

# Key Negotiations & Related Outcomes of the UN Climate Conference in Belém

30th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30)

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## SUMMARY

Held amid difficult geopolitical conditions and intensifying climate impacts, COP30 concluded with adoption of the Belém Political Package, reflecting compromises across many issues. The key decision was the “Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change.” Mutirão is “a traditional knowledge inherited by the Brazilian society and born from cooperation.” The decision resulted from two weeks of rigorous Presidency consultations with Parties, the content and title of the decision is meant to reflect the global spirit of cooperation. The decision celebrates the Paris Agreement’s achievements on the occasion of its 10-year anniversary but also launched an historic three-year dialogue on trade. Other core outcomes included the adoption of global indicators for adaptation, a just transition mechanism, and the extension of finance talks on Article 2.1(c). Decisions also refined the work program on mitigation, and renewed workplans in technology and gender. COP30 reaffirmed the importance of multilateralism and enhanced international cooperation.



## HIGHLIGHTS

COP30 was destined to be difficult. The wider context in which COP30 took place was challenging: difficult, uncertain geopolitical conditions; the rise of populism in many countries; increasingly severe and frequent global climate impacts; and a retreat from globalization and international cooperation.

### Shifting from promises to delivery.

Governments adopted a broad political package centered on implementation. This reflects growing pressure to show real-world progress amid worsening climate impacts and fragile geopolitics.

**Measuring global adaptation.** Countries agreed on a common set of global indicators to track adaptation progress, setting the stage for an important shift: measuring progress against the Global Goal on Adaptation.

### Ensuring enhanced international cooperation.

The Global Climate Action Agenda was aligned with the outcomes of the first global stocktake. COP30 advanced ongoing technical work while opening space to discuss climate and trade for the first time. New Presidency initiatives, such as the Global Implementation Accelerator and Belém Mission to 1.5, provide new avenues for cooperation.

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# Summary

Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 30th Conference of Parties (COP30) the "COP of truth," aiming to restore public confidence in climate policy.<sup>i</sup>

Reaching consensus outcome at COP30 was destined to be difficult, as the UNFCCC seeks to transition from decades of treaty negotiations toward a far greater focus on implementation. This task was made even harder given the wider context in which COP30 took place: extremely difficult and uncertain geopolitical conditions; the rise of populism in many countries, with climate action exploited as a divisive rather than unifying issue; increasingly severe and frequent global climate impacts; and a retreat from globalization and international cooperation, including reduced funding for international development and the United Nations.

Many Parties' expectations for the climate conference included a robust response, through a consensus outcome, to the gap on collective ambition and implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which were due in February 2025. Expectations also included a call for all countries who have not yet done so to come forward with new and more ambitious NDCs. Parties expected COP30 to deliver on its mandates, such as adopting the indicators for the global goal on adaptation (GGA), as well as taking decisions on just transition and the global stocktake (GST). They further anticipated that the outcome should send a strong signal on finance as well as acknowledge and celebrate all that has been achieved to date under the Paris Agreement, given its ten-year anniversary.

Despite high temperatures, flooding from heavy thunderstorms, a violent protest, and even a fire in the conference venue, Parties in Belém, Brazil, concluded the COP by adopting a "Belém Political Package."<sup>1</sup> This outcome was notable given the challenging geopolitical conditions, including the absence of the United States delegation for the first time since the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992.

The final day of COP30 ended after nearly 24 hours of continuous closed-door negotiations when Parties reached hard-fought compromises to adopt the decision on the "Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change." Mutirão is "a traditional knowledge inherited by the Brazilian society and born from cooperation."<sup>2</sup> The decision was the key consensus political outcome from COP30 and the headline decision for the Belém Political Package. The most contentious issues in reaching agreement on the Global Mutirão decision related to the COP30 response to the ambition of Parties' NDCs, as well as issues of trade and finance.

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i A note regarding usage: Use of "UNFCCC" broadly covers the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. Reference to, e.g., "the Convention" indicates that the reference, Parties, or activities pertain exclusively to that convention and not the Paris Agreement.

Key elements of the Belém Political Package comprise:

- The **“Global Mutirão” decision**, which includes
  - emphasis on the important role of multilateralism and synergies with other regimes in the context of sustainable development
  - celebration of the Paris Agreement’s achievements on the occasion of its 10-year anniversary
  - an expression of “hope that the Agreement will once again enjoy near universality”
  - acknowledgement that “the Paris Agreement is working” and a resolution “to go further and faster”
  - recognition of the need to accelerate implementation of domestic mitigation measures
  - encouragement for Parties to align their NDCs with net zero by or around mid-century
  - an invitation for Parties to develop implementation and investment plans for their NDCs
  - a “Global Implementation Accelerator” to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 degrees C within reach and to support countries in implementing their NDCs and national adaptation plans (NAPs)
  - recognition of the efforts of the Climate High-Level Champions in providing continuity through their work—such as the launch of the Global Climate Action Agenda five-year plan that thematically aligns with the targets and signals from the first global stocktake
  - the launch of the “Belém Mission to 1.5” to enable implementation in NDCs and NAPs and to reflect on accelerating the implementation, international cooperation, and investments in NDC and NAP plans
  - a call for efforts to triple adaptation finance by 2035 to support vulnerable countries
  - a two-year work program to discuss climate finance, including the predictability of public resources from developed countries
  - a three-year dialogue to consider challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade
- agreement to develop a **just transition mechanism** under the Just Transition Work Programme
- a decision on **the global stocktake** that launches the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Dialogue on implementing the outcomes of the global stocktake and sets out responsibilities for refining the second global stocktake
- **the extension of a dialogue on Article 2.1(c)**—the dialogue calls for making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development and its complementarity with Article 9
- a nine-year Belém **Technology Implementation Programme**
- a **global goal on adaptation package** that included: adopted indicators; modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap; and a call to launch a two-year Belém-Addis vision on adaptation to operationalize the indicators
- a decision on the **mitigation work program** that sends key messages from its global dialogues and investment focused events on forests and the waste sector, including circular economy approaches
- a nine-year **Belém Gender Action Plan**
- conclusion of the **third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage**.

Other key outcomes from COP30 include:

- the end of the first full cycle under the Enhanced Transparency Framework through the Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress (FMCP), which reviews Parties' climate progress reports
- publication of the Global Climate Action Agenda at COP30 Outcomes Report and Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2025, reflecting the work of the Global Climate Action Agenda
- publication of the final "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T" report on the process that aims to scale up public and private finance to U.S. \$1.3 trillion for developing countries
- more than 80 countries joined the Mutirão Call for a Fossil Fuel Roadmap to advance the commitment to transition away from fossil fuels set out in the COP28 global stocktake decision
- launch of the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), which will compensate countries for preserving tropical forests.

In addition to the formal outcome, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced in the final plenary that he would support work on two roadmaps under the Presidency's responsibility: one on halting and reversing deforestation and a second on transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly, and equitable manner.<sup>3</sup> He also welcomed Colombia's April 2026 summit on fossil fuel phase-out, noting that the future COP30 Presidency roadmaps could build on its outcomes.

It was decided that COP31 will take place in Türkiye. In an unprecedented arrangement, Türkiye will be "COP31 President" and Australia the "President of Negotiations."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, while physically hosted in the city of Antalya, Türkiye, Australia will lead the negotiations; at the same time, Türkiye will lead and manage the action agenda. The Pacific Islands are expected to host the Pre-COP, the preparatory event for COP31.

# Further Details on Key COP30 Outcomes

## Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity Against Climate Change

### Key outcomes

- a “Global Implementation Accelerator” to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 degrees C within reach and support countries in implementing their NDCs and NAPs<sup>5</sup>
- launch of the “Belém Mission to 1.5” to enable implementation in NDCs and NAPs and reflect on accelerating the implementation, international cooperation, and investments in NDC and NAP plans<sup>6</sup>
- a three-year dialogue to consider challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade<sup>7</sup>
- a high-level ministerial round table to reflect on the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG), including on the quantitative and qualitative elements related to the provision of finance<sup>8</sup>
- a call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035, in the context of the agreement of the NCQG<sup>9</sup>
- a two-year work program on climate finance, including on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement—which says that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing countries for mitigation and adaptation—in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement on climate finance.<sup>10</sup>

The Global Mutirão decision was the key consensus political outcome from COP30 and the headline decision for the Belém Political Package. The Presidency faced political pressure to address the levels of ambition represented by Parties’ new NDCs, in the context of tense geopolitics and procedural challenges arising from proposals for four new agenda items.

Those proposals focused on: the implementation of Article 9.1, of the Paris Agreement on finance; responding to the NDC synthesis report and addressing gap between the ambition to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees C and implementation of existing commitments; promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change related trade-restrictive unilateral measures; and the synthesis of biennial transparency reports. The result of two weeks of rigorous Presidency consultations with Parties, the content and title of the decision is meant to reflect the global spirit of cooperation.

A key outcome of the Global Mutirão is a new Presidency initiative, a “Global Implementation Accelerator.” The aim of this initiative is to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 degrees C within reach and support countries in implementing their NDCs and NAPs. This initiative could complement the launch of the “Belém Mission to 1.5,” which builds on the first global stocktake’s “Roadmap to Mission 1.5.”<sup>11</sup> The new Global Implementation Accelerator will enable implementation of NDCs and NAPs and reflect on accelerating the implementation, international cooperation, and investments in NDC and NAP plans.

At COP30, Parties for the first time agreed to discuss trade in the climate negotiations by launching a three-year dialogue to consider challenges and barriers to enhancing international cooperation on trade. The Convention sets out that unilateral and other measures to combat climate change “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade” because Parties should cooperate to promote an international economy that allows sustainable economic growth and development for all.<sup>12</sup>

# Global Goal on Adaptation

## Key outcomes

- adoption of 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators<sup>13</sup>
- establishment of the “Belém-Addis vision on adaptation,” a two-year “policy alignment process” by Parties to develop guidance to operationalize the Belém Adaptation Indicators<sup>14</sup>
- modalities for the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Road Map, which will cover 2026–28 and focus on initial implementation of the GGA, including ensuring access to means of implementation<sup>15</sup>
- acknowledgement of the Global Mutirão decision’s call to triple adaptation finance by 2035.<sup>16</sup>

## Background

Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement established the GGA to provide a guiding framework to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change.<sup>17</sup> Parties at COP28 adopted the UAE Framework on Global Climate Resilience (UAE Framework) to guide efforts to achieve the GGA and monitor its progress. The UAE Framework aims to reduce the growing impacts, risks, and vulnerabilities of climate change, while also enhancing adaptation action and support and sets out thematic targets to be achieved by 2030.<sup>18</sup> Parties at COP28 also launched a two-year UAE-Belém work programme on indicators for measuring progress achieved toward the targets under the UAE Framework.<sup>19</sup> At COP29, Parties agreed to launch the Baku Adaptation Road Map, which aims to support progress under Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and help implement the UAE Framework.<sup>20</sup>

## Outcomes from COP30

Adoption of the Belém Adaptation Indicators proved contentious. In September 2025, UAE-Belém work programme experts drafted a list of 100 potential indicators for Parties to work on. Some Parties were of the view that the 59 Belém Adaptation Indicators ultimately adopted at COP30 were not derived from this process and were not adequately considered prior to adoption, raising objections in the final plenary.

The indicators, which will help track progress against the targets of the UAE Framework for the second GST, are: voluntary; non-prescriptive; non-punitive; facilitative; global in nature; respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances; and country driven.<sup>21</sup> The decision encourages Parties to utilize the indicators in reporting and planning processes.<sup>22</sup>

At COP30, Parties also launched the Belém-Addis vision on adaptation—a two-year, joint Subsidiary Bodies process to further operationalize the indicators. Parties will continue to work on the Belém Adaptation Indicators, including improving their metadata and methodologies.<sup>23</sup> The metadata and methodologies will be considered at CMA9 (November 2027).<sup>24</sup> Parties also agreed to undertake a review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and the Belém Adaptation Indicators in 2029.<sup>25</sup>

Parties at COP30 further adopted modalities for the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Road Map, which cover the years 2026–28. The work focuses on initial implementation of Baku Adaptation Road Map activities through two annual workshops and a technical paper by the secretariat.<sup>26</sup>

# Just Transition

## Key outcomes

- a decision to develop a just transition mechanism to enhance international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity building and knowledge sharing<sup>27</sup>
- twenty-two (22) key messages from the 2024–25 global dialogues that Parties should consider in designing, implementing and supporting just transition pathways in line with national circumstances, priorities, and capabilities, as applicable<sup>28</sup>
- a request to the Subsidiary Bodies to develop the terms of reference for the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP).<sup>29</sup>

## Background

Launched at COP27 and operationalized at COP28, the aim of the JTWP is to discuss pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. The JTWP is built on and complements both the elements and structure of other work programs, workstreams, and bodies under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Each year, the JTWP holds two dialogues, hosts a high-level ministerial roundtable, and recommends a draft decision on its work for consideration and adoption at that year's COP.<sup>30</sup> At COP29, Parties were unable to agree on a decision recognizing the first year's work of the JTWP or future guidance.

## Outcomes from COP30

At COP30, despite differences of view, Parties ultimately agreed to launch a new "just transition mechanism," to be implemented in a manner that builds on and complements "relevant workstreams under the Convention and the Paris Agreement." Parties have yet to determine the function and scope of the mechanism and are expected to adopt a decision on the process to operationalize the mechanism at CMA8 (November 2026) in Türkiye.<sup>31</sup>

The JTWP decision sets out a non-exhaustive list of 22 key messages derived from Parties' exchanges and sharing of information on opportunities, best practice, actionable solutions, challenges, and barriers from its global dialogues.<sup>32</sup> Parties and non-Party stakeholders (NPS) were invited to consider the key messages in designing, implementing, and supporting just transition pathways in line with national circumstances, priorities, and capabilities, as applicable.<sup>33</sup> The decision also encourages Parties to consider just transition pathways in their NDCs, NAPs, and long-term low-emission development strategies (LT-LEDS), recognizing the need for enhanced and continued support to developing countries.<sup>34</sup> The JTWP was invited to integrate relevant outcomes of the first GST in its work.<sup>35</sup> In turn, it also invited other constituted bodies of the UNFCCC to integrate just transition elements and outcomes in their workplans and report on just transition-related progress in order to promote synergies.<sup>36</sup>

In terms of future work, Parties requested that the Subsidiary Bodies develop the process for the review of the effectiveness and efficiency of the JTWP, including ways to improve existing modalities, in June 2026. The secretariat was requested to map and prepare a synthesis report on relevant instruments, initiatives, and processes under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, as well as relevant entities in the UN system.<sup>37</sup> The review will feed into Parties' consideration of the renewal of the JTWP at COP31.<sup>38</sup>

# Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme

## Key outcomes:

- a request to the secretariat to improve the organization of future global dialogues and investment-focused events,<sup>39</sup> and an invitation to Parties to share views on improvements to the continuation, functioning, and effectiveness of the work programme<sup>40</sup>
- key messages from the work in 2025 on forests, synergies, and waste<sup>41</sup>
- efforts to encourage the registration of mitigation projects in the Article 6.8 Non-Market Approaches (NMA) Platform, the UNFCCC web-based platform for recording and exchanging information on non-market approaches (NMAs).<sup>42</sup>

## Background

Established at COP26 and launched at COP27, the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme (MWP) aims to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation before 2030 in a manner that complements the GST.<sup>43</sup> It features two annual global dialogues and investment-focused events. The issues that conflicted Parties upon the MWP's adoption at COP26 (e.g., whether to set recommendations or goals for specific sectors, and whether and how it would link to COP processes) continued to beset Parties in subsequent decisions (e.g., the scope of, improvements to, and messages from the MWP).

## Outcomes from COP30

At COP30, Parties split over a proposed digital platform. With the MWP due to close in 2026, Parties ultimately requested the secretariat to improve the organization of future global dialogues and investment-focused events, including through enhancing Parties' participation, as well as improving the investment-focused events' cooperative matchmaking function to assist Parties in accessing finance. Parties, observers, and other stakeholders were invited to exchange views in June 2026 on the opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges, and barriers relevant to the continuation, functioning, and effectiveness of the work programme. At COP31, Parties will consider whether to extend the MWP.<sup>44</sup>

For several years, Parties have tried to explore whether the MWP could complement and address signals from the GST, such as the transition away from fossil fuels. In the plenary, some Parties protested the adoption of the MWP without language on a roadmap for the transition away from fossil fuels. Despite this, the decision was adopted. Subsequently, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced that he would support work on two roadmaps under the Presidency's responsibility: one on transitioning away from fossil fuels and a second on halting and reversing deforestation.<sup>45</sup> He also welcomed plans for an April 2026 summit on fossil fuel phase-out, noting that the future COP30 Presidency roadmaps could build on its outcomes.

The MWP decision acknowledges past discussions on enhancing collaboration between governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders to drive investable, country-owned mitigation projects. In that context, it set out a series of calls to operationalize use of the NMA Platform. Parties have been encouraged to record relevant projects to the NMA Platform.<sup>46</sup> The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was requested to:

consider how to improve Parties' abilities to record or register their projects to the NMA Platform and interconnectivity with other platforms; and recommend a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP31.<sup>47</sup> The secretariat was asked to prepare a technical paper exploring how to operationalize the NMA Platform for this use by June 2026.<sup>48</sup> (For more on the development of the NMA Platform, see "Article 6 on Carbon Markets and Non-Market Approaches")

## Taking Forward the Outcomes of the Global Stocktake

### Key outcomes

- launching the UAE Dialogue on implementing the outcomes of the GST, which will facilitate the sharing of experience and of information on opportunities, challenges, barriers, and needs, including key enablers, such as the means of implementation and strengthened international cooperation, in implementing the GST outcomes<sup>49</sup>
- the scientific community, the GST co-facilitators, and the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies to consider or guide key refinements to the second GST<sup>50</sup>
- consideration and adoption of conclusions on the 2024 and 2025 reports on the annual GST dialogue.<sup>51</sup>

### Background

Article 14 of the Paris Agreement requires Parties to undertake a GST every five years to assess collective progress toward the agreement's long-term mitigation, adaptation, and finance goals and enhance international cooperation for climate action.<sup>52</sup> The first GST concluded at COP28 and, as part of the Paris Agreement's "ambition cycle," new NDCs that were due by February 10, 2025,<sup>53</sup> must include information on how Parties have considered the GST outcome.<sup>54,55</sup> The COP28 GST decision set out, in addition to key targets and signals from the first GST, several dialogues and a process to refine the second GST.

That decision established a dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, which had been due to be operationalized at COP29. However, Parties disagreed on its scope and timeline, delaying its launch. The COP28 GST decision also called for Parties to consider refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process based on experience from the first GST. Parties have been considering refinements since June 2024. Parties had been unable to agree on procedural and logistical elements, including the timeline, as well as whether to request the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—as a critical source of "best available science"—to align its Assessment Report cycle (typically seven to nine years) with the GST's five-year cycle. The COP28 GST decision further established an "annual global stocktake dialogue" to "facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practice on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of Parties' next NDCs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement."<sup>56</sup> An annual GST dialogue was held in June 2024, but Parties were unable to agree on whether to set out key messages or on whether and when the dialogue should continue or conclude.

### Outcomes from COP30

At COP30, Parties agreed to launch the UAE Dialogue on implementing the outcomes of the GST. It will be held at SB64 (June 2026) and SB66 (June 2027) before concluding.<sup>57</sup> The COP30 decision also establishes a high-level ministerial dialogue to be conducted at CMA9 (November 2027).<sup>58</sup> Summary

reports of each dialogue will serve as inputs to the second GST (which will take place from 2026-2028).<sup>59</sup>

With respect to refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process, Parties also decided to: invite the scientific community to provide best available inputs to feed into the GST in a timely manner, as available;<sup>60</sup> encourage the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue to enhance consideration of loss and damage, response measures, and international cooperation in the GST's thematic areas;<sup>61</sup> and invite the Subsidiary Body Chairs to ensure sufficient time for each phase of the GST.<sup>62</sup>

Additionally, Parties considered and adopted conclusions on both the 2024 and 2025 reports of the annual GST dialogue, which encouraged Parties to draw on the lessons learned and good practice from the summary reports.<sup>63</sup> The next dialogue will be held at SB64 (June 2026), after which it will conclude.<sup>64</sup> Parties will consider the resumption of the dialogue in its consideration of the outcome of the second GST (2028).<sup>65</sup>

## Aligning Finance Flows with the Goals of the Paris Agreement

### Key outcomes

- a three-year extension of discussions on Article 2.1(c) through the Veredas Dialogue<sup>66</sup> and the Xingu Finance Talks, an annual high-level roundtable<sup>67</sup>
- acknowledgement that there is no common interpretation of the scope of Article 2.1(c), along with a need for safeguards affirming that efforts to align finance flows with the goals of the Paris Agreement are nationally determined and non-prescriptive.<sup>68</sup>

### Background

Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement calls for making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. Since 2023, Parties, relevant organizations, and stakeholders have exchanged views on Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9, which looks at climate finance more broadly, through the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue, which was set to end in 2025.

### COP30 Outcomes

Building on the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue, Parties decided to extend discussions on financial alignment and consistency for three years under the Veredas Dialogue. Under the Dialogue, the COP Presidency will convene the Xingu Finance Talks, an annual high-level roundtable to exchange views on the challenges and opportunities of implementing Article 2.1(c). All interested Parties and NPS, including academia, international financial institutions, and the private sector, are encouraged to engage in and contribute practical solutions to these discussions.

The COP30 decision recognizes that there is no common interpretation of the scope of Article 2.1(c) or the manner of its implementation. The outcome also recognizes the need for safeguards for the domestic implementation of financial reforms, noting that any efforts to make finance flows consistent with the Paris Agreement's goals are nationally determined, facilitative, non-punitive, and non-prescriptive.

# Technology

## Key outcomes

- adoption of a nine-year technology implementation program (TIP)<sup>69</sup>
- a high-level ministerial dialogue on technology development and transfer in 2028.<sup>70</sup>

## Background

COP16 established the Technology Mechanism (TM) to facilitate the implementation of enhanced action on climate technology development and transfer toward achieving the full implementation of the UNFCCC. The Technology Mechanism comprises the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). Parties to the Paris Agreement established a technology framework to provide overarching guidance to the TM and mandated that the TEC and CTCN also serve the Paris Agreement. In 2023, the GST established the TIP to: (i) strengthen support of technology priorities identified by developing countries; and (ii) address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the TM. Parties have struggled to agree on its scope, timeline, relationship to the GST, and relationship to the existing technology architecture under the UNFCCC in order to operationalize the work.

## COP30 Outcomes

At COP30, Parties adopted the Belém TIP to: contribute to the urgent action needed to limit temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels; be implemented on the basis of principles of the technology framework and the provisions of the Paris Agreement; and support of the implementation of Parties' NDCs, NAPs, and LT-LEDS, given their importance in implementing the GST outcomes. The COP30 decision set out the TIP's: priorities and principles; key elements; and the tasks and responsibilities for the TEC and CTCN.

The TEC and CTCN will convene and prepare summary reports for two kinds of annual dialogues starting in 2027. The first kind consists of global in-session dialogues during the Subsidiary Bodies meetings on addressing challenges to implementing developing countries' technology priorities and those challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the TM. The second consists of regional dialogues in conjunction with regional forums thematically aligned with the global in-session dialogue for that year.

The TIP's annual reports will feed into the periodic assessments of the TM, as well as future GSTs.<sup>71</sup> The TIP will conclude in 2034, with the possibility of extension, taking into account the third GST.<sup>72</sup>

Parties also agreed to convene a high-level ministerial dialogue on technology development and transfer in 2028.

## Gender

### Key outcomes

- adoption of a nine-year gender action plan that aligns with the timelines of the enhanced Lima work program on gender that was agreed at COP29<sup>73,74</sup>

### Background

To integrate gender considerations into the work of Parties and the UNFCCC Secretariat, COP20 established the Lima work programme on gender (LWPG). At COP29, Parties extended the enhanced LWPG for a period of ten years and requested that its third gender action plan be adopted at COP30. Each gender action plan sets out the objectives and activities for the advancement of knowledge and understanding of gender-responsive climate action. A gender action plan also seeks to mainstream gender in the implementation of the UNFCCC and the work of Parties, the secretariat, United Nations entities and all stakeholders, as well as women's full, equal and meaningful participation in the UNFCCC process.

### COP30 Outcomes

The Belém Gender Action Plan is structured around five priority areas: capacity-building, knowledge management, and communication; gender-balance, participation, and women's leadership; coherence; gender-responsive means of implementation; and monitoring and reporting.<sup>75</sup> The COP30 decision recognizes that the Gender Action Plan may inform Parties as a tool for implementing climate action, and that pathways and approaches should be nationally determined.<sup>76</sup> The Belém Gender Action Plan aligns its timelines and reviews with those of the enhanced LWPG; both will be reviewed in 2029 and conclude in 2034.<sup>77</sup>

## National Adaptation Plans

### Key outcomes

- work to enhance efforts of the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Expert Group to address the gaps and needs of developing countries in creating and implementing their national adaptation plans (NAPs)<sup>78</sup>
- eighty-six (86) NAPs submitted by December 30, 2025.<sup>79</sup>

### Background

NAPs are voluntary national plans that set out how countries will adapt to climate change in the medium and long term. COP16 set out a process to develop and implement NAPs to help developing countries identify and address long-term climate adaptation needs.<sup>80</sup> The first GST calls for Parties to have NAPs by 2025 and implement them by 2030.<sup>81</sup> In June 2024, Parties initiated a "progress assessment" for the NAP process to: recognize the adaptation efforts of developing countries; assess their progress in achieving their NAP objectives; and consider how the NAP process contributes to the achievement of the GGA, as defined in Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement. The assessment further aims to facilitate the sharing of experiences, best practices, and lessons learned among countries, while also identifying gaps and needs for improvement in the NAP processes. Parties were unable to reach consensus at COP29, particularly on finance for NAP implementation.

## COP30 Outcomes

The COP30 decision on the progress assessment for the formulation and implementation of NAPs acknowledged that developed country Parties have made some progress but continue to face challenges in accessing sufficient adaptation finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building for their NAPs.<sup>82</sup> Parties welcomed anticipated financial support from the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Green Climate Fund Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme as well as capacity-building support from UN organizations, agencies, and other regional and international support programs and agencies for NAPs.<sup>83</sup> Parties requested the LDC Expert Group to collaborate on an overview of climate finance flows and financial support provided to developing country Parties for their NAPs and a technical paper on how LDCs and small-island developing States are integrating different climate approaches into their NAPs.<sup>84</sup> The next progress assessment for the formulation and implementation of NAPs will take place at COP35 (2030).<sup>85</sup>

## Loss and Damage

### Key outcomes

- recognition of the rapid progress in the operationalization of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) and a request to the Board of the FRLD to expedite the adoption of the FRLD's long-term fundraising and resource mobilization strategy and plan<sup>86</sup>
- requests to enhance and improve support to developing countries in addressing and responding to Loss and Damage (L&D), including preparation of a regular, multi-year report on the global status of L&D<sup>87</sup>

### Background

At COP29, Parties fully operationalized the FRLD, which was established to provide finance for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to L&D.

Every five years, Parties review the efficacy of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), which drives the L&D agenda through its Executive Committee and the Santiago Network. The Executive Committee guides the implementation of the WIM's functions, while the Santiago Network connects developing countries and communities with tailored, context-specific technical assistance on L&D. At COP29, Parties started the WIM's third review.<sup>88</sup>

## COP30 Outcomes

The COP30 decision welcomed the FRLD Board and Parties' work through 2025. Achievements and milestones included: establishment of the Barbados Implementation Modalities, particularly its access modalities grant interventions for 2025–26;<sup>89</sup> adoption of the Board's 2026 workplan;<sup>90</sup> more than U.S. \$815 million in pledges to the FRLD (as of November 19, 2025);<sup>91</sup> and the Board's decision to launch the first replenishment of the Fund in 2027.<sup>92</sup>

At COP30, Parties also concluded the third review of the WIM. The decision acknowledged progress, welcomed pledges, and requested committees and bodies to further improve their work. In particular, Parties requested the Santiago Network Advisory Board and relevant organizations, bodies, networks, and experts to publish a regular, multi-year report on the global status of L&D that reflects information and reporting provided by Parties to help inform their national L&D policy development.

# Article 6 on Carbon Markets and Non-Market Approaches

## Key outcomes

- a decision on Article 6.2 that requests the Article 6 technical expert review teams to explain their findings on any inconsistencies in the reporting of cooperative approaches, make recommendations on their resolution, and support the UNFCCC secretariat in improving training on those areas of inconsistency<sup>93</sup>
- a decision on Article 6.4 that operationalizes the transition of activities from the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) and related transfer of funds,<sup>94</sup> prioritizes the review of CDM methodologies that are eligible to transition to the PACM,<sup>95</sup> and requests the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body to strengthen its stakeholder engagement process<sup>96</sup>
- a decision on Article 6.8 that provides further guidance for the secretariat to implement the work program, improves the user experience of the NMA Platform, continues providing capacity building on NMAs; and prepares for the work program's review.<sup>97,98</sup>

## Background

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes that some countries will use international emissions trading or other NMAs to achieve their NDCs. Article 6.2 sets out the accounting rules for cooperative approaches involving the exchange of carbon credits as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). As of November 15, 2025, the UNFCCC has received information on 39 cooperative approaches and 24 authorizations. Article 6.4 establishes a centralized framework, the PACM, for Parties to issue, use, and trade carbon credits. Article 6.8 establishes a framework for collaborative NMAs—in other words, not involving carbon credits—to support Parties in achieving their NDCs through holistic mitigation approaches that include adaptation, technology transfer, finance, and capacity building. As of November 13, 2025, three NMAs have been recorded onto the Platform, 106 national focal points have been nominated, and 31 support providers listed.

## COP30 Outcome

The COP30 Article 6.2 decision requested the secretariat, with the support of expert reviewers, to explain inconsistencies in the reporting of cooperative approaches and provide capacity building on how to prevent and address inconsistencies, including through relevant training materials. Given delayed development of the Article 6.2 registry system for tracking digital representations of ITMOs, Parties requested the secretariat to expedite its work and for the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to review the sufficiency and stability of funds with a view to recommending a decision at COP31.<sup>99</sup>

The COP30 Article 6.4 decision extended the deadline for host countries to approve the transition of activities from the CDM to the PACM from December 2025 (decided at COP26) to June 2026, which allows for the transfer of U.S. \$26.8 million from the CDM to fund the PACM.<sup>100</sup> As soon as the PACM becomes self-financing (and no later than 2035), annual financial transfers will be made to the Adaptation Fund, for a total of U.S. \$56.8 million each year.<sup>101</sup> As the Supervisory Body of the Mechanism (SBM) continues to operationalize the PACM, Parties requested the SBM to prioritize the review of CDM methodologies that are eligible to transition to the PACM,<sup>102</sup> strengthen its stakeholder engagement process,<sup>103</sup> and continue to ensure that its standards,

methodologies, and tools ensure environmental integrity are based on the best available science and informed by robust evidence.<sup>104</sup> Parties will review the PACM's modalities, including SBM member terms, in 2028.<sup>105</sup>

The COP30 Article 6.8 decision provides further guidance to the secretariat to implement the work program through 2026, such as to improve the user experience of the NMA Platform, including by adding new categories to help users filter through countries, ecosystems, and sectors for recorded NMAs.<sup>106</sup> Parties were invited to consider national processes for identifying and selecting NMAs and to record more NMAs onto the Platform.<sup>107</sup> The decision also requested SBSTA to review the work program through 2026 to make recommendations on enhancing its effectiveness for consideration by Parties at COP31.<sup>108</sup>

## Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings

### Key outcomes

- continued efforts to make the UNFCCC process more efficient and inclusive, including inviting Parties to pursue efficiency in their work<sup>109</sup> and requesting the Secretariat to continue to cluster mandated events where feasible<sup>110</sup>
- appreciation that Ethiopia will host COP32 in 2027.<sup>111</sup>

At COP30, Parties engaged in discussions on the arrangements for intergovernmental meetings. During these conversations, they considered issues like the efficiency of the UNFCCC process and who will host future COPs. Building on text agreed in June 2025, Parties set out further suggestions to improve the efficiency of their work, although some expressed frustration that more progress was not made on this issue at COP30. Parties will continue consideration of efforts to increase the efficiency of the UNFCCC process in June 2026.<sup>112</sup>

## Agriculture

### Key outcomes

- SBSTA and SBI agreed to continue discussions on the joint work and draft conclusions on systemic and holistic approaches to implementing climate action on agriculture, food systems, and food security, including their understanding, cooperation, and integration into plans.<sup>113</sup>

### Background

COP27 established the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security, a four-year initiative to discuss increasing ambition on climate action in agriculture and food security. COP29 launched the Sharm el-Sheikh online portal for sharing information on projects, initiatives, and policies for increasing opportunities for implementation of climate action to address issues related to agriculture and food security.<sup>114</sup>

## COP30 Outcome

At COP30, the SBSTA and SBI agreed to continue the joint work until its conclusion at COP31, unless Parties choose to renew the work. At SB64 (June 2026), discussions will focus on progress, challenges, and opportunities related to identifying needs and accessing means of implementation for climate action in agriculture and food security, including sharing of best practice.<sup>115</sup>

# Mountains and Climate Change

## Key outcome


- a dialogue on mountains and climate change.<sup>116</sup>

As requested by the GST decision, an expert dialogue on mountains and climate change was held in 2024.<sup>117</sup> Ahead of COP30, a group of Parties sought to add an agenda item on mountains and climate change and to launch an annual dialogue on mountains modeled after the annual oceans dialogue, given the disproportionate impact of climate change on mountain ecosystems and communities. The COP30 decision requests a dialogue on mountains and climate change to be held in June 2026, at which Parties will determine whether to host annual dialogues in the future,<sup>118</sup> and a presentation of the dialogue's summary report at COP31 to coincide with the launch of the second GST.<sup>119</sup>

Photo Credit: Rafa Neddermeyer/COP30 Brasil Amazônia/PR



The Main stage of the Closing Plenary at COP30.



# World Climate Action Summit and Major Announcements

The **World Climate Leaders Summit** on November 6–7, 2025, served to set the tone for COP30. The message from leaders in Belém was clear: the Paris Agreement still is alive; through enhanced international cooperation, countries must work to show that multilateralism can effectively address the world's common challenges. Several world leaders spoke at the summit and made important announcements:

- Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley expressed deep disappointment with the low capitalization of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, especially in the context of recent destruction caused by hurricanes. She also urged a coalition of the willing to address methane emissions from the oil and gas and agricultural sectors.<sup>120</sup>
- President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen highlighted the EU's 90 percent emissions reduction by 2040 target that was agreed in November 2025. President Von der Leyen also highlighted the work of the European Commission's Task Force on International Carbon Pricing and Markets Diplomacy.
- India announced that it will meet its 2030 NDC target, achieving 50 percent of its installed electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel sources by this year.
- The Republic of Korea, in collaboration with Chile, will host the 4th UN Ocean Conference in 2028.

During the High Level Segment, Parties highlighted Article 6 carbon markets as a relevant aspect of climate finance. Norway's Minister of Climate and Environment proposed to nearly double spending to up to U.S. \$1.5 billion to purchase up to 15 million international carbon credits to meet its 2030 climate target. Singapore committed to two million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent credits from high-integrity, nature-based solutions and to making progress on developing transition credits.

Throughout COP30, 40 countries submitted **NDCs 3.0**, bringing the total to 120. This included 16 members of the G20. [As of publication, 134 countries have submitted their latest NDCs.<sup>121</sup>]

## Outside of the Formal Negotiations

- Earlier in 2025, the **Action Agenda** was aligned with the targets and signals from the first GST through 117 "Plans to Accelerate Solutions" to be taken forward by international cooperative initiatives participating in "activation groups."<sup>122</sup> These plans will inform the second GST. The Global Climate Action Agenda at COP30 Outcomes Report highlighted the shift from headline commitments to concrete action.<sup>123</sup> More detailed information on implementation can be found by reviewing the Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2025<sup>124</sup> or through reported initiative-level indicators in the Global Climate Action Platform (also called the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action [NAZCA] portal).<sup>125</sup> The Global Mutirão decision recognized the efforts of the Climate High-Level Champions in providing continuity through their work,<sup>126</sup> indirectly acknowledging the alignment and new five-year plan.<sup>127</sup>

- More than 80 countries joined the **Mutirão Call for a Fossil Fuel Roadmap**, announced November 18, 2025, aiming to advance the commitment to transition away from fossil fuels set out in the COP28 GST decision.<sup>128</sup> Colombia announced that it will host the first international diplomatic conference on fossil fuel phase-out in April 2026.
- COP29 launched the **Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T**, a process that aims to scale up public and private finance to U.S. \$1.3 trillion for developing countries, including through grants and non-debt creating instruments. After consultations with countries and other stakeholders, the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers, the UN Independent High-Level Expert Group on Finance set out a catalogue of initiatives and best practices,<sup>129</sup> which COP29 and COP30 Presidencies presented as **the final Roadmap report** to Parties at a high-level event.<sup>130</sup> At the high-level event, many Parties expressed a need for further work to implement the recommendations of the report.
- Parties successfully completed the second group review of their climate progress reports through the **Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress**. The European Union, South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Finland, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland presented their first biennial transparency reports (BTRs) under the Paris Agreement's enhanced transparency regime. Through this technical process, Parties reaffirmed the critical importance of transparency in shaping collective understanding of national progress toward meeting their respective NDCs and identifying gaps to improve implementation. The conclusion of the FMCP at COP30 also ended the first full Enhanced Transparency Framework cycle.
- As an example of an initiative committed to advancing pathways and strategies for transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, a **new pilot fund** for Colombia commits U.S. \$10 million toward a U.S. \$200 million goal for Latin America.<sup>131</sup> The pilot fund is hosted by the Journey Fund, a global "fund-of-funds" platform that provides catalytic capital to scale just transition investments, in partnership with the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative.
- Brazil officially launched the **Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF)** in a high-level event led by President Lula. Initial contributors include Brazil (U.S. \$1 billion), Norway (U.S. \$3 billion), Indonesia (U.S. \$1 billion), Germany, (€1 billion), France (€500 million), and the Minderoo Foundation (U.S. \$10 million in investments), though some pledges are conditional upon the facility's capitalization. The Netherlands committed U.S. \$5 million and Portugal committed €1 million to operationalize the TFFF Secretariat. Total pledges to the TFFF exceeded U.S. \$6.7 billion.<sup>132</sup>
- Throughout COP30, the **Adaptation Fund** received finance pledges totaling U.S. \$135 million. Pledges came from Germany (€60 million), Spain (€20 million), Sweden (U.S. \$13.8 million, announced April 2025), Ireland (€10 million), Switzerland (U.S. \$5.1 million), Luxembourg (€5 million), Belgium's Walloon region (€3 million), Portugal (€1 million), South Korea (U.S. \$800,000), and Iceland (U.S. \$700,000).<sup>133</sup>
- Spain pledged €20 million to the **Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage** during the Leaders' Summit. In 2025, countries pledged a total of U.S. \$38.7 million to the FRLD, including from Iceland (U.S. \$3 million), Japan (U.S. \$5 million), and Luxembourg (€7 million). Since its inception, the FRLD has received pledges totaling U.S. \$821.5 million.<sup>134,135</sup> Switzerland pledged U.S. \$1.2 million to the Santiago Network.<sup>136</sup>

- The Brazilian-led **Belém Health Action Plan** launched with an initial U.S. \$300 million investment from the Climate and Health Funders Coalition, a group of more than 35 philanthropies.<sup>137</sup>
- In partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Governments of Italy and Germany, the NAP Global Network, and the NDC Partnership, the COP30 Presidency launched the National Adaptation Plan Implementation Alliance to accelerate the implementation of NAPs.<sup>138</sup>

## Future Sessions

- Negotiations will resume at the annual mid-year meeting of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies to be held in Bonn, Germany, on June 8–18, 2026.
- Australia and Türkiye will host COP31 on November 9–20, 2026, in the city of Antalya.
- Ethiopia will host COP32 on November 8–19, 2027, in the city of Addis Ababa, becoming the first Least Developed Country to host a COP.



The port of Antalya, Türkiye, the host city of COP31.

# C2ES Resources

## Just Transition

### Considerations for the Progress Assessment of NAPs at COP30

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Progress-Assessment-of-NAPs-at-COP30.pdf>

### Considerations & Recommendations for the UAE Just Transition Work Programme

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/UAE-Just-Transition-Work-Programme-COP30.pdf>

## Global Stocktake

### Delivering on the Targets and Signals from the First Global Stocktake

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/20250729-C2ES-GST-Factsheet.pdf>

### Enhancing Action & Cooperation for the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Transition-Away-from-Fossil-Fuels-discussion.pdf>

### Enhancing Action & Cooperation for Halting & Reversing Deforestation

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Halting-and-Reversing-Deforestation-by-2030-Discussion-Paper.pdf>

### Negotiations on the Global Stocktake: State of Play and Key Considerations

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/20250912-C2ES-Negotiations-on-the-Global-Stocktake-v.2.pdf>

## Finance

### The Future of Article 2.1(c) Discussions: Issues and Options

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Future-of-Article-2.1c-Discussions.pdf>

### Issues and Options: Centering Adaptation Finance at COP30

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Centering-Adaptation-Finance-at-COP30.pdf>

### Issues and Options to Develop Modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/C2ES-Baku-Adaptation-Roadmap-Submission.pdf>

## Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Impacts

Considerations for Selecting Indicators for the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250502-C2ES-GGA-indicators-principles-v5.2.pdf>

Considerations for the Progress Assessment of National Adaptation Plans at COP30

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Progress-Assessment-of-NAPs-at-COP30.pdf>

The 2024 Review of the Warsaw International Mechanism: Considerations for COP30

<https://www.c2es.org/document/the-2024-review-of-the-warsaw-international-mechanism-considerations-for-cop30/>

## Transparency

Harnessing the Opportunities of the Facilitative Multilateral Consideration of Progress (FMCP) for Ambition

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/20250812-C2ES-Harnessing-the-FMCP.pdf>

The Enhanced Transparency Framework (Discussion Paper)

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/20250403-C2ES-ETF-State-of-Play-v2.3.pdf>

## UNFCCC process

A Vision for the 2025-2030 Action Agenda

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/C2ES-Vision-for-the-Action-Agenda.pdf>

10 Years of the Paris Agreement: Progress Toward Achieving Key Goals

<https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/C2ES-Paris-Agreement-Progress.pdf>

For other C2ES resources, see C2ES COP30 Resources

<https://www.c2es.org/supporting-the-paris-agreement/c2es-cop30/>

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
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