

INTERNATIONAL

Issues and Options for the Modalities, Deliverables, and Composition of the GGA Technical Task Force



Discussion Paper

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Authors:

Dr. Timo Leiter, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Chelsea Johnson Balcomb, C2ES

Kaveh Guilanpour, C2ES

The adoption of the Belém Adaptation Indicators (**BAI**) at the 7th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (**CMA7**) marked an important milestone toward measuring progress of the targets of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (**UAE Framework**). However, **according to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat, almost 90 percent of the BAI are not ready to be applied because global methodologies to calculate them are only partially available or missing.**¹ Based on the length of metadata sheets for the indicators of the Sustainable Development Goals (**SDGs**), the BAI metadata could comprise 60–1,200 pages (10–20 pages per indicator), which underscores the detailed technical work required.

At 64th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (**SB64**), Parties failed to reach agreement on the Technical Task Force that is mandated to be established to develop methodologies and metadata for the BAI, largely over disputes over the taskforce's composition. This disagreement has delayed the process of operationalizing the BAI and could weaken the assessment of adaptation in future global stocktakes (**GST**).

In order for Parties to use the BAI in their third Biennial Transparency Report (BTR), the indicators need to be operationalized as soon as possible. To help resolve the current gridlock around the GGA Technical Task Force, it would be useful to clarify its scope and mandate across three areas where decisions are still needed:

Composition: Establish a clear division of responsibilities between negotiators and technical experts, while ensuring balance across regions, gender, and areas of expertise. Parties could consider a membership that is half the size of the former expert group under the UAE–Belém work programme on indicators.

Modalities: Provide clear political steering and an effective process for developing metadata and methodologies, including through collaboration with relevant organizations, constituted bodies, and knowledge holders.

Deliverables: Develop metadata and methodologies using a common template, drawing wherever possible on existing methodologies, frameworks, and relevant technical work.

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Questions for consideration

- Which composition, modalities, and deliverables are suitable for the GGA Technical Task Force?
- How can the BAI be operationalized as quickly as possible to inform Parties' third BTR and future GSTs?
- How can Parties steer the development of metadata and methodologies without allowing technical details to dominate time-sensitive negotiation sessions?
- How do intended political outcomes under the Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation (**BAVA**) relate to the development of metadata and methodologies by the GGA Technical Task Force?


A. Context

1. Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement established the Global Goal on Adaptation (**GGA**) “of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal.”²
2. At the 5th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (**CMA5**) (December 2023), Parties adopted the UAE Framework, which includes 11 global adaptation targets for 2030 and beyond to guide the achievement of the GGA and measure progress toward it.³
3. At CMA7 (November 2025), Parties adopted a list of 59 indicators as the BAI. The purpose of the BAI is to measure progress toward the targets of the UAE Framework. They are voluntary and global in nature.⁴ CMA7 *invited* Parties “to make use of these Indicators as appropriate and as relevant in their reporting and planning processes” including in BTRs or Adaptation Communications.⁵
4. However, almost 90 percent of the BAI are not ready for use because they lack a global methodology to calculate the indicator (see **Figure 1** below). About half of the indicators can be partially operationalized, and for almost 40 percent of the BAI, no global methodology is currently available.⁶
5. The CMA7 decision requested the SBs to “undertake technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the BAI to be considered at CMA9 (November 2027), including by establishing a technical task force” (**GGA Technical Task Force**).⁷
6. At SB64 in June 2026, Parties were unable to agree on the modalities and composition of the GGA Technical Task Force. The issue will be taken up at the next session during CMA8 in November 2026.
7. This discussion paper presents issues and options for the composition, modalities, and deliverables for the GGA Technical Task Force to inform Parties' deliberations ahead of and at CMA8 (November 2026).
8. This discussion paper suggests learning from previous processes, such as the SDGs metadata sheets, which run about 10–20 pages for each indicator.⁸ For the BAI, this could amount to 600–1,200 pages of



technical sheets. With this in mind, Parties could consider which elements require CMA approval and establish an intersessional process for reviewing metadata and methodologies to enable usage of the indicators in the third round of BTRs which are due by end of 2028 and, to the extent possible, in GST2.

Figure 1: Availability of Global Methodologies for the 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators⁹



B. Issues and Options for the GGA Technical Task Force

9. Operationalization of the BAI involves the following three functions that are important to consider in the deliberations of the modalities and composition of the GGA Technical Task Force:
- **Steering:** How is the technical work led and directed? For instance, what is the role of Parties and of the SB Chairs, and will there be co-leads/co-facilitators of the GGA Technical Task Force?
 - **Coordination:** Will the UNFCCC Secretariat or the GGA Technical Task Force coordinate with international organizations, other knowledge holders, and other bodies under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, especially the Adaptation Committee (**AC**) and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (**LEG**)?
 - **Technical work:** How and by whom will the technical work of developing or improving methodologies and metadata be undertaken? What role do negotiators and technical experts have?

Composition

10. A suitable composition of the GGA Technical Task Force will depend primarily on the scope of its mandate and on the tasks its members are requested to perform. A decision on the composition is therefore interconnected with decisions on the modalities and deliverables.
11. The three main options are presented in **Table 1** in the order that they were proposed during the negotiations. The order does not imply any ranking, preference, or assessment of their relative merits.

Table 1: Membership Options for the GGA Technical Task Force

Options	Members of the Technical Task Force	Guidance		Main issues to be considered
1. Technical members (similar to the UAE–Belém work programme on indicators)	Technical experts	Guidance from Parties at each SB session	Operating under the guidance of the SB Chairs	How to guide the technical work and how to review and clear deliverables. This option would require a steering mechanism (see Modalities below)
2. Technical but Party-led (SB64 proposal by the SB Chairs ¹⁰)	Technical experts and two negotiators as co-facilitators		Two co-facilitators, one from a developed-country Party and one from a developing-country Party	What decision making powers the co-facilitators have relative to all Parties under the SBs and how they are selected
3. Mix of technical & Party members (pre-COP proposal by the SB Chairs)	Technical experts and negotiators		Either of the two options above, or a two-tier structure (multiple negotiators overseeing the technical work – see below)	What role and tasks negotiators have, how technical work is arranged (see Modalities below)

Members and Roles

12. Technical experts will need to have demonstrated expertise in areas of the BAI and UAE Framework targets in order to develop or improve methodologies and metadata. They could be from any relevant organization including UN agencies, academia, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, or independent experts.
13. Members selected for their expertise could be asked to serve in their personal capacity. Additionally, Parties could consider members who represent organizations that are custodians of closely related existing indicators, for example, for the SDGs or Sendai Framework indicators.
14. Parties could consider retaining some of the 78 experts from the UAE–Belém work programme to preserve institutional memory and technical continuity. Excluding such potential members could delay operationalizing the BAI.

Selection of members

15. Two ways of selection have been discussed so far:
 - The SB Chairs select members based on predefined criteria from a pool of nominations received from Parties, observer organizations and/or self-nominations.
 - Regional groups appoint members, that is, where every UN region self-determines its selection procedure.
16. The first option described above was used in the UAE–Belém work programme on indicators. This selection option has an advantage as a consistent application of the criteria to all nominations and an

efficient way of balancing members across gender and other criteria. In contrast, an advantage of the second option could be higher acceptance by UN regional groups since they would directly select their candidates. The second option would require a prior agreement on the number of members per region.

17. Parties could consider a hybrid approach that combines a global selection process for technical members and regional appointments for negotiators.


Membership size

18. It is not necessary to have a large number of experts on the GGA Technical Task Force, as long as a mandate is provided for it to seek additional input and expertise from outside organizations where relevant.
19. Such a mandate could limit the number of technical experts to about 2–4 per target of the UAE Framework, in other words, to around 22–44 experts which would be about half of the size of the former expert group which had seven members per target. The lower end of just 20–30 experts would only be feasible if UN agencies, who are custodians of closely related metadata, are involved in the development of BAI methodologies.
20. If negotiators are part of the GGA Technical Task Force (Option 3 in **Table 1** above), the membership size would increase accordingly. Similar to the membership of the AC and the LEG, it could be an additional 1–2 members per UN regional group. Another alternative could be to have representatives from all Party groups.

Modalities

21. **Figure 2** depicts the three functions needed to operationalize the BAI.

Figure 2: Three functions for operationalizing the Belém Adaptation Indicators



Steering

22. A closer linkage between technical work and steering by Parties could be achieved through:

- Active steering either through the SB Chairs who consult with Parties or through two co-facilitators—one from a developed and one from a developing country Party. Another option suggested at SB64 was to create a two-tier structure within the GGA Technical Task Force: a steering function (e.g., in the form of a steering group) and the technical part.
- A two-tier structure could enable a broader representation of Parties on the GGA Technical Task Force while maintaining a separation between the technical work and its Party-led steering. In case of two co-facilitators, their decision-making powers would need to be defined.
- In addition, regular check-ins between the steering function and the technical work could be undertaken, for example, via workshops (including back-to-back with the Baku Adaptation Road Map [BAR] workshops), via meetings online or in person intersessionally, or both. Parties will need to elaborate on the number of check-ins between the steering and technical work.

23. Some decisions will have to be taken intersessionally because the June 2027 negotiations at SB66 would otherwise be the only opportunity to take any decisions on the GGA Technical Task Force and its products ahead of CMA9. The SB Chairs or the steering function within a two-tier structure could play an important role in taking practical decisions intersessionally, especially on any details that a CMA8 decision would not specify.

Coordination

24. Arrangements for coordination with other bodies under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, particularly the AC and the LEG, as well as with relevant international organizations and other knowledge holders, will need to be agreed to. Such coordination could be facilitated by the UNFCCC Secretariat under the guidance of the SBs and of the steering modalities (for example the SB Chairs, co-facilitators, or steering group).

25. Processes for efficient coordination with organizations that manage related existing metadata and methodologies will need to be established. The UNFCCC Secretariat could support this coordination, or members of the GGA Technical Task Force could coordinate directly with organizations related to their areas of expertise.

26. The GGA Technical Task Force could be mandated to undertake extensive outreach on draft deliverables, especially on draft metadata sheets, to ensure the coherence, clarity, scientific robustness, and user-friendliness of the methodologies and metadata of the BAI.

Technical Work

27. Most BAI can be split into multiple indicator components where metadata and methodologies may be available for some but not all parts of the full wording of an indicator. For example, the first indicator under the water target has three parts: “level of water stress (1st part), including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable (2nd part), accounting for relevant climate hazard intensity and/or frequency” (3rd part).¹¹ Metadata is partially available for the first and third parts, but not for the second.

28. To operationalize the BAIs in the near term, the GGA Technical Task Force could therefore propose methodologies and metadata that capture each indicator as far as possible while identifying further work needed for a more complete coverage.

Deliverables

29. Parties will have to consider the type and the timing of the deliverable(s) and output(s) by the GGA Technical Task Force, including how and whether output(s) should be reviewed and agreed upon.

Type

30. Three deliverables are needed to operationalize the BAI:

- an overview of available metadata and methodologies for the BAI that can serve as a stocktake of what is already available and what needs to be refined or newly developed¹²
- a template for the metadata sheets—the development of which can draw on similar templates for SDG¹³ and Sendai Framework indicators¹⁴
- the actual metadata and methodologies for each of the BAI.

31. Given the technical nature of this work, Parties will find negotiating detailed spreadsheets and lengthy documents challenging. Therefore, Parties could consider what content will need to be part of a decision or its annex and what content can be covered in other documents that do not require in-session negotiation.

32. Members of the GGA Technical Task Force could be assigned to individual BAI or to groups of BAI (e.g., per target) to:

- propose draft operational indicators for each BAI¹⁵



- develop a first draft of the metadata and methodologies in collaboration with international organizations, relevant constituent bodies, and other knowledge holders, drawing on Parties' experiences with testing the BAI
 - present revised metadata and methodologies for feedback to either the steering function or at SB sessions (e.g., SB66 in June 2027).
33. Parties could consider publishing a final or near-final version of the metadata sheets in an online repository, for example, in the GGA section of the UNFCCC Secretariat's website. To support faster uptake of the BAI the metadata sheets could be published on a rolling basis as they become available.
34. The metadata sheets for SDG indicators are on average between 10–20 pages long, and some are more than 30 pages. long¹⁶ The combined total number of pages of metadata sheets for the 59 BAI will therefore likely be at least 500 pages. This length has implications for what can be negotiated at a COP and for the time commitment of involved individuals (see Composition and Annex I).

Timing

35. Some indicators are easier to operationalize than others. To enable Parties to use the indicators in the third round of BTRs, which are due by the end of 2028, the timing of the release of final or draft metadata sheets is important.
36. Parties could benefit from the release of completed metadata and methodologies as soon as they are ready rather than waiting with their release until CMA9 (November 2027). A process of clearing metadata sheets, including methodologies, intersessionally would therefore be required as part of the GGA Technical Task Force modalities.
37. To continuously update and refine metadata and methodologies over time, technical work would need to continue beyond CMA9. Parties could consider deriving lessons learned from the processes in place for updating of metadata for the indicators of the SDGs, the Sendai Framework, and Kunming Montreal Biodiversity Framework.¹⁷

C. Related C2ES Resources

- What happened to the Global Goal on Adaptation at SB64? Where do we go from here? (July 2026), <https://www.c2es.org/2026/07/global-goal-on-adaptation-at-sb64-where-do-we-go-from-here/>
- Enhancing International Cooperation and Action to Adapt to Climate Tipping Points in an Overshoot World (September 2026), <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20260804-C2ES-Enhancing-International-Cooperation-and-Action-for-Adapting-to-Climate-Tipping-Points-in-an-Overshoot-World.pdf>
- Considerations for the Belém– Addis Vision on Adaptation (June 2026), <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Considerations-for-the-Belem-Addis-Vision-on-Adaptation.pdf>
- Next Steps for Belém Adaptation Indicators (March 2026), <https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Next-Steps-for-the-Belem-Adaptation-Indicators.pdf>
- What Comes After COP30? A Look at the Global Goal on Adaptation (November 2025), <https://www.c2es.org/2025/11/a-look-at-the-global-goal-on-adaptation-cop30/>

D. Related LSE Resources

- Considerations for the development of indicators under the framework for the Global Goal on Adaptation (August 2024), <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/profile/timo-leiter/#policy>
- Modalities for the Indicator Work Programme under the Global Goal on Adaptation (April 2024), <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/modalities-for-the-indicator-work-programme-under-the-global-goal-on-adaptation/>

E. Annex I: The Limits of Negotiating Highly Technical Details

38. Based on lessons from the preceding two-year UAE–Belém work programme on indicators and its expert group (*the expert group*), issues to be considered for the GGA Technical Task Force include:
- a suitable connection between the technical and political level while avoiding highly specialized technical work getting gridlocked by political matters.¹⁸
 - a process that does not leave negotiators with having to sort complex technical matters at the last moment of CMA8.¹⁹
39. Parties also need to consider the nature of the task of developing metadata and methodologies, and its purpose. CMA6 confirmed that the indicators “should allow for the aggregation of information to support the GST” to enable the review of progress toward the targets of the UAE Framework.²⁰ Aggregation requires an agreed methodology to calculate the numerical value of an indicator. The operational details including definitions, units of measurement, methodologies, and data sources are referred to as “metadata”. They are described in a document called a “metadata sheet”.
40. Only a small number of BAI can be immediately operationalized based on existing metadata, mainly BAI that are closely related to existing indicators under the SDGs, the Sendai Framework, or other global assessment initiatives, for example, like those on water and health. For most of the BAI, where relevant metadata already exists, it has to be either significantly or substantially adjusted. For a few BAI, metadata needs to be developed anew.
41. The development of metadata requires highly specialized expertise for each of the specific aspects that the BAI cover. For example, it may require expertise on climate-resilient water and sanitation, infectious diseases, ecosystem-based adaptation, adaptive social protection systems, and on protecting cultural heritage from climate impacts.
42. The risk of getting bogged down in technical details is even greater for the likely more than 500 pages of metadata than for a few pages of proposed indicators. It is therefore important for Parties to clarify what needs to be included in a CMA decision and what can be covered in separate metadata documents.
43. For example, the metadata sheets of the SDG indicators are not being adopted by the UN General Assembly. Instead, an Inter-Agency and Expert Group (*IAEG*) under the UN Statistical Commission reviews and approves the metadata that the custodian agencies of each SDG indicator draft.²¹
44. Moreover, metadata is not static. As improved methodologies, refined definitions, or new data sources become available, for example, from Earth Observation,²² a clearly defined process for updating metadata needs to be in place. By delegating the adoption of SDG metadata to a UN Commission rather than requiring adoption by the UN General Assembly, the metadata updates for SDG indicators can be undertaken whenever technically appropriate. Parties therefore need to discuss how BAI metadata can be kept up to date. This is especially relevant as some BAI can in the short term only be operationalized via proxy indicators due to missing metadata or insufficiently available data.
- 45.

F. Annex II: Political Considerations: Outcomes of the Belém–Addis Vision on Adaptation

46. CMA7 established the Belém–Addis vision on adaptation (*BAVA*), which aims at “developing guidance for operationalizing the BAI for consideration at CMA9.” This two-year process consists of a “policy alignment process by Parties” based on the technical metadata work including via the Technical Task Force and on countries’ experiences in testing the indicators.²³

47. It remains unclear what the outcomes of the two-year BAVA at CMA9 (November 2027) are supposed to be. If the metadata sheets are to be the main product, there is a risk that they get drawn into political conflicts as Parties might try to achieve political agendas via technical metadata.
48. Clarification is therefore needed at CMA8 in Antalya, Türkiye, about the expected outcomes of the BAVA and the role of metadata sheets. Any political demands or intended outcomes, for example, on support for adaptation, would best be viewed separate from the technical process of metadata development.

G. Annex III: Drawing on Experiences of Testing the Belém Adaptation Indicators

49. Importantly, the drafting of the metadata should be informed by Parties' testing of the BAI, which has been encouraged by Decision 12/CMA.7. Parties could be invited to share their experiences either formally (e.g., via submissions or in their BTRs) or informally at mandated events, which may be organized by the GGA Technical Task Force with assistance from the UNFCCC Secretariat and which could be focused along thematic or dimensional targets.
50. The UNFCCC Secretariat could be requested to synthesize information on experiences of BAI testing in the BTR synthesis report, which is due in 2027.

H. References

¹ UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter UNFCCC], *Targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators. Technical paper by the secretariat*, Document FCCC/TP/2026/4 (Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC, September 30, 2026), <https://unfccc.int/documents/661011>.

² UNFCCC, *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, Decision 1/CP.21, Article 7.1 (January 29, 2016), <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf>.

³ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 2/CMA.5, ¶ 6–7 (March 15, 2024), <https://unfccc.int/documents/637073>.

⁴ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 6–7 (March 30, 2026), <https://unfccc.int/documents/655273>. The Belém Adaptation Indicators can complement, but are not meant to replace, country-specific adaptation indicators, e.g. indicators that are part of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning systems that track the implementation progress of National Adaptation Plans. National adaptation Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning systems or sectoral monitoring systems can help gathering data to report on the Belém Adaptation Indicators under the Paris Agreement.

⁵ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 12. While the Belém Adaptation Indicators are relevant to consider for results frameworks of internationally funded adaptation portfolios, they were not developed as project indicators. Measuring local adaptation progress requires context-specific indicators. Timo Leiter and Anne Olhoff, *Adaptation metrics: Current landscape and evolving practices. Background paper for the Global Commission on Adaptation* (Rotterdam, Netherlands: Global Center for Adaptation, September 24, 2019), <https://gca.org/reports/adaptation-metrics-current-landscape-and-evolving-practices/>.

⁶ UNFCCC, *Targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators. Technical paper by the secretariat*.

⁷ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 23

⁸ UN Statistics, *Sustainable Development Goal Indicators*, accessed October 7, 2026, <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/>.

⁹ Illustration made by Dr. Timo Leiter. UNFCCC, *Targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators. Technical paper by the secretariat*, ¶ 22.

¹⁰ UNFCCC, *SBSTA 64 agenda item 4(a), SBI 64 agenda item 10(a): Matters relating to adaptation: Global goal on adaptation*, (June 18, 2026), <https://docs.unfccc.int/documents/10000227> (Draft Text).

¹¹ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, Annex ¶ 3a.

¹² UNFCCC, *Targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators. Technical paper by the secretariat.*

¹³ UN Statistical Office, *Guidelines for the Global Metadata Structure Definition for Sustainable Development Goals Indicators Version 1.2.*

¹⁴ UNDRR, *Technical Guidance for Monitoring and Reporting on Progress in Achieving the Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction Collection of Technical Notes on Data and Methodology.*

¹⁵ UNFCCC, *Targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5 and the Belém Adaptation Indicators. Technical paper by the secretariat*, 18.

¹⁶ UN Statistical Office, *Guidelines for the Global Metadata Structure Definition for Sustainable Development Goals Indicators Version 1.2* (New York: New York, UN Statistical Office, November 2023)

https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/SDG_MSD_Guidelines.pdf.

¹⁷ UN Statistical Office, *Guidelines for the Global Metadata Structure Definition for Sustainable Development Goals Indicators Version 1.2.* UN Disaster Risk Reduction [hereinafter UNDRR], *Technical Guidance for Monitoring and Reporting on Progress in Achieving the Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction Collection of Technical Notes on Data and Methodology* (Bonn: Germany, UNDRR, 2017),

<https://www.undrr.org/publication/technical-guidance-monitoring-and-reporting-progress-achieving-global-targets-sendai>. “Indicators for the Kunming – Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework”, Convention on Biological Diversity Global Biodiversity Framework, accessed October 8, 2026, <https://www.gbf-indicators.org/>.

¹⁸ Some negotiators criticized limited ways of tracking and influencing the work of the expert group in 2025. For the expert group, it became challenging when the meaning of guidance provided via CMA decisions was interpreted differently by different Party groups who subsequently had diverging expectations about the content of the technical work.

¹⁹ The modalities of the UAE–Belém work programme on indicators were that technical products, especially indicator proposals, were developed by an expert group of 78 members and discussed by Parties at a workshop ahead of each session. However, after the final workshop in October 2025, the process did not provide an opportunity for any adjustments to the list of 100 potential indicators ahead of 7th Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA7). As a result, Parties were faced with the difficult task of deciding if and how to amend the proposed indicators during the very limited negotiation time at CMA7. Several Party groups therefore emphasized they want to avoid a similar situation where: a highly detailed and technical product is supposed to be adopted by Parties at the CMA without prior opportunities for adjustments; and Parties are ultimately presented with a take it or leave it version by the presidency that prioritizes the preferences of some party groups over others. UNFCCC, *Workshop under the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme. Summary report by the secretariat*, Document FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/7, (Bonn; Germany, UNFCCC, November 3, 2025).

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_07.pdf.

²⁰ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 3/CMA.6, ¶ 23 (March 27, 2025),

<https://unfccc.int/documents/644937>.

²¹ Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators, UN Statistical Office, accessed October 7, 2026,

<https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs/>.

²² Sarah Connors et.al, *Earth observations for climate adaptation: tracking progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation through satellite-derived indicators*. *Npj Climate and Atmospheric Science* 359 (2025),

<https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-025-01251-1>.

²³ UNFCCC, *Global goal on adaptation*, Decision 12/CMA.7, ¶ 21.