Convention and conventions on biodiversity and desertification.

COP 8 India

Conference of the Parties 8 (COP 8)
Climate Talks in New Delhi

October 23 - Novomber 1, 2002

The Eighth Session of the Conference of Parties (COP-8) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change met in New Delhi from October 23 to November 1, 2002, in conjunction with the seventeenth sessions of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI).

With most of the issues relating to implementation rules for the Kyoto Protocol resolved at COP-7 in Marrakech - but the Protocol not yet in force - the formal agenda at COP-8 was comprised mostly of second-order and technical issues. Indeed, some dubbed the meeting "a COP between COPs." However, beyond the formal agenda - in political statements and in hallway discussions - COP-8 also saw the emergence of a vigorous debate over next steps in the development of the climate change regime. The wide differences among parties on that question was reflected in the difficult, at times bitter, negotiations over the Delhi Declaration, a broad political statement meant to reflect the consensus among parties at COP-8.

The United States, while reiterating its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, was deeply engaged in the negotiations as a party to the Framework Convention and as a member of the Umbrella Group (developed countries outside the European Union and Eastern Europe). Having repeatedly cited the lack of developing country commitments as a primary basis for its rejection of Kyoto, the United States struck a far different tone in Delhi, declaring that it would be "unfair" to insist that developing countries adopt greenhouse gas targets. The United States also pressed hard on a number of issues that, while largely procedural in nature, appeared to take on broader significance as a test of other parties' willingness to accommodate U.S. concerns.

An overriding emphasis for many parties was the importance of bringing Kyoto into force as quickly as possible. Ninety-six countries - including the European Union nations, Japan, China, India and Mexico - have ratified the Protocol. Its entry into force now hinges on ratification by Russia, which would achieve the necessary threshold of ratification by 55 parties accounting for 55 percent of developed country carbon dioxide emissions in 1990. Although Russian representatives at COP-8 offered conflicting signals on the likely timing of a ratification decision, there remained optimism that Russia would ratify sometime in 2003.

Although most of the issues were relatively minor compared to those in the Bonn Agreement and Marrakech Accords reached at COP-6.5 and COP-7, respectively, parties often stuck to entrenched positions and, overall, made little significant progress. Many of the issues were deferred for further consideration at future meetings. Among the outcomes, COP-8:

  • Adopted the Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development.
  • Adopted rules of procedure for the executive board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
  • Completed work on the reporting required of developed countries to assess their compliance under the Kyoto Protocol.
  • Adopted guidance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for managing two new funds established at COP-7 to assist developing countries.
  • Adopted new guidelines for national communications to be submitted by developing countries reporting on their emissions and steps they are taking to meet their commitments under the Framework Convention.
  • Requested the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Montreal Protocol's Technological and Economic Assessment Panel to conduct a special report on the question of HFCs/PFCs - compounds that have replaced ozone-depleting substances but contribute to climate change.

Delhi Declaration

As the host of COP-8, the Indian government set as a principal objective the adoption of a Delhi Declaration, a broad political statement meant to signify the meeting's success. An initial draft circulated by the Indian chair of the conference reflected a strong developing country perspective, emphasizing the issues of sustainable development, adaptation, and implementation by developed countries of their commitments under the Framework Convention.

The draft was silent on the question of steps beyond Kyoto's first commitment period (2008-2012), prompting strong objections from the European Union and some other developed countries (see below). While the United States was largely content with the Indian draft, it concurred in comments by the Umbrella Group calling for acknowledgement of the need for "global participation" in addressing climate change. The G-77, representing developing countries, called for a stronger emphasis on financial assistance and on the adverse economic effects on developing countries of measures taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

As adopted, the Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change on Sustainable Development makes no reference to future steps to further elaborate the climate regime. It largely underscores principles established in the Framework Convention and themes adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable Development earlier this year in Johannesburg. The Declaration states that:

  • Parties that have ratified Kyoto strongly urge others to do so in a timely manner (as nations declared in Johannesburg).
  • The IPCC's Third Assessment Report confirms that significant cuts in global emissions will be necessary to meet the Convention's ultimate objective.
  • All parties should continue to advance the implementation of their Convention commitments, and developed countries should demonstrate that they are taking the lead in modifying long-term emission trends.
  • Economic and social development and poverty eradication are the overriding priorities of developing countries.
  • Urgent action is needed to enable countries, and in particular the least developed and small island countries, to adapt to the impacts of climate change.
  • Actions are required to develop cleaner, more efficient and affordable energy technologies, including fossil fuel and renewable energy technologies.
  • Actions are required, with a sense of urgency, to substantially increase the global share of renewable energy sources.

While the Declaration was adopted by consensus, in statements in the closing plenary the European Union, Japan and Canada expressed disappointment that it did not offer a clearer long-term vision. The EU said it would submit its own statement for the record. Developing countries and the United States expressed strong support for the Declaration. Nigeria expressly thanked the United States for serving as a "constructive force" in the negotiations.

See the Delhi Declaration here. (pdf format)

Future Commitments

Although not squarely before the parties as a matter for negotiation, the looming issue of future commitments heavily shaped the political dynamic of COP-8 and dominated much of the political dialogue. Developing countries continued to publicly oppose any suggestion that they take on some form of emission target. Among developed countries, there was a striking reversal of roles by the European Union and the United States, with the former pressing the question of future steps and the latter declaring such discussion premature.

The EU, in its response to the draft Delhi Declaration, called for establishment of a "forward-looking process" following Kyoto's entry into force to consider what actions should be taken after 2012. It said the process should be conducted with a view to "a more inclusive and long-term global cooperation based on broader and balanced participation." In a statement to the plenary, Denmark, which holds the EU presidency, said the EU "is not talking about imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries," but reiterated the call for a new process to broaden participation. The EU's views were echoed by some other developed countries, in particular Australia and Canada.

In his address to the conference, Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee strongly rejected "misplaced" calls for a process leading to developing country commitments. He argued that per capita incomes and emissions are much lower in developing countries, and that the developing country contribution to atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will remain small compared to that of industrialized nations "for several decades to come."

In the past, the United States has led calls for stronger action by developing countries. In Delhi, however, the United States declared that "it would be unfair - indeed, counterproductive - to condemn developing nations to slow growth or no growth by insisting that they take on impractical and unrealistic greenhouse gas targets."

CDM Executive Board

The CDM, one of the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms, allows developed countries to meet their emission targets in part with certified emission reductions (CERs) generated through emission reduction and sinks projects in developing countries. At COP-7, the parties adopted general rules for the CDM and established an interim executive board to get the CDM under way pending Kyoto's entry into force. It is anticipated that COP/MOP-1 (the first meeting of Kyoto parties following the Protocol's entry into force) will ratify the decisions of the interim executive board and the COP and that the interim board will become permanent.

The executive board submitted a report to COP-8 outlining its activities during the past year (including the development of rules and modalities for small-scale CDM projects and accreditation procedures for operating entities) and proposing rules of procedure, which were adopted by the parties with a few modifications.

One of the most contentious issues, pressed by the United States, concerned attendance by observers at meetings of the executive board. Under the informal procedures used by the executive board, observers have not been allowed in the meeting room but instead must watch the proceedings on video. The executive board and Secretariat contend that these arrangements are more economical and allow for greater intimacy and informality. The United States, which having rejected Kyoto is considered an observer, insists that "attendance" means access to the meeting room. It was decided that, in its annual reports, the executive board would inform the COP how it is addressing the attendance issue.

Reporting Requirements Under the Kyoto Protocol

Parties completed a set of detailed guidelines on how developed country parties to the Kyoto Protocol must account for the several types of emission units established by the Protocol and their transfers of these units through Kyoto's flexibility mechanisms - emissions trading, joint implementation, and the CDM.

The guidelines require tracking and reporting of emission units and transfers in a uniform format to allow linkage of national emission registries. They also establish procedures for expert review of registries to assess compliance with the Protocol, including the requirement that parties keep a portion of their emission units off the market in a "commitment period reserve" to ensure they do not sell units needed to meet their targets. Parties found out of compliance with the reporting requirements can be deemed ineligible to participate in the trading mechanisms.


Funding to assist developing countries in meeting their Convention commitments and in coping with climate change impacts continued to be a divisive issue.

At COP-7, the parties established three new funds to assist developing countries, and a group of developed countries pledged a total of approximately $400 million. At COP-8, developing countries pressed for funding to implement adaptation projects, detailed guidance to the GEF for managing the new funds, and regular contributions to the funds. The COP adopted guidance to GEF on two of the funds established in Marrakech - the least developed countries fund, and the special climate change fund. In addition, the parties requested that the UNFCCC and GEF secretariats undertake a comprehensive assessment of developing needs and submit a report at SB-20 (in summer 2004); and requested the GEF to review its project cycle, with a view to making it simpler and more efficient.


The emission targets established under Kyoto apply to a "basket" of six greenhouse gases, including HFCs and PFCs, two classes of substitutes for ozone-depleting substances. The Protocol gives parties flexibility as to which of the six gases to control.

Since Kyoto, the EU has continued to focus special attention on HFCs and PFCs. As part of their domestic climate change policies, several EU states have imposed or are considering phaseout schedules for HFCs and PFCs, and the EU has argued that other countries should as well.

To address the issue, COP-8 invited the IPCC and the Montreal Protocol's Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) to undertake a special report to develop balanced scientific, technical and policy-relevant information. The parties also decided to remove HFCs and PFCs as a separate issue on the SBSTA agenda. The outcome was acceptable to U.S. business interests, which argue that, with better information on the costs and benefits of different uses of HFCs and PFCs, countries will be less inclined to simply adopt a comprehensive phaseout.

Sinks in CDM

At COP-7, the parties decided that reforestation and afforestation projects would be eligible under the CDM, but not other land use activities such as avoided deforestation and forest management. The COP-7 decision also requested SBSTA to develop definitions and modalities for afforestation and reforestation projects, taking into account such issues as non-permanence, additionality and leakage.

At COP-8, SBSTA continued its consideration of this matter, focusing in particular on the issue of permanence. Two options were identified: insurance against the destruction or degradation of forest sinks; and creation of a different type of CER unit for sink projects that would be temporary in nature (so-called TCERs). Under the latter option, CERs generated by sink projects would expire at the end of each commitment period and would have to be made up by the country using them, either through substitute credits or reissued credits if the original project still exists.

SBSTA did not resolve the issues and adopted only procedural conclusions, calling for a workshop early next year and further consideration at its next session.

Non-Annex I Communications

The Framework Convention requires developing countries, with funding support from developed countries, to submit national communications detailing their emissions and steps they are taking to meet their Convention commitments. Many developing countries have yet to submit their initial reports.

Parties adopted stronger guidelines for second and subsequent national communications, including the methodologies to be used in developing emission inventories and the types of implementation and adaptation measures to be described. Although developed countries wanted the reports to include data showing emission trends over several years, the decision requires only single-year data, as favored by developing countries. The frequency of reporting is to be taken up at COP-9.

Clean Energy Exports

Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, Canada has proposed that it be allowed emissions credit for selling natural gas and hydroelectricity to the United States, arguing that these clean energy exports reduce U.S. and global emissions. Canada's proposal has two dimensions: establishing the principle that Kyoto parties are entitled to credit for emission reductions resulting from their export of clean energy (defined as natural gas and hydroelectricity) to non-Kyoto parties; and granting Canada up to 70 million tons of credit a year in the first commitment period.

The latter proposal received little support, but the broader idea of credits for clean energy exports received support from a few countries, including New Zealand, Russia and Poland. The EU and, to the surprise of many delegates, the United States strongly opposed the proposal. As noted below, this issue became linked to the PAMs and adverse effects issues, and SBSTA simply decided to continue its consideration of the matter at its next session.

Brazilian proposal

During the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil proposed a formula for establishing emission targets for developed countries based on their historical responsibility for climate change (as measured by their contribution to increased temperature). Since Kyoto, SBSTA's consideration of the issue has broadened to include: 1) all sources and sinks of all regions, not simply carbon emissions from industrialized countries; and 2) indicators of climate change other than increased temperature, such as radiative forcing and increased atmospheric concentrations. As a result of the broadening of the focus to all countries, some developing countries have become concerned about the possible implications for future developing country commitments.

An expert review of the issues coordinated by the Secretariat has concluded that the attribution of climate impacts to specific countries would require a more robust model, including better historical emissions data for each country. At COP-8, SBSTA agreed that work on the Brazilian proposal should continue in the scientific community. SBSTA encouraged research institutions that have been involved in the expert review to continue their work and report to SBSTA-20 (in summer 2004), and invited other research programs to join the effort.

Policies and measures (PAMs)

The Kyoto Protocol requires developed countries to pursue policies and measures (PAMs) to reduce greeenhouse gas emissions and enhance sinks, but allows each country flexibility to devise its own set of measures. Since Kyoto, the EU has pushed for development of methodologies to assess the effect of PAMs on greenhouse gas emissions and to elaborate "best practices."

At COP-8, the issue was derailed by Saudi Arabia's insistence that assessments of PAMs focus not only on their effectiveness in reducing emissions, but also their adverse economic effects on developing countries (and, in particular, oil-producing states). SBSTA was unable to adopt any substantive conclusions, and decided to continue its consideration of this topic at its next session.

Adverse effects of response measures

The Framework Convention requires parties to give "full consideration to what actions are necessary …. to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the … impact of the implementation of response measures." The Kyoto Protocol includes a similar provision.

Oil-producing states led by Saudi Arabia continued to press the issue of the adverse economic effects of mitigation measures, not only under the agenda items that explicitly address them, but also in the discussions of PAMs and the Canadian clean energy proposal. As a result, SBSTA and SBI were unable to reach substantive conclusions on any of these agenda items and instead decided to continue consideration of these issues at their next session.

IPCC Reports

Continuing a debate begun at SB-16 in June, the EU argued that the IPCC's Third Assessment Report (TAR) - reflecting a strong scientific consensus that human activity is a principal cause of climate change - provides the impetus for a new global process to decide on actions beyond 2012. Other countries strongly resisted, however, and SBSTA merely called for further consideration of the TAR at its next session.

The Secretariat and the IPCC organized a special event to discuss research needs in preparation for the Fourth Assessment Report to be completed in 2007. Parties agreed to increase collaboration with research programs independent of the Convention and IPCC processes to develop a better understanding of cross-cutting issues such as the relationship between climate change, sustainable development and equity; stabilization of atmospheric concentrations; and uncertainty.

Effective participation

At the insistence of the United States, the parties considered a new agenda item on effective participation in the Convention process. U.S. delegates - echoing complaints by some industry representatives that notification of and access to proceedings is often lacking - pushed for new procedures for participation in workshops and expert bodies, including notification of meetings on the UNFCCC web site and a default rule allowing participation by any NGO or party observer. The SBI called for notification on the web of workshops and meetings and requested the secretariat to tailor the number of observers to the nature of each workshop.

Arrangements for COP/MOP-1

The Kyoto Protocol provides that, following Kyoto's entry into force, the Conference of the Parties will serve also as the Meeting of the Parties to Kyoto. However, the Protocol does not say whether the meetings should be held sequentially or concurrently, or what the arrangements should be regarding agenda, officers and so forth.

With Kyoto's possible entry into force next year, SBI considered the arrangements for COP/MOP-1 and, in particular, its relationship to the COP. The Secretariat had proposed a concurrent meeting of the COP and the COP/MOP, but with separate agendas clearly identifying which items are COP items, which are COP/MOP items, and which are common issues to be considered in joint meetings of the COP and the COP/MOP. SBI had considerable discussion as to exactly how joint meetings would be organized and, in particular, how decisions would be adopted regarding issues of common concern to both the Convention and Protocol. The SBI considered a draft text but wanted more time to consider the mechanics and implications of joint meetings and referred the matter to its next session.

Venue for COP-9

Parties accepted an offer from Italy to host COP-9, set for early December 2003, with the location to be determined.

Developing Countries

International:  Developing Countries

GHG emissions from the developing world are increasing and may overtake those of the industrialized world in the next 15-30 years. Parties have thus far put off consideration of binding emission reduction targets for non-Annex I countries, recognizing their low historic contribution to the problem and their need to further develop their economies.

Numerous studies, however, show that actions already being implemented in many developing countries have lowered carbon emissions relative to what they otherwise would have been. Studies also have identified significant opportunities for investment that can contribute to economic growth while averting or lowering carbon emissions and easing local environmental concerns such as air pollution. A study by M. Bernstein et al., Developing Countries & Global Climate Change: Electric Power Options for Growth, June 1999, identifies policy options for meeting projected power needs that can reduce local and global environmental impacts while producing similar or even higher economic benefits than those projected under business-as-usual paths. A subsequent series of reports examined specific policy options for Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and the Republic of Korea.

1990 CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Combustion and Land-Use Change

1990 CO2 Emissions
This chart illustrates global carbon dioxide emissions in 1995 by region. For each bar, width represents population; height represents per capita emissions; and total area (population times per capita emissions) represents total emissions. Emissions from combustion of fossil fuels are broken out by the three major fuels - coal, oil and gas. The triangle at the top of each bar illustrates the uncertainty associated with emissions from land-use changes. Countries in the "Pacific Asia" group are shown in black. Source: UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Among the industrialized countries, the United States has been most vocal in seeking stronger commitments from developing nations. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution adopted by the Senate in July 1997 (Senate Resolution 98 of the 105th Congress) states in part that the United States should not sign an agreement committing industrialized countries to emission limits unless it also establishes "new specific scheduled commitments...for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period." With that language in mind, the Clinton Administration said it would not submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification until there was "meaningful participation by key developing countries," but in bilateral talks failed to secure significant commitments from those countries.

Developing country negotiators, noting the Convention's emphasis on "common but differentiated responsibilities," have said they will not be prepared even to discuss the timing or form of potential developing country commitments until industrialized nations have demonstrated further progress in meeting their own emission targets. They also point to unfulfilled commitments by industrialized countries to assist developing nations on technology transfer, capacity building, and adaptation to the impacts of climate change.

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