international

BARCELONA -- Will the U.S. bring numbers to Copenhagen?

That is the question most on the minds of negotiators here in Barcelona as they struggle to chart a path toward success at the upcoming climate summit in Copenhagen.  And with good reason – what can be achieved next month in the Danish capital will depend in large measure on what the United States brings to the table.

Every developed country except the U.S. already has formally adopted or proposed emission targets for 2020.  (According to a compilation by the U.N. climate secretariat, these numbers amount to a collective reduction of 16 to 23 percent below 1990 levels.)  U.S. negotiators are being very coy about whether they will be able to add theirs by the time of Copenhagen.

While a host of other issues bedevil these talks, there is no question that the lack of U.S. numbers severely constrains the range of possible outcomes.  Indeed, it’s difficult to imagine even a solid political deal coming together in Copenhagen if the U.S. is unwilling to, at least provisionally, lay out its intentions on the emissions front.

At the same time, it’s understandable why the U.S. might hold back.  It would be pointless, and potentially disastrous, for the administration to put forward numbers that Congress would not in the end support.  And while the House of Representatives has passed a comprehensive climate bill, the Senate process is just now beginning and won’t conclude before Copenhagen.  So it’s hard to say just where Congress will come out.

Under these circumstances, venturing forward with numbers carries certain risks.  First, there are risks to the domestic climate process:  If too many on Capitol Hill feel the President is getting out ahead of Congress, that could make it harder to build the bipartisan support needed to get legislation done.  Second, there are risks to the international process:  If the U.S. dangles numbers it can’t ultimately sign on to, any interim deal in Copenhagen will unravel, and the negotiations could wind up back at square one.  Finally, if the U.S. puts forward numbers yet no agreement is reached, both the domestic and the international processes could suffer.

Beyond these questions of risk, there are some serious substantive issues:

• What numbers?  Clearly, any numbers would have to reflect those now under discussion in Washington.  The most obvious are the proposed cap-and-trade targets, ranging from President Obama’s initial proposal (14 percent below 2005; or 1990 levels), to the House-passed bill (17 percent below 2005; 4 percent below 1990), to the Kerry-Boxer bill proposed in the Senate (20 percent below 2005; 6 percent below 1990).  The House bill and Senate proposal contain provisions that would deliver additional reductions, but there is no saying now how they will ultimately fare.
• In what form?  As we have argued before, and as prominent voices now concur, any likely outcome in Copenhagen would be a political, not a binding, deal – as a basis for then negotiating a legal instrument with binding commitments.  In that event, any numbers agreed in Copenhagen would be provisional.  And without final U.S. legislation, presenting a range would be far wiser than presenting a single number (though the aim in a final legal agreement should certainly be a specific target).
• What’s the framework?  There are significant differences between the U.S. and other parties on the nature of a future international framework – for instance, would developed country targets be verified according to national or international accounting rules?  If it’s not possible to bridge those differences by Copenhagen, there will be some ambiguity around any targets on the table there.

What’s more, the prospects for a Copenhagen deal hinge as well on a second set of numbers: financial contributions to support developing country efforts.  At this point, there are huge estimates of need but no firm offers from any developed countries.  A deal presumably would require clear numbers from all, including the United States.

Whether the U.S. comes to Copenhagen with numbers is a political judgment that can be made only by President Obama.  In our view, he should send numbers only if he is confident that he will be in a position to convert them into a binding commitment (pending ratification) within the timeframe agreed in Copenhagen for reaching a final legal agreement.  His ability to deliver on that will depend on when Congress completes its job; that, in turn, depends at least in part on how vigorously the President chooses to engage in the legislative process.  (His engagement is a necessary condition for – but by no means a guarantee of – legislative success.)

So in the end, the President’s call on numbers for Copenhagen will rest on his judgment of where Congress is, where other parties are, and whether his active engagement can get the job done in 2010.

BARCELONA -- The two men perhaps best qualified to judge have now openly declared that they do not expect next month’s Copenhagen climate summit to produce a legally binding agreement.

That is the sober assessment offered in separate briefings over the past couple of days by Yvo de Boer, executive secretary of the U.N. climate secretariat, and Michael Zammit Cutajar of Malta, who for the past year has chaired the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen. (There are two negotiating tracks: one under the Kyoto Protocol, the other under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which includes the United States. Zammit Cutajar chairs the latter.)

Both were speaking to NGOs tracking the final week of pre-Copenhagen talks underway here in Barcelona.  And both cited similar reasons: a lack of time, and a lack of consensus among parties that a new legal instrument is necessary or desirable.

To those who believe nothing short of a final legal deal in Copenhagen is acceptable, their pronouncements are a betrayal.  But to those of us who have previously offered similar assessments, the two men’s courageous candor injects a badly needed sense of realism into a process that has been plagued by – and could ultimately be doomed by – unreal expectations.

Neither de Boer nor Zammit Cutajar is calling for decisions to be put off.  Both emphasized that they see Copenhagen as a critical moment when governments must seal the best deal they possibly can.  In their estimation, that would be a political deal laying out government’s intentions and the elements of a new international climate architecture.  It would be a prelude to – and emphatically not a substitute for – a legally binding agreement sometime in 2010.

Both envision a Copenhagen outcome comprised of a set of “decisions” by parties – well more than a political declaration or communiqué, but without the binding character of a treaty.  De Boer believes the package should include a mandate to translate its content into a legally binding instrument; Zammit Cutajar agrees, but said he doesn’t yet see a consensus for that among parties.

De Boer’s more detailed vision includes a “functioning architecture” and annexes listing: individual emission targets for all developed countries; actions to be undertaken by major developing countries (quantifying how much they will reduce emissions below business as usual); individual contributions by developed countries of “prompt-start” (immediate) funding for developing countries; and a cost-sharing formula for future developed country financial contributions.

Though still short of legally binding, getting even this far is a monumental undertaking in the mere month remaining.  Although other developed countries have put emission numbers on the table, the United States has not; none have tabled numbers on finance.  And while developing countries are showing a greater willingness to act, none have shown a readiness to reflect their actions in a form that would ultimately translate into an international commitment.

In broad stroke, the proposals by de Boer and Zammit Cutajar correspond to the type of outcome we recommended.  They also echo the types of ideas now being floated by the Danish government, which will host the Copenhagen summit.  One difference is that the Danes have taken to characterizing their preferred outcome as “politically binding,” a novel term that appears intended to convey more than is really there.

It’s understandable, now that the Danes have enticed a growing number of heads of state to attend, that they might be tempted to inflate the significance of whatever agreement is reached.  Better, we think, to be realistic about the best that can be achieved and, when it’s achieved, to call it what it is.  A binding agreement must remain the ultimate goal.  A solid political agreement in Copenhagen would put that within reach.  

LOS ANGELES -- Sub-national leaders from over 50 countries gathered last week in Los Angeles, California as part of Governor Schwarzenegger’s 2nd annual Global Governor’s Climate Summit. Topics ranged from public health impacts of climate change to technological solutions to the role of youth leadership and education. The summit kicked off with a surprise appearance by Harrison Ford, announcing the establishment of a new collaboration convened by Conservation International called Team Earth, which will focus its first effort on global deforestation. Forests emerged as a recurring theme of the discussions here. Motivated by concern that deforestation must not be excluded from the negotiations of a climate treaty this time around, 11 governors from the U.S., Brazil, and Indonesia signed a memo addressed to their nations’ presidents, pressing for a robust deforestation policy mechanism to come out of Copenhagen.  

Leaders from across the globe also expressed growing concern about preparing their citizens to adapt to climate change. It is clear that leaders on the local level are worried about the impacts that are already being felt by their citizens and are anticipating their growing role in implementing policies to address adaptation, in addition to greenhouse gas reductions.  Some have even begun to classify jobs in climate adaptation as “green jobs” and are working to expand the number of these jobs in their jurisdictions.

Another overarching takeaway is the sense that local and regional governments embrace their important role in combating climate change, repeatedly referring to policies implemented at sub-national levels across the globe as examples for national action.