

INTERNATIONAL



# Enhancing Action & International Cooperation for Accelerating the Substantial Reduction of Methane Emissions by 2030

Discussion Paper

November 7, 2025

## A. Summary

1. The period from the end of the first global stocktake (**GST**) at COP28 (2023) through to COP31 (2026) is critical. During this time period we will learn the collective level of ambition of new climate targets, whether countries have taken into account the outcomes of COP28 in formulating them, and whether countries have put in place the domestic plans, legislation, finance and investment needed to implement those new targets. In 2026, Parties are expected to begin the second global stocktake process, which will assess collective progress toward the Paris Agreement's goals in light of new commitments. Thus, in the context of the Paris Agreement's ambition cycle, 2024–26 are crucial years for preparation, action, and enhanced international cooperation.
2. The GST decision from COP28 sets out a number of key, transformational global targets and signals to Parties to: (i) inform their next nationally determined contributions (**NDCs**); and (ii) enhance implementation and international cooperation.<sup>1</sup> Parties were expected to communicate their NDCs by February 10, 2025, with an end date of 2035.<sup>2</sup> The GST signals form part of guidance and requirements that have been set out from Paris to date,<sup>3</sup> including that:
  - Each Party's successive NDC will represent a "progression" beyond its previous NDC and reflect its "highest possible ambition," reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (**CBDR-RC**), in the light of different national circumstances<sup>4</sup>
  - Parties "shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives" of their NDCs<sup>5</sup>
  - Parties include, as part of the information to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding of NDCs:
    - how the Party considers that its NDC is fair and ambitious in the light of its national circumstances<sup>6</sup>
    - how the NDC contributes toward achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2<sup>7</sup>

- how the NDC is informed by the outcomes of the GST, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement<sup>8</sup>
  - Parties come forward with ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 degree C, as informed by the latest science, in the light of different national circumstances<sup>9</sup>
  - Parties commit to accelerate action in this critical decade on the basis of the best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of CBDR-RC in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty<sup>10</sup>
  - Parties put in place new or intensify existing domestic arrangements for preparing and implementing successive NDCs<sup>11</sup>
  - Parties are expected to present their next NDCs at a special event to be held under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General.<sup>12</sup>
3. In order to implement the GST targets and signals through enhanced NDC ambition and implementation, major barriers must be meaningfully addressed, turned into opportunities for enhanced international cooperation, and translated into development priorities and domestic policies.
  4. This paper focuses on the GST decision's call to Parties to contribute to global efforts, in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement and their different national circumstances, by **"[a]ccelerating the substantial reduction on non-carbon dioxide emissions globally, in particular methane emissions by 2030."**<sup>13</sup>
  5. In the context of making the case for clear leadership to enable such action, this paper further:
    - sets out barriers and solutions, as identified by our work and others, that must be addressed and implemented to enable real action in 2025–26 with regards to accelerating the substantial reduction in methane emissions by 2030<sup>14</sup>
    - sets out key leadership considerations, how such a leadership role can be effectively utilized, and key priorities for 2026.
  6. Many of the **obstacles to accelerating the substantial reduction on methane emissions by 2030<sup>15</sup> can largely be summarized as three immediate challenges: infrastructure, investment, and information-related challenges.**
  7. Parties must respond quickly and tangibly to accelerate the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030.<sup>16</sup> A number of solutions and opportunities exist to help overcome these challenges. At the same time, clear leadership that is inspiring, inclusive, respects the nationally determined nature of NDCs, and meets Parties and NPS where they are in terms of capacity, is essential. Enhanced international cooperation is vital to move from incrementalism to transformative levels of action in 2026 and beyond.

The substantial reduction of methane emissions globally by 2030 could have a major impact on global temperatures, equivalent to removing the emissions of all cars and trucks in the world.<sup>17</sup> Achieving this GST1 outcome will be critical to meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature target.

**Scaling finance** for methane emissions reduction will play an essential role in the achievement of the target.

One-hundred sixty countries have already signed onto the voluntary Global Methane Pledge (*GMP*), a initiative aimed at reducing global methane emissions by at least 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2020 levels.<sup>18</sup> This pledge represents a significant first step, signaling widespread recognition in methane's role in accelerating climate change and resolve to curb its emissions.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (*IPCC*), global methane emissions must be reduced by 34 percent compared to 2019 level by 2030 and by 35 percent by 2035 in order to align with 1.5-degrees-C pathways.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the GMP should be seen as an ambition floor, and **countries should be encouraged to come forward with more ambitious methane reduction targets.**

Countries are increasingly setting explicit methane targets<sup>20</sup> and national regulation policies.<sup>21</sup> These commitments signal growing political will to address the issue more seriously and are supported by policy frameworks that enforce reductions across multiple sectors, including oil and gas, agriculture, and waste management.

Recognizing the importance of accelerating the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030, **Parties could explore the feasibility of a legally binding international framework on methane reduction**, drawing on lessons from other agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol.<sup>22</sup> Such a framework could, among other things enhance accountability, monitoring, and transparency in achieving global methane goals.

Any future framework would need to balance regulatory measures with voluntary cooperation and effective communication, supporting coordinated global action on methane while respecting diverse national circumstances.

Building on the GST targets and signals from the UAE Consensus, including the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030, COP30 in Belém must reflect on the level of ambition presented by the NDCs and set the new direction as we head toward the end of this critical decade. COP31 must further accelerate NDC implementation.

### **Questions for consideration**

- How are Parties taking forward the signal to accelerate the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030?
- How can Parties best be supported to accelerate the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030?
- What plans are there to enhance international cooperation toward accelerating the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030?
- Which organization(s), countries, or regions are best placed to show leadership and build momentum to accelerate the substantial reduction of methane emissions by 2030?
- Is there an opportunity for governments to consider a legally binding international framework on methane reduction?

## B. Context

8. The GST is a key part of the Paris Agreement's "ambition cycle."<sup>23</sup> Parties to the Paris Agreement are required to undertake a GST every five years "to take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals...It shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support, and in light of equity and the best available science."<sup>24</sup>
9. The outcome of the GST shall inform Parties in: (i) updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support (including their NDCs); and (ii) enhancing international cooperation for climate action.<sup>25</sup> The GST outcome also reaffirms sustainable and just solutions founded on meaningful, inclusive participation of all stakeholders and underlines that just transitions can support more robust and equitable mitigation outcomes.<sup>26</sup>
10. There are guidance and requirements for their NDCs that have been set out by Parties from Paris through to COP28 (see "Summary" above). Parties were originally encouraged to communicate their NDCs by February 10, 2025, with an end date of 2035.<sup>27</sup> Fewer than 30 countries submitted NDCs 3.0 by the February 10, 2025, deadline. Parties were later encouraged to submit their NDCs by the UN Secretary-General's Summit in September. As of November 7, 2025, 80 Parties have communicated new NDCs.<sup>28</sup>
11. According to the November 2024 *NDC Synthesis Report*, 91 percent of Parties covered methane emissions in their previous NDCs.<sup>29</sup>
12. The years 2025–26 are crucial to take forward the GST targets and signals, translating them into effective domestic policies and measures as well as enhancing international cooperation on climate action. The moment of truth as to whether the GST, in the wider context of the Paris Agreement's ambition cycle, will have succeeded in increasing ambition will be in 2025, when new NDCs must be tabled by all Parties. The collective impact of these will be set out in a synthesis report to be made available ahead of COP30.<sup>30</sup>

## C. Accelerating the Substantial Reduction in Methane Emissions: From Incremental to Transformational Change

13. Methane emissions are responsible for nearly a third of global temperature rise since the industrial revolution, according to the International Energy Agency (*IEA*).<sup>31</sup> Accelerating the substantial reduction of methane emissions is critical to meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature goals and improving air quality. According to the IPCC, reductions in methane emissions would lower peak warming and limit the likelihood of overshooting the Paris Agreement's temperature goals by the end of the century.<sup>32</sup>
14. Methane is one of the most potent greenhouse gases, with a global warming potential that is approximately 86 times greater than the same mass of carbon dioxide emissions on a 20-year basis and about 28 times greater on a 100-year basis.<sup>33</sup> Its potency means that it has an outsized impact on global warming, particularly in the near term.
15. Methane has a relatively brief atmospheric lifetime—typically around 12 years—after which it breaks down into other greenhouse gases with a lower global warming potential.
16. Because methane is short-lived and has a high global warming potential, the rapid reduction of methane emissions has the potential to significantly benefit efforts to meet the Paris Agreement's temperature goals.
17. Methane accounts for 17 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions, second only to carbon dioxide. Curbing methane emissions can yield immediate benefits for climate stabilization, catalyzing near-term cooling and, thereby, allowing time for other mitigation strategies to take effect.

18. In recognition of methane's significant global warming impact, the GST decision called on Parties to contribute to, in a nationally determined manner, the significant reduction in methane emissions globally by 2030.
19. The warming effects of methane emissions have repercussions not only for the climate, but also for human health and the global economy, as methane emissions contribute to a yearly loss of around 400 million hours of work globally due to extreme heat.<sup>34</sup> If implemented in ways that prioritize high-quality decision making and enhance coordination and synergies, methane abatement by 2030 can contribute the achievement of several sustainable development goals (**SDGs**) (e.g., SDG 13 on climate action, SDG 2 on zero hunger, and SDG 3 on health and wellbeing).<sup>35</sup>
20. 60 percent of methane emissions are human induced. Human-induced methane emissions largely stem from three sectors: agriculture, fossil fuels, and waste.<sup>36</sup>
21. In the agriculture sector, methane is primarily emitted through enteric fermentation in ruminant animals like cattle, as well as from manure management and rice cultivation. Targeted solutions in this sector could have widespread benefits for emissions reduction globally. For example, rapid and large-scale implementation of improved live-stock feeding strategies globally can improve methane emissions by 20 percent by 2030, and implementation of alternate wetting and drying cultivation of continually flooded rice paddies could reduce emissions from rice production by between 20 and 30 percent.<sup>37</sup>
22. In the fossil fuels sector, methane leakage is a major contributor to emissions, which pipelines, production facilities, and natural gas extraction operations often being sources of unintentional methane releases. Addressing these leaks presents an opportunity to both mitigate climate change and improve operational efficiency.<sup>38</sup>
23. The waste management sector also contributes significantly to methane emissions through landfills, where organic waste decomposes anaerobically. By employing circular economy approaches, improving waste segregation, expanding composting efforts, and enhancing landfill gas capture and utilization, cities and regions can substantially reduce methane emissions from this sector.<sup>39</sup>
24. A substantial reduction in methane emissions globally by 2030 will require robust international cooperation. 160 countries have already signed a pledge to cut methane emissions by 30 percent this decade.<sup>40</sup> But, latest reports show that the world is still not working fast enough to address methane emissions.<sup>41</sup>

## **D. Barriers and Solutions to Accelerated the Substantial Reduction of Methane Emissions by 2030**

### **Barriers**

25. Parties still face a number of regulatory, economic, social, and technological barriers to accelerate the substantial reduction of methane emissions. As identified by C2ES,<sup>42</sup> the GST's Technical Dialogue Synthesis report,<sup>43</sup> and other sources, these challenges include:
  - abatement of methane emissions depends on the accurate characterization of emission sources, and existing inventory methodologies do not fully capture methane emissions
  - lack of infrastructure may prevent captured gas from being brought to market, especially where gas is co-produced with oil
  - difficult-to-quantify costs of refining business operations and worker training
  - split investment incentives
  - lack of cooperation and coordination between governments, industry, and the finance community.<sup>44</sup>
26. These obstacles can largely be categorized as three main challenges: information, infrastructure, and investment.

## Solutions

27. A number of high-impact solutions and opportunities to address key challenges have been identified through a wealth of efforts across different fora. The following list draws from C2ES’s work, as well as the High-Level Climate Champions’ (*HLCs*) *2030 Climate Solutions*.<sup>45</sup>

Actions, solutions, and enablers for NBS and EBA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Set standard for equipment technology, leak detection and repair, and flaring and venting (Source: C2ES)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Measure and report methane emissions (Source: C2ES)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulate upstream emissions, include by pricing emissions or setting performance or procurement standards (Source: C2ES)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide capacity building to Global South producers so that such measures do not penalize those that still lack access to technologies, capital, and know-how (Source: 2030 Climate Solutions)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide capacity building to civil society organizations and local regulators to use transparent and available monitoring, reporting, and verification information to regulate and hold the industry accountable for its emissions (Source: 2030 Climate Solutions)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guarantee strong public and philanthropic financial support for transparent and widespread MRV solutions such as UNEP’s IMEO, with open data and public reporting of emissions (Source: 2030 Climate Solutions)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish strict financial disclosure requirements for financial services to oil and gas companies that include carbon footprint associated with investments and list greenhouse gas mitigation requirements that include methane abatement in line with OGMP 2.0 guidelines (Source: 2030 Climate Solutions)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oil and gas companies rapidly deploy emissions reductions measures and technologies, including measures that put a stop to all non-emergency flaring and venting, and universal adoption of monthly or continuous leak detection and repair programs (Source: C2ES)</li> </ul>

28. The **HLCs and the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action** identify impactful climate solutions and opportunities for international cooperation.<sup>46</sup> At COP28, in the context of the conclusion of the GST and building on prior work, the HLCs presented the *2030 Climate Solutions*—an Implementation Roadmap that sets out solutions framed in specific actions, with insights from a wide range of NPS on effective measures being undertaken that need to be scaled up and replicated as well as current gaps that need to be bridged.<sup>47</sup> The HLCs’ solutions recommend key actions for methane emissions reduction.<sup>48</sup> These recommendations for actions and support overlap with high-impact opportunities and solutions to address barriers to methane abatement, as also identified in work by C2ES.<sup>49</sup>

29. The COP30 Presidency’s Fourth Letter presents a unified approach to the action agenda for the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action and the CHLC, aligned with the outcomes of GST1. This new approach to the action agenda includes 30 key objectives that support the work of activation groups to identify solutions and scale progress towards the GST1 outcomes. Activation group 25 on reduction of non-carbon dioxide includes initiatives such as:<sup>50</sup>

- Food Waste Breakthrough
- Super Pollutant Action Alliance
- Global Methane Reduction Platform for Development
- Oil and Gas Climate Initiative
- #MakingBiogasHappen Programme
- Global Methane Pledge



- Global Methane Reduction Platform.

30. This new vision for the action agenda could usefully be stabilized across presidencies to continue to drive implementation of the GST1 outcomes, including reduction of methane emissions, and foster accountability in key initiatives.<sup>51</sup>

## **E. Leadership for Accelerating the Substantial Reduction in Methane Emissions**

31. As an outcome of the UAE Consensus, the COP28 Presidency (UAE) has been working together with the Azerbaijani (COP29) and Brazilian (COP30) Presidencies to drive ambitious collective action, including through the “Roadmap to Mission 1.5C,” an initiative to significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition in the next round of NDCs. This configuration has been called “the Troika.” The Troika, together with the G7 and G20 and including through the Roadmap to Mission 1.5C, broadly seek to drive ambition and enhanced international cooperation.

32. One-hundred fifty-nine countries and the European Commission participate in the Global Methane Pledge (**GMP**), a voluntary framework supporting nations to take action to collectively reduce methane emissions by 30 percent from 2020 levels by 2030 that was launched by the European Union and the United States at COP26 (2021).<sup>52</sup> The GMP has catalyzed actions in six major areas: Energy Pathway, the Waste Pathway, the Food and Agriculture Pathway, Methane Plans and Policies, Data for Methane Action, and Finance for Methane Abatement.

33. Global Methane Hub (**GMH**), also launched at COP26, funds and convenes stakeholders at the international, national, and local level that are working to curb methane emissions.<sup>53</sup>

34. The United Nations Environment Programme (**UNEP**) has launched several initiatives that support the substantial reduction in methane emissions, including the:

- Climate and Clean Air Coalition (**CCAC**) formed in 2012, which is a voluntary coalition of over 200 governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations convened within UNEP that work to reduce short-lived climate pollutants.<sup>54</sup> CCAC serves as the Secretariat for the GMP and launched the Methane Roadmap Action Programme (**M-RAP**) to support Global Methane Pledge countries to support development and implementation of transparent and consistent national methane roadmaps.<sup>55</sup> It also initiated the Fossil Fuel Regulatory Programme (**FFRP**) with the Clean Air Task Force, which will support up to 20 developing country governments over the next three years with tailored support for building capacity.<sup>56</sup>
- Oil & Gas Methane Partnership 2.0 (**OGMP 2.0**) launched in 2020 by CCAC, UNEP, and the European Union, which provides a reporting framework for methane emissions in the oil and gas sector, fosters best-practice sharing and supports companies and governments in adopting robust measurement and verification standards to drive emissions reductions<sup>57</sup>
- International Methane Emissions Observatory (**IMEO**) launched in 2021, which delivers training and technical guidance to governments and companies looking to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector.<sup>58</sup>

35. The World Bank mobilizes finance and provides grants to reduce methane emissions in the oil and gas sector through the Global Flaring and Methane Reduction Partnership (**GFMR**).

36. The IEA supports governments looking to reduce methane emissions, including through convenings and its methane tracker database.<sup>59</sup>

37. The Oil and Gas Climate initiative supports the implementation of regulations to reduce methane emissions from existing and new sources.<sup>60</sup>



38. The Global Methane Initiative (GMI), an international public-private partnership, works to reduce barriers to methane recovery and use in three main sectors—oil and gas, biogas, and coal mines—by providing technical support since 2004.<sup>61</sup>
39. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (*UNECE*) Group of Experts on Coal Mine Methane and Just Transition published a best practice guidance on ventilation air methane mitigation in 2025 after working to address methane mitigation for two decades.<sup>62</sup>
40. These efforts reflect the need for focused leadership to specifically drive progress on each of the GST targets and signals.

### Upcoming Methane Related Events

41. Methane abatement-related organizations, coalitions, and initiatives may meet or engage at a number of high-level events over 2025–26. These events include:

<b>NOVEMBER 2025</b>
10–21 November, UNFCCC 30 <sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (Belém, Brazil) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17 November, Global Methane Pledge Ministerial</li> <li>• Super Pollutant Ministerial (TBC)</li> </ul>
<b>DECEMBER 2025</b>
1–12 December, Seventh United Nations Environment Assembly (Nairobi, Kenya) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 9 December, 2025 Climate and Clean Air Coalition Ministerial: Accelerating Action on Super Pollutants for a Resilient Planet</li> </ul>
<b>FEBRUARY 2026</b>
24–26 February, 4 <sup>th</sup> Annual Methane Mitigation Europe Summit (Amsterdam, Netherlands)
<b>MARCH 2026</b>
TBD, Petersberg Dialogue (Berlin, Germany)
9–13 March, 12 <sup>th</sup> Better Air Quality Conference (Bangkok, Thailand)
30–31 March, Methane Turns 250: From Discovery to Solutions (Ispra, Italy)
<b>APRIL 2026</b>
1–2 April, Methane Turns 250: From Discovery to Solutions (Ispra, Italy)
13–18 April, World Bank and International Monetary Fund Spring Meetings (Washington, DC)
<b>JUNE 2026</b>
2–4 June, 4 <sup>th</sup> Annual Methane Mitigation Technology Innovation Summit (Houston, Texas, USA)
14–16 June, G7 Summit (Évian-les-Bains, Haute-Savoie, France)
8–18 June, UNFCCC SB64 (Bonn, Germany) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual GST NDC dialogue</li> </ul>
20–28 June, London Climate Action Week (London, UK)
<b>JULY 2026</b>
TBD, UNFCCC Ministerial on Climate Action (MoCA) (TBD)
<b>SEPTEMBER 2026</b>
9–22 September, UN General Assembly (New York, NY)
TBD, NY Climate Week (New York, NY)
<b>OCTOBER 2026</b>
TBD, Pre-COP (TBD)
12–18 October, Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (Bangkok, Thailand)
<b>NOVEMBER 2026</b>
9–20 November, COP31 (TBD)
<b>DECEMBER 2026</b>
14–16 December, G20 Summit (Miami, Florida, USA)



## Capacity Building and Support for Methane Abatement and NDCs

42. Other initiatives can provide critical capacity-building support for the development of climate policy and NDCs. One key initiative is **UN Development Programme's (UNDP's) Climate Promise**.<sup>63</sup> Climate Promise leverages Parties' NDCs and brings together UNDP's infrastructure, networks and breadth of substantive offers to provide comprehensive support on NDC implementation. UNDP provides support to help countries take bold action to reduce their emissions, increase their resilience to climate impacts and support sustainable development priorities.
43. In April 2024, UNDP unveiled the next stage of Climate Promise, Climate Promise 2025, which supports countries in developing and delivering their pledges and draws on UNDP's newly established Climate Hub.<sup>64</sup> Climate Promise 2025 links climate diplomacy and thought leadership with climate action and sustainable development at national and local levels to align the next generation of NDCs with the Paris Agreement goals.
44. Another key initiative is the **NDC Partnership**.<sup>65</sup> Leveraging more than 250 members and more than 110 institutions, the Partnership responds to requests for support needed to translate identified NDC implementation priorities into actionable policies and programs. Based on these requests, the membership offers a tailored package of expertise, technical assistance, and funding. This collaborative response provides developing countries with efficient access to a wide range of resources to adapt to and mitigate climate change and foster more equitable and sustainable development.<sup>66</sup>
45. In June 2024, the NDC Partnership and the UNFCCC secretariat launched the **NDC 3.0 Navigator**. The NDC 3.0 Navigator is an interactive tool designed to support countries in raising NDC ambition and accelerating the implementation of the next round of NDCs. It brings together expert-created strategies, resources, and country insights to support countries in updating their NDCs.<sup>67</sup> The NDC Navigator also set out strategies for Parties translating "global efforts" on translating adaptation goals for diversity from the first GST into national adaptation efforts.<sup>68</sup> These strategies include actions to reduce climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, as well as to accelerate the use of NBS through national and subnational initiatives.
46. UNEP's CCAC provided guidance for integrating non-carbon-dioxide pollutants, including methane, into NDCs 3.0 in 2024.<sup>69</sup> Their recommendations included setting economy-wide targets that include both carbon dioxide and non-carbon dioxide pollutants across all sectors; integrating air quality planning with national climate strategies; and establishing comprehensive assessment and reporting policies for non-carbon dioxide pollutants throughout NDC development and implementation that align with the enhanced transparency framework.

## F. Recommendations

47. The substantial reduction of methane emissions globally by 2030 could have a major impact on global temperatures, equivalent to removing the emissions of all cars and trucks in the world.<sup>70</sup> Achieving this GST1 outcome will be critical to meeting the Paris Agreement's temperature target.
48. **Scaling finance** for methane emissions reduction will play an essential role in the achievement of the target. As of 2023, only 2 percent of tracked global climate finance flows go toward methane abatement measures—less than what is needed annually.<sup>71</sup>
49. One-hundred sixty countries have already signed onto the voluntary GMP, a collective initiative aimed at reducing global methane emissions by at least 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2020 levels.<sup>72</sup> This pledge represents a significant first step, signaling widespread recognition in methane's role in accelerating climate change and resolve to curb its emissions.

50. According to the IPCC, global methane emissions must be reduced by 34 percent compared to 2019 level by 2030 and by 35 percent by 2035 in order to align with 1.5-degrees-C pathways.<sup>73</sup> Thus, the GMP should be seen as an ambition floor, and **countries should be encouraged to come forward with more ambitious methane reduction targets.**
51. Countries are increasingly setting explicit methane targets<sup>74</sup> and national regulation policies.<sup>75</sup> These commitments signal growing political will to address the issue more seriously and are supported by policy frameworks that enforce reductions across multiple sectors, including oil and gas, agriculture, and waste management.
52. Recognizing the importance of substantially reducing methane emissions globally by 2030, **Parties could explore the feasibility working toward a legally binding framework on methane reduction, drawing on lessons from other agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol.** While efforts to date have largely been voluntary commitments and pledges, a legally binding agreement could provide clearer accountability mechanisms and ensure that countries are held to their emission reduction targets.
53. The voluntary nature of the GMP means that the implementation of methane reduction measures can vary. While widespread participation in the pledge is promising, a more structured approach may be needed to achieve global methane reduction targets at the scale and pace necessary to meet the Paris Agreement's goals.
54. In an address at the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley suggested a short, enforceable agreement, modeled after the Montreal Protocol, which successfully phased out substances that deplete the ozone layer.<sup>76</sup> The proposal has gained some traction, although some have warned that building widespread support for adoption could face challenges.<sup>77</sup>
55. Such a framework could help streamline, guide, and enhance international cooperation, ensuring that all Parties are incentivized to take meaningful, coordinated actions toward reducing methane emissions. The adoption of legally binding measures could foster transparency and enable the tracking of progress and providing stronger leverage for enforcement mechanisms.
56. A Montreal Protocol-style approach, such as the one suggested by Mottley, could include legally binding targets, robust monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and a strong framework for compliance and accountability. The suggestion to model a new methane agreement after the Montreal Protocol is based on the latter's success in achieving global cooperation. The Montreal Protocol, established in 1987, is widely regarded as one of the most successful international environmental agreements, having led to the near-complete phase-out of ozone-depleting substances.<sup>78</sup>
57. Given methane's potent warming effects in the short term, a similar global framework for its reduction could have similarly transformative impacts on climate change mitigation, particularly if it is structured to be both flexible and enforceable.
58. While a legally binding agreement could help elevate the urgency of methane mitigation, it is equally important to emphasize the role of incentives and collaboration alongside regulatory measures.

## Ongoing Leadership Is Needed

59. The immediate priority through the remainder of 2025 is action and implementation that inform enhanced NDCs and ambition. Countries that have not yet submitted NDCs 3.0 are expected to do so in 2025. As such, 2025 will demonstrate how much Parties are willing to commit to achieving the Paris goals. The NDC synthesis report, which covered the first 64 NDCs 3.0 submitted, showed that current climate pledges are not enough to reach the 1.5 degrees C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, but also showed that NDCs are showing an increase in ambition over time as intended.<sup>79</sup>



60. As mandated at COP24 in Katowice, Parties shall specify how the preparation of its NDC has been informed by the outcomes of the GST, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 9, of the Paris Agreement; and, if available, on the Party's implementation plans.<sup>80</sup> All Parties shall provide this material in the ICTU component of NDC submissions.<sup>81</sup> Achieving these targets and preparing, communicating, and maintaining successive NDCs with the aim of achieving the objectives of such NDCs is critical to the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.<sup>82</sup>
61. Given that Parties are required to provide information on how their NDC is informed by the GST outcomes, they should use their NDCs to follow up on the targets and signals from GST1, like the substantial reduction of methane emissions.
62. Some countries have still yet to submit their NDCs, Once there has been sufficient time to analyze the NDCs in the annual update of the NDC synthesis report that will be made available ahead of COP30, it will become clearer whether the GST will have succeeded.<sup>83</sup> It is also possible that NDCs will reveal themselves to more usefully be investment plans or tools.<sup>84</sup> In 2026, leadership will be critical for informing subsequent implementation. This is particularly important for the substantial reduction of methane emissions, given its high warming potential, now that overshoot of 1.5 is evident. The full and expeditious implementation of this GST1 outcome could play a vital role in limiting the duration and extent of the overshoot, thus helping to avoid catastrophic climate change.
63. The year 2025 also marks the first year that the Paris Agreement's enhanced transparency framework will be fully operational. New processes, like the facilitative multilateral consideration of process, provides opportunities for Parties to share best practices and lessons learned in implementing their NDCs. In 2026, Parties will submit their second biennial transparency reports (**BTRs**), which may take into account commitments made in their most recent NDCs. For Parties that clearly follow up on the GST1 targets in their NDCs, showing how they will contribute to the acceleration of the substantial reduction in methane emissions globally by 2030, they can report on their progress to that end between in their second BTRs, which will cover efforts from 2024–26.
64. The Brazilian Presidency must utilize the Roadmap to 1.5 degrees C and the outcomes of COP29 to skillfully build on the picture of progress toward a successful outcome at COP30 that remains critical to ambition and enhanced international cooperation in 2026. COP30 in Belém should not be seen as a cliff edge, but a steppingstone to COP31 and beyond. In 2026, the second GST process begins again.

## G. References

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter UNFCCC], *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 79 (December 13, 2023), <https://unfccc.int/documents/637073>.

<sup>2</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 170. See also, UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Art. 4.9, conclusion date: December 12, 2015, United Nations Treaty Series Online, registration no. I-54113, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english\\_paris\\_agreement.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf); UNFCCC, *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, 1/CP.21, ¶¶ 22-25 (January 29, 2016), <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2>; UNFCCC, *Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement*, Decision 6/CMA.3, ¶ 2 (March 8, 2022), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2021\\_10\\_Add3\\_E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2021_10_Add3_E.pdf) (Encourages Parties to communicate in 2025 a nationally determined contribution with an end date of 2035, in 2030 a nationally determined contribution with an end date of 2040, and so forth every five years thereafter); UNFCCC, *Report on the 11th meeting of the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Meeting*, PAICC/2024/M11/4, ¶ 19 (April 17-19, 2024), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/PAICC\\_11\\_meeting\\_report.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/PAICC_11_meeting_report.pdf).

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- <sup>6</sup> UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Arts. 3, 4.3; UNFCCC, *Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21*, Decision 4/CMA.1, Annex I, ¶ 6.
- <sup>7</sup> UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Arts. 3, 4.3; UNFCCC, *Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21*, Decision 4/CMA.1, Annex I, ¶ 7.
- <sup>8</sup> UNFCCC, *Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21*, Decision 4/CMA.1, Annex I, ¶ 4(c).
- <sup>9</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 39.
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- <sup>12</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 179.
- <sup>13</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 28 (f).
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- <sup>15</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 28 (f).
- <sup>16</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 28 (f).
- <sup>17</sup> World Bank, "Global Flaring and Methane Reduction Partnership."
- <sup>18</sup> Global Methane Pledge, "Pledges."
- <sup>19</sup> IPCC, *Sixth Assessment Report* (IPCC, March 2023), <https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/>.
- <sup>20</sup> Global Methane Explorer, "National methane reduction targets," accessed November 4, 2025, <https://methane-explorer.climateanalytics.org/targets>.
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- <sup>22</sup> Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley, "Prime Minister of Barbados addressed the Climate Summit 2025 on Wednesday, September 24, 2025," September 24, 2025, 3:00, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ygNQfevZmw>.
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- <sup>24</sup> UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Arts. 14.1, 14.2.
- <sup>25</sup> UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Art. 14.3.
- <sup>26</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶¶ 9-10.
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