

INTERNATIONAL



# Negotiations on the Global Stocktake: State of Play and Key Considerations

## Discussion Paper

September 11, 2025

The decision on outcomes of the first global stocktake (**GST**) reflected hard-fought compromises, calling for Parties to scale-up climate action through several targets and signals. It also launched several follow-up processes related to the GST. Parties have struggled thus far to reach consensus on how to move these processes forward. This paper analyzes the state of play of the three GST follow-up processes set out by the decision on the outcome of the first global stocktake and the implications of their slow progress.

The GST lies at the core of the Paris Agreement's "ambition cycle" and has potential to leverage enhanced international cooperation to catalyze the transformational level of climate action needed to achieve the Paris Agreement's goals.

The outcome of the first GST (**GST1**) set out several targets and signals to Parties and also launched three follow-up processes to guide Parties, including:

- an annual GST dialogue to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned on how the GST outcomes are informing the preparation of Parties' next Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs (the **GST NDC Dialogue**)
- a United Arab Emirates (**UAE**) dialogue focusing on implementing the GST outcomes (the **UAE Dialogue**)
- a "refinement process" for the second GST (**GST2**).

The GST NDC dialogue has started, having taken place in 2024 and 2025, but Parties at the Sixth Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement (**CMA6**)/the 29<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties (**COP29**) were unable to agree on how to reflect the outcomes in a report.

Parties further struggled to reach consensus at CMA6/COP29 on both the UAE dialogue and whether to refine the process for GST2, pushing negotiations to 2025, beyond when they were originally expected to conclude at CMA6.

This paper explores the issues that Parties must resolve to move forward on the three processes and dialogues. It also considers the implications of failing to conclude at COP30, including linkages to other processes.

## Questions for consideration

- What is the landing zone for the scope of UAE Dialogue on which Parties can usefully engage in the short-term (either one session or several)?
- What are the implications for not concluding negotiations on the UAE Dialogue at COP30?
- What are the implications for not concluding negotiations on the GST2 refinement at COP30?
- What are the implications of slow progress on the follow-up processes set out by the decision on the outcome of the GST1 for enhancing international cooperation?

## A. Context

1. The GST is central to the Paris Agreement's "ambition cycle." Set out under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, Parties are required to undertake a GST every five years to assess collective progress toward the agreement's long-term goals on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation.<sup>1</sup> The outcome of the GST shall inform Parties in: (i) updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support as the basis for their nationally determined contributions (**NDCs**); and (ii) enhancing international cooperation for climate action.<sup>2</sup>
2. Under Article 4, paragraph 9 of the Paris Agreement, Parties shall communicate NDCs every five years, in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions. Parties shall specify how the NDC has been informed by the outcomes of the GST, and each Party is expected to communicate a new NDC representing a "progression" beyond its previous NDC and reflecting its "highest possible ambition."<sup>3</sup>
3. The COP28 outcome marked the conclusion of the Paris Agreement's first GST (**GST1**). The GST decision sets out important global targets and signals to Parties, provides some direction and guidance, and launches follow-up processes to guide Parties in 2024.<sup>4</sup> These processes are:<sup>5</sup>
  - an annual GST dialogue to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned on how the GST outcomes are informing the preparation of Parties' next NDCs (the **GST NDC Dialogue**)
  - a United Arab Emirates (**UAE**) dialogue focusing on implementing the GST outcomes (the **UAE Dialogue**)
  - a "refinement process" for the second GST (**GST2**).
4. Parties were required to communicate their new and more ambitious NDCs by February 10, 2025, with an end date of 2035.<sup>6</sup> The deadline now seems to have slipped to September 2025, where the UN Secretary-General is expected to hold an event to announce or welcome ambitious NDCs.<sup>7</sup> As of August 18, 2025, 29 Parties have submitted NDCs.<sup>8</sup>
5. This paper sets out the current state of play with regard to the GST-related dialogues and processes.

## B. Annual GST NDC Dialogue

6. Paragraph 187 of the decision on the outcomes of the first GST "[r]equests the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies to organize an annual global stocktake dialogue starting at their sixtieth sessions (June 2024) to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and good practice on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of Parties' next NDCs in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement and also requests the secretariat to prepare a report for consideration at its subsequent session."
7. The first annual GST NDC Dialogue was held June 6–7, 2024, at the sixtieth Subsidiary Body sessions (**SB60**).<sup>9</sup> The dialogue featured three roundtable sessions with Parties and intergovernmental organizations presenting on lessons and experiences on integrating the first GST outcomes in the updating and preparation of NDCs across thematic areas of mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage,

and means of implementation and support; enabling and cross-cutting elements in domestic arrangements; and advancing international cooperation.<sup>10</sup>

8. Parties at the sixth Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (**CMA6**) in November 2024 considered the report on the NDC Dialogue with a view to adopting a decision.<sup>11</sup> However, Parties could not agree on: whether to set out messages and substantive elements from the report; when to conduct the next NDC dialogue; or whether the NDC dialogue should be concluded.<sup>12</sup> Parties forwarded the matter to CMA7.
9. The second annual GST NDC dialogue was held June 19–20, 2025, at SB62.<sup>13</sup> The dialogue featured two roundtable sessions with Parties and intergovernmental organizations presenting on integrating the first GST outcome into the preparation of NDCs and advancing NDC implementation and enabling environments.<sup>14</sup>
10. A summary report of the second annual GST NDC dialogue will be published and Parties will meet again in Belém to consider the reports from the first and second annual GST dialogue reports with a view to adopting a decision on them.

## C. UAE Dialogue

11. Paragraphs 97 and 98 of the GST decision names and establishes the United Arab Emirates dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes, which “will be operationalized starting from the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and conclude at its tenth session (2028) and requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to develop the modalities for the work programme at its sixtieth session (June 2024) for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its sixth session.”
12. When Parties met at SB60 to develop the modalities for the UAE Dialogue, Parties were deeply divided on its scope. While paragraphs 97 and 98 are not clear on the focus of the UAE Dialogue, those paragraphs are in the finance section of the GST decision. As a result, some Parties believe that the focus of the UAE Dialogue should be on finance, while other Parties believe that the Dialogue should, more broadly, address all outcomes of the GST. Parties were unable to resolve their differences at COP29 and postponed discussions until June 2025.
13. In May 2025, ahead of SB62, the COP30 Presidency announced that it hoped to “early harvest some of the decisions in order to not leave everything for [COP30] in November,” including a decision on the UAE Dialogue.<sup>15</sup> It emphasized that the Dialogue “can provide a platform to foster cooperation and ambition” and encouraged Parties to “engage with a common purpose to launch the Dialogue and support global progress on all of the GST’s urgent calls, in particular those due in this critical decade.”<sup>16</sup>
14. At SB62, Parties made little progress, remaining deadlocked over the scope and outputs of the UAE Dialogue. Parties further clashed over inclusion of language regarding unilateral trade measures and clarifying that the UAE Dialogue does not duplicate the GST or act as a “mini,” annual GST ratchet mechanism. Parties ultimately agreed that an informal note capturing divergent views and options would be the basis of further work in Belém.<sup>17</sup> Based on that informal note, the following will need to be agreed in order to operationalize the UAE Dialogue, including:
  - **the scope of the UAE Dialogue:** (i) opportunities, needs, gaps, and challenges for means of implementation and/or finance more specifically; (ii) collective progress on implementing all outcomes of the first GST; (iii) opportunities, barriers and challenges for strengthening international cooperation, including by addressing disincentives to cooperation and multilateralism such as unilateral trade measures, where applicable;<sup>18</sup> or (iv) some combination of the above
  - **frequency and duration:** (i) held annually through 2028 (SB64, SB66, SB68); (ii) held SB64 and SB65 (November 2026); (iii) held at CMA8 (November 2026) only

- **format:** whether it will be a reoccurring annual dialogue or a single workshop
- **inputs:** a synthesis of submissions; reports and national communications of Parties, as well as relevant input from non-Party stakeholders (**NPS**), including international, regional and subregional organizations, relevant to the scope of the Dialogue
- **outputs:** report(s); a decision considering the report; report(s) submitted to GST2
- **related activities:** organized by the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, a meeting of the Dialogue's co-facilitators together with co-chairs and co-facilitators of processes under relevant agenda items in advance of each Dialogue to coordinate work for that session; an annual high-level ministerial round table beginning at CMA8; a decision that welcomes the informal summary report on the expert dialogue on mountains and climate change and invites relevant work programs and constituted bodies under the Convention and Paris Agreement to integrate the consideration of mountain-based action into their existing mandates and activities, as appropriate.

15. Agreement on scope and frequency/duration would resolve many related issues. However, Parties have yet to find common ground on the purpose of the UAE Dialogue. Discussions on scope reveal different understandings of and approaches to the outcome of the GST and how the Paris Agreement balances "top-down" pressure and "bottom-up" national efforts. Some Parties have expressed concern that if the UAE Dialogue only focuses on finance or means of implementation, follow-up on the targets and signals of the GST for mitigation and adaptation will be left unaddressed. For those Parties, this is particularly salient because earlier proposals, such as a proposal to address the GST mitigation targets and signals in the mitigation work program, have been unsuccessful.<sup>19</sup> And proposals for the UAE Dialogue to, for instance, assess finance gaps could duplicate ongoing work by the Standing Committee on Finance, which has produced reports on the financial needs of developing country Parties and progress toward the U.S. \$100 billion a year finance goal.
16. However, it could also be argued that an annual UAE Dialogue that encompassed all elements of the GST outcome could be seen as a "mini-stocktake," one that was not envisioned by Parties in the adoption of the Paris Agreement or the decision on the outcome of the first GST. Rather than monitor implementation of the GST outcome through the UAE Dialogue, these Parties see implementation of the GST outcome as taken forward through national processes on the ground and subsequent GSTs. These concerns also relate to whether to take more formal recognition of the UAE Dialogue outcomes, either through submitting reports to GST2 and/or taking a decision in the CMA.
17. Time is not on Parties' sides for these difficult questions. Parties would have to adopt a decision at CMA7 to start the UAE Dialogue at the same meeting, one year behind schedule. Additionally, when the UAE Dialogue starts and how often it convenes impacts its utility informing GST2—if it only meets once, e.g., at CMA8, what could it usefully feed into GST2?

## D. GST2 Refinement Process

18. The COP28 GST decision sets out a separate process to consider and refine the procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process on the basis of experience gained from the first GST,<sup>20</sup> informed by Party and observer submissions.<sup>21</sup>
19. The GST's three primary procedural components are: information collection and preparation; technical assessment (overlapping with the information collection and preparation phase in GST1); and consideration of outputs, or the political phase of the GST.<sup>22</sup>
20. Parties' consideration of whether and how to refine this process began at SB60 and was expected to conclude at CMA6.<sup>23</sup> The GST decision also states that the information collection and preparation component of GST2 shall start at CMA8 in 2026.<sup>24</sup> Parties were unable to resolve their differences at CMA6/COP29 and postponed discussions until June 2025. At SB62, Parties made little headway.

21. Ultimately, Parties agreed to capture their major differences in an informal note that will inform further negotiations in Bélem.<sup>25</sup> These include:
- whether to invite the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (**IPCC**) to consider shifting its assessment report cycle to align to inform the GST cycle
  - whether the technical assessment phase should consist of two or three technical dialogues (GST1's technical assessment consisted of three technical dialogues)
  - whether the technical assessment and consideration of output phases will overlap
  - whether the joint contact group for the GST will start the consideration of outputs phase two or three subsidiary body sessions ahead of CMA10
  - the composition of the high-level committee for the consideration of outputs.
22. The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization in 1988 to assess the science related to climate change.<sup>26</sup> It is the UN body tasked with providing political leaders with periodic scientific assessments concerning climate change, its implications and risks, as well as to put forward adaptation and mitigation strategies. Its comprehensive scientific assessment reports are published every 5 to 7 years.<sup>27</sup> The latest IPCC report, the Sixth Assessment Report (**AR6**), was finalized between 2021 and 2023 – in parallel to GST1.<sup>28</sup> The Synthesis Report of AR7 will be produced after the completion of the Working Group reports and is expected to be released by late 2029 – after GST2.<sup>29</sup>
23. Those Parties that would like the AR7 (and future reports) to align with the GST cycle have previously proposed requesting the IPCC change its AR cycle, i.e., to significantly shorten it. In the informal note, the Parties invite the IPCC to, inter alia, structure, organize, and/or align its work to input into the GST, perhaps reflecting a wish to respect the IPCC's autonomy as a UN body.
24. The impact of failing to agree on refinements to GST2 is unclear. GST2 will begin in 2026 regardless, and the guidance adopted in Katowice (Decision 19/CMA.1) still stands. If Parties fail to agree to changes to the GST process, one implication is that GST2 will likely be carried out in the same fashion as GST1.

## E. Other Considerations

25. The GST is a critical part of the Paris ambition cycle, with the potential to leverage enhanced international cooperation to accelerate the transformation needed to achieve the Paris goals. Despite the celebration of the GST outcome at COP28, the follow-up processes that the decision set out have been slow to progress.
26. The NDC Dialogue occurs annually and the UNFCCC Secretariat is preparing summary reports as agreed, but Parties have yet to reach consensus on what to include in a summary report. The UAE Dialogue has not yet been operationalized, despite being mandated to do so at CMA6, and Parties still diverge on how to set up its scope, frequency, format, inputs, and outputs. And Parties were unable to reach consensus on the GST refinement process by its expected date, with Parties' positions at SB62 still far apart.
27. What does the lack of progress on processes set out by the GST decision indicate about the collective commitment of Parties to follow up on GST1?
28. While many Parties emphasize that implementation of the GST1's targets and signals are undertaken domestically and to be reflected in their NDCs, as of September 9, 2025, only 30 NDCs 3.0 have been submitted. C2ES's analysis of how Parties have been informed by the GST outcome shows some promise but also many gaps and uncertainties.<sup>30</sup> The slow progress on follow-up processes set out by the GST, pushing work under the UAE Dialogue and GST2 refinement process beyond the deadline for NDCs 3.0, could have implications for the quality of information in NDCs informed by GST1.

29. Finally, uncertainties regarding the outcome of the UAE Dialogue and the refinement process for the GST2 have implications for other ongoing work, including the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) given that the Secretariat is mandated to prepare a report summarizing the activities of the JTWP that will inform GST2.<sup>31</sup> However, Parties are struggling to define those activities in negotiations under the JTWP.<sup>32</sup> Parties are currently negotiating the adoption of indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which will help track progress against the GGA's targets for GST2.<sup>33</sup>
30. Separately, the COP30 Presidency has launched the Global Ethical Stocktake, which seeks to bring "new perspectives to technical and political processes — especially from the standpoint of ethics and grounded in the lived experiences of people — in order to expand the pathways and ways forward on the road to COP30 in Belém."<sup>34</sup> The resulting global report will be submitted to the COP Presidency for transmission to national decision-makers and for "subsequent consideration in their respective negotiation processes."<sup>35</sup> Whether and how the UAE Dialogue, GST2 refinement process, or another process will take on that contribution remains unclear.

## **F. C2ES Resources**

**Delivering on the Targets and Signals from the First Global Stocktake**, July 2025

<https://www.c2es.org/document/delivering-on-the-targets-and-signals-from-the-first-global-stocktake/>

**Enhancing Action & Cooperation for the Tripling of Renewable Energy Capacity by 2030**, September 2024

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-the-tripling-of-renewable-energy-capacity-globally-by-2030/>

**Enhancing Action & Cooperation for the Doubling of Global Energy Efficiency by 2030**, September 2024

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-the-doubling-of-energy-efficiency-by-2030/>

**Enhancing Action & International Cooperation for the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels**, October 2024

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-the-transition-away-from-fossil-fuels/>

**Enhancing Action & International Cooperation for Accelerating Carbon Dioxide Removal Approaches**, May 2025

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-accelerating-carbon-dioxide-removal-approaches/>

**Enhancing Action & International Cooperation for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation**, October 2024

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-halting-and-reversing-deforestation-and-forest-degradation/>

**Enhancing Action & Cooperation for Early Warning Systems**, September 2024

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-early-warning-systems/>

**Enhancing Action & Cooperation for Sustainable Agriculture and Resilient Food Systems**, October 2024

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-cooperation-for-sustainable-agriculture-resilient-food-systems/>

**Enhancing Action & International Cooperation for Nature-Based Solutions and Ecosystem-Based Approaches**, June 2025

<https://www.c2es.org/document/enhancing-action-international-cooperation-for-nature-based-solutions-and-ecosystem-based-approaches/>





## G. References

- <sup>1</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter UNFCCC], *Paris Agreement*, Arts. 14.1, 14.2, December 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No 16-1104, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english\\_paris\\_agreement.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf).
- <sup>2</sup> UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Art. 14.3.
- <sup>3</sup> UNFCCC, *Paris Agreement*, Arts. 3, 4.3; UNFCCC, *Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21*, Decision 4/CMA.1, Annex I, ¶ 4(c) (March 19, 2019), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018\\_3\\_add1\\_advance.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2018_3_add1_advance.pdf).
- <sup>4</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5 (March 15, 2024), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023\\_16a01E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_16a01E.pdf).
- <sup>5</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 187, ¶¶ 97-98, and ¶¶ 192-93. The decision also set out a high-level ministerial dialogue on scaling up adaptation finance. UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 99 ("Decides to convene a high-level ministerial dialogue at its sixth session on the urgent need to scale up adaptation finance, taking into account the adaptation-related outcomes of the global stocktake, and to ensure the mobilization by developed country Parties of the adaptation support pledged.")
- <sup>6</sup> UNFCCC, *Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement*, Decision 6/CMA.3, ¶ 2 (March 8, 2022), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2021\\_10\\_Add3\\_E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2021_10_Add3_E.pdf), (Encourages Parties to communicate in 2025 a nationally determined contribution with an end date of 2035, in 2030 a nationally determined contribution with an end date of 2040, and so forth every five years thereafter); UNFCCC, *Report on the 11th meeting of the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Meeting*, PAICC/2024/M11/4, ¶ 19 (April 17-19, 2024), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/PAICC\\_11\\_meeting\\_report.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/PAICC_11_meeting_report.pdf).
- <sup>7</sup> António Guterres, "Secretary-General's remarks on Climate Action 'A Moment of Opportunity: Supercharging the Clean Energy Age,'" July 22, 2025, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-07-22/secretary-generals-remarks-climate-action-moment-of-opportunity-supercharging-the-clean-energy-age-delivered-scroll-down-for-all-french>.
- <sup>8</sup> UNFCCC, "NDC 3.0," accessed August 21, 2025, <https://unfccc.int/ndc-3.0>.
- <sup>9</sup> UNFCCC, "Annual Global Stocktake Dialogue," June 6-7, 2024, <https://unfccc.int/event/annual-global-stocktake-dialogue>.
- <sup>10</sup> UNFCCC, *Annual GST Dialogue 2024, Programme* (June 6-7, 2024), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Agenda-for-Publication-Annual-GST-Dialogue\\_Final1\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Agenda-for-Publication-Annual-GST-Dialogue_Final1_0.pdf).
- <sup>11</sup> UNFCCC, *First annual global stocktake dialogue: Summary report by the secretariat*, FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/5 (October 18, 2024), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024\\_05.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2024_05.pdf).
- <sup>12</sup> UNFCCC, *Draft text on CM 6 agenda item 4(b) – Matters relating to the global stocktake: Report on the annual global stocktake dialogue referred to in paragraph 187 of decision 1/CMA.5*, Version 20/11/2024 8:00, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/gst\\_dialogue\\_report\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/gst_dialogue_report_0.pdf).
- <sup>13</sup> UNFCCC, "Annual GST Dialogue – Mandated Event," June 19-20, 2025, <https://unfccc.int/event/annual-gst-ndc-dialogue-mandated-event-0>.
- <sup>14</sup> UNFCCC, *Global Stocktake NDC Dialogue 2025*, June 19-20, 2025, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Tentative\\_Agenda\\_GST\\_NDC\\_Dialogue\\_2025.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Tentative_Agenda_GST_NDC_Dialogue_2025.pdf).
- <sup>15</sup> Joe Lo, "Brazil seeks early deals on two stalled issues at Bonn climate talks," *Climate home News*, May 23, 2025, <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/05/23/brazil-seeks-early-deals-on-two-contentious-issues-at-bonn-climate-talks/>.
- <sup>16</sup> COP30 Presidency, "Third Letter from the Presidency," May 23, 2025, <https://cop30.br/en/brazilian-presidency/letters-from-the-presidency/third-letter-from-the-presidency>.
- <sup>17</sup> UNFCCC, *Informal note on SBI 62 agenda sub-item 6(b) – Matters relating to the global stocktake: Modalities of the United Arab Emirates dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 on decision 1/CMA.5*, Version 26/6/2025 15:00, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UAE\\_Dialogue\\_dt\\_sb62\\_05.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/UAE_Dialogue_dt_sb62_05.pdf).
- <sup>18</sup> Some Parties' efforts to include discussion of "climate change related trade-restrictive unilateral measures" in both the UAE Dialogue and JTWP have arguably hampered efforts to find respective landing zones.
- <sup>19</sup> C2ES, *Issues and Options for Increasing the Efficacy of the Mitigation Work Programme* (Washington, DC: C2ES, August 2025).

<sup>20</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 192 ("Recalls paragraph 15 of decision 19/CMA.1, and decides that consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake shall commence at the sixtieth sessions of the subsidiary bodies and conclude at the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement").

<sup>21</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 193 ("Invites Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit via the submission portal by 1 March 2024 information on experience and lessons learned in relation to conducting the first global stocktake and requests the secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the submissions in time to inform the refinement referred to in paragraph 192 above").

<sup>22</sup> UNFCCC, *Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99-101 of decision 1/CP.21*, Decision 19/CMA.1, ¶ 3 (March 19, 2019), [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2018\\_03a02E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/CMA2018_03a02E.pdf).

<sup>23</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 192 ("Recalls paragraph 15 of decision 19/CMA.1, and decides that consideration of refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained from the first global stocktake shall commence at the sixtieth sessions of the subsidiary bodies and conclude at the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement").

<sup>24</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the first global stocktake*, Decision 1/CMA.5, ¶ 194.

<sup>25</sup> UNFCCC, *Draft text on SBSTA agenda item 3 and SBI 62 agenda item 6(a) – Matters relating to the global stocktake: Procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process*, Version 24/6/2025 12:30, [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GST\\_dt\\_sb62.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GST_dt_sb62.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> "IPCC approves outlines of the first two reports in the seventh assessment cycle," *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter IPCC]*, August 2, 2024, <https://www.ipcc.ch/2024/08/02/ipcc-approves-outlines-of-the-first-two-reports-in-the-seventh-assessment-cycle/>.

<sup>27</sup> "IPCC approves outlines of the first two reports in the seventh assessment cycle," IPCC.

<sup>28</sup> IPCC, *Synthesis Report*, <https://www.ipcc.ch/synthesis-report/>.

<sup>29</sup> IPCC, *Seventh Assessment Report*, <https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar7/>.

<sup>30</sup> C2ES, *NDCs 3.0: How the Global Stocktake Targets and Signals Have Informed New Nationally Determined Contributions* (Washington, DC: C2ES, August 2025).

<sup>31</sup> UNFCCC, *United Arab Emirates just transition work programme*, Decision 3/CMA.5, ¶ 11 (March 15, 2024), <https://unfccc.int/documents/637073>.

<sup>32</sup> C2ES, *Issues and Considerations for the Just Transition Work Programme*, (Washington, DC: C2ES, April, 2025), <https://www.c2es.org/document/issues-and-considerations-for-the-just-transition-work-programme/>.

<sup>33</sup> C2ES, *Considerations for Selecting Indicators for the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience*, (Washington, DC, May 2025), <https://www.c2es.org/document/considerations-for-selecting-indicators-for-the-uae-framework-for-global-climate-resilience/>.

<sup>34</sup> COP30 Presidency and Government of Brazil, *Global Ethical Stocktake* (June 26, 2025), [https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/noticias/presentation\\_global-ethical-stocktake\\_june2025.pdf](https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/noticias/presentation_global-ethical-stocktake_june2025.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> COP30 Presidency and Government of Brazil, *Global Ethical Stocktake*.