Federal

The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions seeks to inform the design and implementation of federal policies that will significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Drawing from its extensive peer-reviewed published works, in-house policy analyses, and tracking of current legislative proposals, the Center provides research, analysis, and recommendations to policymakers in Congress and the Executive Branch. Read More
 

Question 4 - Developing Country Participation

Pew Center on Global Climate Change Response to:

"Design Elements of a Mandatory
Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System"

Issued by Sen. Pete V. Domenici and Sen. Jeff Bingaman
February 2006

Question 4

If a key element of the proposed U.S. system is to “encourage comparable action by other nations that are major trading partners and key contributors to global emissions,” should the design concepts in the NCEP plan (i.e., to take some action and then make further steps contingent on a review of what these other nations do) be part of a mandatory market-based program?   If so, how?

Pew Center Response
Download Response to Question 4 (pdf)

It is important to distinguish between two distinct but related policy objectives: 1) achieving adequate action by all major emitting countries, and 2) protecting U.S. firms against competitiveness impacts.  Each requires a different set of policy approaches.

Ensuring that other countries act against climate change is important from a competitiveness standpoint.   However, it is first and foremost an environmental imperative: without adequate action by all major emitters, the goal of climate protection cannot be met.  Of steps the United States can take to encourage other nations to act, establishing a mandatory program to limit and reduce U.S. emissions may in and of itself be the most critical.  Lack of action by the United States stands as the major impediment to stronger efforts by other countries.  Demonstrating the will – and establishing the means – to reduce U.S. emissions will greatly alter the international political dynamic and improve prospects for international cooperation. 

Making future U.S. action expressly contingent on the efforts of other countries may provide some further inducement for action.  Alternatively, by appearing irresolute, it may deter others from commencing ambitious long-term efforts.  A more effective means of achieving adequate and comparable effort by all major emitters would be the establishment of mutual commitments through multilateral negotiation and agreements.60; In the case of developing countries, this should include or be complemented by positive incentives, preferably through market mechanisms.

Ensuring that efforts are broadly comparable, however, will not necessarily achieve the second objective: protecting against competitiveness impacts. It is not the competitiveness of the U.S. economy as a whole that is at issue. Competitiveness at the national scale is largely a reflection of productivity, and the U.S. economy consistently ranks among the world’s most competitive [1]. The cost of achieving mandatory GHG limits at the levels under consideration would only marginally affect projected economic growth and is unlikely to affect overall competitiveness [2].

To the degree there are competitiveness impacts, they would fall on specific sectors – energy-intensive industries whose goods are traded internationally, a relatively small segment of the U.S. economy [3]. However, these sectors could remain vulnerable even if efforts by all major emitters are broadly comparable because countries will choose to allocate effort differently [4]. For instance, a country may reduce overall emissions but exempt a given sector from controls, giving that sector an advantage over foreign competitors that are subject to controls. In that case, a review of comparability, unless undertaken sector by sector, offers little assurance against competitiveness impacts.

A full assessment of policy options for addressing competitiveness would require a more thorough analysis of the potential impacts on vulnerable sectors than is presently available. Generally, the impacts on a given sector or firm would depend on its specific competitive positioning and its ability to substitute and innovate. Most analyses of U.S. industry experience with past environmental regulation find little evidence of competitive harm. One comprehensive review – synthesizing dozens of studies across a range of U.S. regulations and sectors – concluded that while environmental standards may impose significant costs on regulated industries, they do not appreciably affect patterns of trade [5]. Some economic literature suggests that, to the contrary, innovation spurred by regulation may in fact confer a competitive advantage [6].

In the design of a cap-and-trade system, the best way to protect broadly against competitiveness impacts is to set the caps at modest levels and minimize compliance costs by, for instance, allowing offsets and full banking of allowances. The choice of allocation approach also has implications. A free “grandfathering” of allowances based on historic emissions provides inherent protection for potentially vulnerable firms by conferring assets whose sale can offset losses.

One option to mitigate potential competitiveness impacts is to provide supplemental allowances to sectors deemed to be vulnerable. Another is to dedicate funds — possibly by auctioning a portion of allowances — to assist vulnerable sectors. Assistance could include:

  • Incentives for the deployment of cleaner or more efficient technologies, such as accelerated depreciation of existing stock, or tax credits for the deployment of specific technologies or the production of less emissions-intensive products.
  • Support for research and development of long-term technology.
  • Transition assistance for workers in sectors likely to experience job losses.

Further steps to address competitiveness would require some mechanism to identify vulnerable sectors based on an analysis of export patterns among energy-intensive industries and relative energy pricing in competing countries.



[1] The United States ranked second only to Finland in the World Economic Forum’s 2005-2006 Global Competitiveness Report. (World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006.)

[2] EIA projects that achieving the emission targets of the Climate Stewardship Act would diminish U.S. GDP by 0.4 percent in 2028, thus total GDP is projected to be 89.6 percent higher rather than 90 percent higher than GDP in 2006. (EIA, Analysis of Senate Amendment 2028, the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003. [pdf] May 2004.)

[3] Repetto et al. found in a 1997 analysis that, among all U.S. industries producing tradeable goods and services, roughly 90 percent of output and employment was in industries with energy costs representing 3 percent or less of output value. (Repetto, R., C. Maurer and G.C. Bird. “U.S. Competitiveness is Not at Risk in the Climate Negotiations.” WRI Issue Brief, October 1997.)

[4] The Carbon Trust recently suggested that differences between National Allocation Plans within the EU Emissions Trading system has significant implications on sectoral competitiveness even though country efforts under the overall system are widely viewed as compatible (Carbon Trust, “The European Emissions Trading Scheme: Implications for Industrial Competitiveness.” June, 2004. See also IISD, “Climate Change and Competitiveness: A Survey of the Issues,” March 2005; and European Commission, “International Trade and Competitiveness Effects,” Emissions Trading Policy Brief No. 6, 2003.)

[5] Jaffe, A.B., S.R. Peterson,P.R. Portney, and R.N. Stavins. “Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIII, March 1995.

[6] Porter, M. “America’s Green Strategy,” Scientific American, 264, 4: 96, 1991; Porter, M. and C. van der Linde, “Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, 4:97-118, 1995.

Question 3 - International Linkage

Pew Center on Global Climate Change Response to:

"Design Elements of a Mandatory
Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System"

Issued by Sen. Pete V. Domenici and Sen. Jeff Bingaman
February 2006

 

Question 3

Should a U.S. system be designed to eventually allow for trading with other greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems being put in place around the world, such as the Canadian Large Final Emitter system or the European Union emissions trading system?

Clarifying Question 3a

  • Do the potential benefits of leaving the door open to linkage outweigh the potential difficulties?

Pew Center Response
Download Response to Question 3 (pdf)

Yes. The ability to link to other programs is critical in order to minimize mitigation and transaction costs, and to harmonize obligations under various systems.   Companies whose obligations differ in the many nations in which they operate will have a much harder time complying with the requirements.  For this reason it is crucial not only to link programs, but also to minimize the differences between relevant aspects of the programs as they are developed. 

This position is corroborated by the extensive and ongoing discussions the Pew Center has had with member companies of the Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC ) and other domestic and international corporations about U.S. and international greenhouse gas (GHG) markets.   Those that have expressed an opinion unanimously support designing U.S. cap and trade to allow for linkage to other national and regional trading systems.  They cite several reasons. 

  • Most note that a well-functioning global trading market is perhaps the most critical mechanism for minimizing the long-term costs of GHG reductions for firms and society as a whole. 
  • Among cost-containment approaches, the linking of global GHG markets is among the least distortionary. 
  • Generally, larger trading volume and greater liquidity of GHG allowances will result in clearer, more stable prices.   More stable prices will allow firms to project future prices more accurately and provide the certainty to plan and invest appropriately for the future (for example, in breakthrough technologies).
  • Globalizing GHG markets supports the goal of encouraging all countries, including China and India, to participate in making real and verifiable reductions. (Companies note that offsets originating in large emitter developing countries will be among the lowest cost reductions and can be combined with export opportunities for U.S. firms.)

Note that the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) will accept EU and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allowances if certain price triggers are reached, but that under the Kyoto Protocol the EU can not accept RGGI allowances because the United States is not a party to Kyoto. RGGI analyses indicate that international agreements that enable two-way linkages would be economically beneficial.

Clarifying Question 3b

  • If linkage is desirable, what would be the process for deciding whether and how to link to systems in other countries?

Pew Center Response

In order to link a U.S. program with other systems, reductions would have to be considered real and verifiable by the respective systems. Deciding whether to link would involve evaluating the inventory, methodologies, monitoring protocols and compliance mechanisms of the other systems, and as well as the design of these programs to make sure that the environmental effect of a given reduction is roughly equivalent across the two programs. In addition, care should be taken to design a U.S. program that other countries will be interested in linking with. In particular, mechanisms that alter the environmental integrity of the program (e.g., a low safety valve) would make reductions in one program not necessarily equivalent to reductions in another, jeopardizing the ability to link the two.

Federal legislation will need to address the state and regional GHG cap-and-trade programs now under development, some of which may be linked to each other and to other countries. As with any area of federal policy in which the states have taken the lead, Congress will have to decide on the extent to which the federal program will defer to pre-existing state programs, for example, governing allowance allocation.

Clarifying Question 3c

  • What sort of institutions or coordination would be required between linked systems?

Pew Center Response

Because the validity and verifiability of reductions is critical for trading, measuring, monitoring, and compliance mechanisms would need to be comparable. While this may or may not require a central overseeing body, a shared platform on which to carry out the trades – such as an agreement to use a common monotoring and reporting protocol – would be required.

While elements within each country differ, Kyoto signatory countries, including the EU, Canada and Japan, have trading systems that are inherently linked by means of the treaty requirements. Requirements stipulate that each country needs to develop a consistent national system for estimating emissions and removals of GHGs by their common definition of trading units – Assigned Annual Units (AAUs), Joint Implementation (JI) credits and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits – and by the requirement that an international transaction log (ITL) be established. This shared platform will enable the tracking and the issuance of credits, cancellation, retirement and carry-over to the commitment periods following 2012. In essence, Kyoto parties are linked because they share common definitions, common requirements and a common platform for trading.

Question 2 - Allowance Allocation

Pew Center on Global Climate Change Response to:

"Design Elements of a Mandatory
Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System"

Issued by Sen. Pete V. Domenici and Sen. Jeff Bingaman
February 2006

Question 2

Should the costs of regulation be mitigated for any sector of the economy, through the allocation of allowances without cost?  Or, should allowances be distributed by means of an auction?  If allowances are allocated, what is the criteria for and method of such allocation?

Pew Center Response
Download Response to Question 2 (pdf)

The Pew Center believes that the costs of regulation can be mitigated through the free allocation of many allowances, as well as through other measures, as discussed in the section on “Cost Containment” in the Additional Topics. 

Resolving the question of how to allocate emission allowances will be fundamentally an issue of political acceptability.   As observed in the successful acid rain trading program and noted in the Pew Center’s previous analytical work (see, e.g., Ellerman et al), there is no appreciable difference in environmental effectiveness in using a free distribution, rather than an auction, to start a program.  The environmental benefits accrue from the timing and quantity of reductions – recognizing that a program that starts sooner would require less drastic reductions.  In other words, the allocation vs. auction debate is more relevant to political feasibility than environmental outcome.  However, there are a number of key considerations and tradeoffs among the various approaches to allocation.  The Pew Center does not have a position on the method of allocation, but has led workshops and discussions addressing these many considerations in developing an allocation method.  The following response lays out these areas of consideration, and in some cases makes recommendations.  It also describes the views of the surveyed corporations on these issues. More detail on the implications of various allocation options can be found in the attached documents (along with a lengthier discussion on the pros and cons of free allocation).

Pew Center Analysis

Covered entities, especially those with significant compliance obligations and those in energy-intensive industries, will bear costs associated with transitioning into a market-based system for emissions allowances.   To assist with this transition, a high percentage of allowances (e.g., 90% - 95%) should be allocated at no cost, rather than auctioned, at least in the initial years of a cap-and-trade system.  A small initial allowance auction can fund transition assistance and research, development and deployment of climate-friendly technologies.  This auction  may serve as a price discovery mechanism to give firms an initial idea of the market price for an emissions allowance.  Over time, the amount auctioned could increase, as firms successfully transition into the trading system and the associated expenditures decrease.  In providing federal funding for technology development, a competitive process, such as a “reverse auction” in which funding is allocated based on emission reduction potential, can reduce program costs.  In the early years of the program, the highest priorities for allocation should be transition assistance and technology development; over time the priorities should shift toward rewarding low-emitting technologies and practices. 

The choice of allocation approaches may have strong distributional impacts, and thus may be a very contentious decision.  For large point sources, allocation can be made either on the basis of historical emissions or against a sector-specific benchmark or set of benchmarks.  Power plant allocations, for example, may be made on an input, net output, or gross output basis.  The goal of allocation is to encourage the transition to a cleaner, more efficient generation fleet, but to do so in a way that recognizes that players in the industry have different starting points.

If the point of regulation is at the power plant level, policymakers must also decide whether to allocate allowances to non-emitting generators, and whether allocation will be fuel-specific or fuel-neutral.  Allocating allowances to non-emitting generation would create incentives for the expansion of these sources, but may increase the burden on emitting generation.  Fuel-neutral allocation may promote fuel switching and efficiency, while similarly increasing the burden on higher-emitting generation sources.

Another important issue is whether subsequent allocations should be fixed at the same level, or should be updated over time.  The argument for updating is that a fixed allocation may disadvantage new and growing businesses.  However, many economists argue that updating is economically inefficient because it encourages emitters to modify their behavior in order to increase future allocations, rather than  simply meet the emissions cap at the lowest cost [1].  Updating also creates uncertainty for business decisions as well as emissions outcomes. Ultimately, however, the inefficiencies and behavioral consequences of updating are an empirical question.  While preliminary evidence on the Ozone Transport Commission NOX program suggests that behavior is not significantly different in states that update versus those that do not, there is some consensus that the inefficiencies of updating grow as the magnitude of the program grows.  (See RGGI Allocation Workshop Summary and Proceedings for more detail on this question.)

A reasonable compromise might be to update over long time periods (e.g., 5 or 10 years), which should not affect economic efficiency significantly and would contribute to a fairer allocation over time. 

Another important issue is how to deal with new entrants.  Updating automatically does this, but there are other methods that may be useful, especially if updating only occurs infrequently.  The simplest is to require new entrants to purchase allowances on the open market.  To the extent that allowances are allocated largely to existing sources, this means that new sources would need to purchase allowances from existing sources. Allowances could also be set aside in a “reserve” at a fixed price – this was the approach taken under the U.S. acid rain program.  This reserve was never actually used because cheaper allowances were available on the market, but it was an important insurance policy for new entrants.  Finally, allowances for new sources could be set aside and given to eligible new sources for free.

A federal cap-and-trade system may either directly allocate allowances, or may “apportion” allowances to the states, which can individually decide how to allocate allowances.  (The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative does the latter.)  Alternatively, the federal government may foster some degree of harmonization by requiring a certain percentage of each state’s allowances go to certain purposes or entities, and then permitting states to allocate the remaining percentage as they wish. The Pew Center believes that it is preferable for the federal government to oversee the allocation process.  Allocation is politically very difficult; addressing it at the federal level would save considerable state-by-state trouble and create an uneven playing field.  In addition, although difficult, federal-level allocation can enable political solutions, which Congress may be able to utilize to reach agreement [2].

Some analysts believe that a high level of free allocation will result in windfall gains for allowance recipients.  The potential for windfall gains depends, for each economic actor, on the relationships between its compliance obligation, its allowance allocation, and its ability to pass along price increases.  While windfall gain may accrue to some sectors that are able to pass along price increases (in excess of cost increases); it will not accrue to all firms within that sector and more importantly will not be available to all sectors.   Furthermore, because some firms will experience additional costs, free allocation can serve to minimize this impact while still sending the appropriate signal that emission reductions are valuable.  There is disagreement among analysts about the degree to which various sectors and firms are able to pass along price increases, and what level of free allocation may compensate those affected. 

Company Perspectives on Design Considerations

Among the companies the Pew Center surveyed, there was little consensus on the method of allocation.  Opinions fell into a small number of distinct “camps” based on financial implications of various allocation methodologies.

The electric power utilities hold the strongest views, but these differ significantly, based largely on the relative carbon intensity of their generating fleets, which in turn corresponds to their fuel mix.   Power companies with a relatively low-carbon fuel mix prefer allocation based on electricity output.  Power companies with relatively high-carbon fuel mix prefer allocation based on historic emissions.  Some manufacturing companies agree with the latter approach, based in part on their interests as large power users and depending on the carbon intensity of the generators supplying their electricity.  Power companies in both camps indicate a willingness to consider compromise approaches depending on other aspects of a regulatory design package.  Some utilities note that a compromise approach might involve beginning with an input-focused allocation that transitions over a period of years toward a more output-based allocation.  Another utility points out the challenge and importance of reconciling differences between regions and economies fueled primarily by coal and regions with abundant natural gas.

Allocation is just one aspect of the larger picture in which all design elements will be considered. Some note that allowance distribution could serve as a means for awarding credit for early action. One utility holds that it is better to minimize the cost impacts on power customers in advance – i.e., at the allocation stage – rather than through the recycling of allowances. Another company suggests allocating allowances based on technology “benchmarking,” which would determine a reasonable baseline level that reflects a balance of technologies used across an industry.

Another company suggests that the allocation system can and should be used to encourage the power generation sector to transition from higher carbon-intensity fleet to a lower one. They believe that instead of viewing allocation as a “compensation” issue, it is important to use the allocation process both to create the bridge to a new energy future and to send a message to the power sector of the overall direction Congress wants the industry to take.

One utility makes the important point that allocation is not the driving force on new plant investment decisions – rather, choice of new plants is based on the overall price signal created by the cap and associated flexibility mechanisms. Finally, there were differing opinions among the surveyed companies as to whether the federal or state government should play the role of deciding how much to allocate to individual emitters.

Clarifying Questions 2a

       Technology R&D and Incentives

  • What level of resources should be devoted to stimulating technology innovation and early deployment?
  • What portion, if any, of the revenues from permits or the auction of allowances should be reserved for technology development?   If some portion is reserved for this purpose, should that set-aside flow to the federal government with funds spent through the traditional appropriation process?  Or should the funds be allocated directly to a non-profit research consortium, chartered by the federal government, which would then administer technology development and deployment projects?  Or should there be some combination of these two options?
  • What criteria should be used to determine how such funds are spent and which projects are chosen?
  • What other mechanisms should be used to promote technology deployment? Options include tax credits, cost-sharing for demonstration projects, assistance to state energy programs, etc.

Pew Center Response

Effective research, innovation, development, and deployment strategies will be critical to enabling a low-carbon energy future. Current levels of federal RD&D need to be significantly increased to reflect parity with other sectors in the U.S. economy (on the basis of RD&D dollars spent per GDP) and with the magnitude of the challenge of enabling a low-carbon energy future. Equally as important, strategies for managing these funds need to be revamped. Current RD&D efforts on low-carbon technologies suffer from a cultural focus on niche markets, inter- and intra-agency “stove-piping,” uncertainty caused by the annual appropriations process and cycle, and detrimental Congressional earmarks on scarce funds. The federal government needs a more integrated approach to RD&D in order to focus the appropriate agencies and resources on critical RD&D needs at appropriate times within a long-term R&D framework. Management modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration (DARPA) is needed to instill a culture focused on development and commercialization of these technologies, and forward funding would help reduce the level of uncertainty and detrimental earmarks. Public/private partnerships and government procurement have a key role to play as developers and incubators of technology and to foster “learning by doing”—a critical step in bringing down the cost of low-carbon technologies and increasing deployment. While support for breakthrough technologies is often appealing, experts point out that what often appears to be a breakthrough is indeed the result of years of incremental investment and work. Public/private partnerships are an effective vehicle for enabling sustained incremental improvements in the performance and cost of low-carbon technologies.

Policy-makers should be wary of the dangers of “picking winners” among technologies, but some support to push the likely candidates along can overcome cost barriers that would otherwise be insurmountable [3]. Research has shown that focusing exclusively on technology-push policies (instruments that offer technology funding incentives without motivating a corresponding demand for these technologies) or exclusively on technology-pull policies (mandates that generate demand for advanced technologies without corresponding support for their development) is more expensive than a combination of the two approaches [4]. Opportunities to introduce competition into the incentive process will reduce the costs of the program and avoid picking winners.

A competitive process to distribute incentives will reduce the costs of the program and avoid picking winners. A “reverse auction”, in which bidders compete to provide some technology or service for the lowest cost, would allow reduction projects to compete for these incentives on a level playing field. An auction could specify technology categories as well as offer a broad competition to elicit new, as-yet-unknown technologies. Alternative funding mechanisms include forward funding, technology prizes [5], tax rebates, guaranteed government purchase agreements (i.e., renewable energy or IGCC-CCS energy), green loans and public-private partnerships.

The private sector is generally a more efficient engine of technological innovation than the government. The private sector is particularly good at identifying and allocating resources to those technologies that have the best potential to become financially self sustaining, since private investment is almost uniquely profit-oriented and return-driven. One example raised by companies is in energy efficiency programs. If the government creates frameworks incentivizing but not directing the private sector (tax credits, cap and trade rules that allow efficiency-based offsets, etc.) and allowing private companies and investors to easily monetize the value of efficiency investments, there is ample evidence that the private sector can achieve these at costs per kilowatt or BTU lower than those for which the government is an intermediary.

When it comes to large-scale, longer-term technologies, companies note that it can be effective to match private investment with public funding in some way, as in the case of existing partnerships for clean coal, nuclear power, and fuel cells. Companies expressing a view favor direct government investment and guidance for early stages of research development – the pre-commercial stages of product life cycle. Where infrastructure and programs already exist and are successful, (e.g., NIST grants or the Department of Energy’s Industrial Technologies Program) these should be used and consistently funded.

Given the relative advantages of the private sector in generating innovation, while it is important to fund federal R&D and deployment activities for certain climate-friendly technologies, it is also important to design a GHG cap-and-trade program to leave the greatest share of the money in private hands, where it will be most efficiently spent, rather than flowing to the federal agencies. For example, a cap-and-trade program that sets a meaningful target and allocates a high percentage of allowances for free to a large number of covered emitters would likely foster a robust private market in allowances. The money in such a market would stay in private hands, without the government acting as middle-man, creating with minimum waste a direct incentive for every company to deploy climate-friendly technologies and practices.

In 2004, the Pew Center conducted a workshop called “The 10-50 Solution: Technologies and Policies for a Low-Carbon Future” [6], and published recommendations in several technology areas for types and levels of investment needed.  Some specific funding recommendations included:

  • International coordination to plan, fund, and deploy coal gasification with CCS trial projects that focus on remaining technical issues and with publicly shared results (e.g., adequately addressing remaining uncertainties will likely require four to six projects, at an estimated cost of approximately $5 billion, and an estimated project lifetime of 10 years)
  • Establishment of carbon sequestration trial projects in the United States to validate the integrity of geologic storage (e.g., such validation will likely require four such projects at an estimated cost of approximately $1 billion, and an estimated project lifetime of 10 years)
  • Reinvent the U.S. electricity grid to facilitate distributed power generation and consumption in ways that make this new model attractive to utilities, and promote energy storage technologies.  The estimated price of this upgrade is in the $100 billion range.

Other mechanisms can provide incentives for deployment without direct funding. These include:

  • Carbon capture and sequestration: Development of a regulatory system for sequestered carbon, including clarity about state-federal split of jurisdiction, and about which agencies at both levels have jurisdiction.   In addition, companies note that public-private partnership in the development of private sector insurance products to cover various liabilities would reduce the financial uncertainty for those in the CO2 chain of custody.
  • Renewables: Development of a uniform system to track renewable energy credits in a consistent way across the country and facilitate trading between multiple state programs; utilities and other companies with interest in generation, as well as firms in the investment community, note the value of improvements to the national power grid that facilitate distributed generation as a driver for renewable energy technology.
  • Nuclear power: Expansion of scope of U.S. Department of Energy nuclear waste R&D to options beyond Yucca Mountain
  • Combined heat and power (CHP) and distributed generation (DG): Support for net metering and incentives for uniform grid interconnection standards at the state level. Development of national test beds for new electricity grid systems.
  • End-use efficiency: Promotion of state adoption of building codes. Expansion and tightening of product standards, potentially made tradable between manufacturers.Product standards on emissions will pull technologies into the marketplace by generating demand for them, and can complement a downstream cap-and-trade program by capturing emissions that would not be covered in a large-source system. Combining end-use standards with large-source emissions trading and funding for technology R&D can allow all sectors of the economy to play a role in reducing emissions in a cost-effective way.

Clarifying Questions 2b

Adaptation Assistance

  • What portion of the overall allowance pool should be dedicated to adaptation research or adaptation-related activities?
  • How should these allowances or funds be administered?
  • What is the appropriate division between federal vs. regional, state, and local initiatives?

Pew Center Response

The Pew Center recommends a national adaptation strategy that would assess the range of needs and provide guidelines or standards for infrastructure planning, as well as reform existing policies that promote maladaptive behavior. In addition to the needs outlined in this strategy, funding should be provided for the development of early-warning systems for heat waves and other related threats, enhanced monitoring of infectious diseases, and evaluations of the implications of climate change for disaster management. Support should also be given for efforts at local, state, and regional levels, which is where much of the adaptation measures will be taken. Indeed, because we are already observing effects of climate change (sea-level rise, increased storm intensity, ecosystem impacts), the funding needs for adaptation will grow substantially over time – from funding research and planning to supporting on-the-ground changes in infrastructure and response.

Clarifying Questions 2c

Consumer Protections

  • What portion of the overall allocation pool should be reserved to assist consumers?
  • Should funds from the sale of permits or allowances be targeted primarily to low-income consumers, or should they be more widely distributed to benefit all consumers?

Pew Center Response

Initially, some portion of auction funds should be used for transition program for affected workers and communities, end-use efficiency investments, and otherwise addressing increased consumer costs as needed.

An earlier Pew Center report, Worker Transition & Global Climate Change [7], indicated that for the average non-supervisory worker in a goods-producing sector (mining, construction, and manufacturing) who does not find a job until having completed two years of training, the total cost of a transition program would be about $106,000 per worker in 2010.

A separate report, Community Adjustment to Climate Change Policy [8], concluded that that a new federal adjustment program for at-risk communities should be part of U.S. climate change policy. The report recommended that the U.S. government take the following actions:

  • Designate and fund the Economic Development Administration (E.D.A.) of the U.S. Department of Commerce to design and implement an economic adjustment program for communities;
  • Identify and assist communities that are particularly dependent on energy-producing and energy-intensive sectors before dislocations occur;
  • Leverage and integrate additional resources by involving multiple federal agencies and state and local governments through federal and regional task forces; and
  • Be flexible in addressing community needs by supporting locally determined, comprehensive strategies for five to seven years after the implementation of new climate policies.

While the amount of resources required for program implementation is difficult to determine, the authors suggested that an appropriate federal commitment might be $550 million ($50 million for planning, $500 million for implementation), and that resources be allocated so that a community has five to seven years to pursue adjustment.

Note that, while transition programs are not formally part of the RGGI allocation process, the program does set aside 25% of the allowances for energy efficiency and strategic energy investments.

Clarifying Questions 2d:

        Set-Aside Programs

  • What portion of the allocation pool should be reserved for the early reduction credit program and the offset pilot program?
  • Are other set-aside programs needed?

Pew Center Response

The Pew Center believes early reduction credit and offsets need not be treated as set-aside programs, but rather as cost-containing flexibility mechanisms.   Early reduction credit provides temporal flexibility, while offsets may provide geographic and sectoral flexibility to covered entities, and will be evaluated as part of the overall legislative package.  

The Pew Center and nearly every company surveyed by the Center feel that credit or recognition should be given for GHG emission reductions achieved before the program becomes mandatory.   The system should be designed so that the many companies that have voluntarily reduced their GHG emissions (as urged by the last three presidents) will not be implicitly penalized for doing so.  Without such credit, companies that have taken early action could face higher costs for future emissions reductions than companies that did not pursue early voluntary reductions and thus have more “low hanging fruit” to harvest – therefore putting the early actors at a competitive disadvantage.

Credit should be provided not only to companies that registered their reductions under the U.S. Department of Energy’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program (established under section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992), but also to those conforming to U.S. EPA Climate Leaders guidelines, the reporting protocol developed by the World Business Council on Sustainable Development and the World Resources Institute, the protocol developed by the World Economic Forum, and equivalent state and private registries, such as the California Climate Action Registry. The test should be whether the reductions were real and verifiable.

Note that the establishment of a “set-aside” program is by no means the only way to provide recognition of early action. Companies could be directly allocated allowances based on their registered emissions reduction. Some companies have suggested that covered emitters be allocated allowances as a function of their “baseline” emissions levels – the default baseline level being the amount emitted during a given year (or period of years). Emitters who could document beginning their emission reductions earlier than the default baseline year (or years) could move their baseline to that earlier period, leading to their being allocated a greater number of allowances. Such a program could either use set-aside credits or direct allowance allocation.

Offsets are generally defined as out-of-system GHG reductions achieved by non-covered entities. Examples include greenhouse sequestration projects or verifiable credits from the programs of other countries with capped emissions. The use of offsets to meet allowance submission requirements should not be restricted, as long as the offsets reflect real, measurable, and verifiable reductions. In general, offset programs have significant benefits, because they provide flexibility in the geographic and sectoral location of emissions reductions. Inclusion of an offset program expands incentives for emissions reductions beyond those entities covered by the cap. These reductions opportunities will lower the overall cost of program compliance, and motivate a continuous search for low-cost, verifiable reduction opportunities.

Most companies note that offsets are a fundamental tool to efficiently lower the cost of emissions reductions both for firms and for the economy as a whole. They are also a critical market-based mechanism for directing investment to promising technologies and approaches for energy efficiency, low or no-carbon energy, low GHG manufacturing, and carbon sequestration. Offsets specifically expand the scope of the program and serve to unleash the power of the market to stimulate innovation and cost-effectively reduce emissions. One company notes that it will take decades to transition capital stock of power generating plants to low carbon sources, so there is a critical need for offsets as a way of cutting net emissions affordably in the short and medium term. Several companies note that the very function of a market-based system that allows offsets with firm rules regarding verifiability and liability for actual reductions will by its nature favor sources of offsets (all the way down to the specific project level) that are real and verifiable, and steer investment away from projects for which the expected reductions must be discounted due to risk factors (technical, commercial, political, etc.)

Regarding the special case of carbon sequestration, a broad “results-based” program — which provides rewards to project developers in proportion to the amount of additional carbon sequestered — has the potential to improve the cost-effectiveness of a national GHG mitigation program. A results-based program is also likely to result in more innovative solutions than “practice-based” approaches – approaches that give credit for certain practices without verifying the amount of carbon sequestered by each project. Nevertheless, some observers believe the government—in cooperation with researchers, landowners, and project developers—may be able to develop project-measurement and monitoring methods that are sufficiently accurate and reproducible to protect the environmental integrity of a large-scale program that allocates rewards on the basis of evaluations of individual projects.

The following would be needed to provide such integrity:

  • A description of accepted practices for sampling and measuring carbon stocks at the project site;
  • Methods to develop reference cases or baselines against which observed changes in carbon levels can be compared. Several different approaches to reference case development may be needed to accommodate the wide range of potential activities and settings.
  • Methods to estimate or address the leakage effects, including permanence, geographical, and trade-offs among different GHGs;
  • Program methodologies designed to provide results that are reproducible by competent, independently-operating evaluators.

In general, offset programs have significant benefits, because they provide flexibility in the geographic and sectoral location of emissions reductions. Inclusion of an offset program expands incentives for emissions reductions beyond those entities covered by the cap. These reduction opportunities will lower the overall cost of program compliance, and motivate a continuous search for low-cost, verifiable reduction opportunities.

In order to verify emission reductions that are fungible with reductions made within the capped sectors, a robust system of measurement and verification is required. The Clean Development Mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol initially provided for a project-by-project review of proposed offsets that presents significant burden and uncertainty for entities seeking offsets. The Pew Center prefers the “standards” approach to offsets taken by the northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI’s standards approach seeks to balance reduction verification with regulatory burden. Rather than reviewing projects one at a time, making judgments as to whether the project baseline is appropriate, whether project reductions are additional and real, etc., standards are set for a specific category of offsets, and project applications are assessed against that standard. This approach has two benefits: it makes program administration easier and project approvals more predictable, thus benefiting governments, environmental advocates and offset project developers by lowering the risk premium for such reductions. In the case of RGGI, the program is starting with the following offset categories: natural gas, heating oil, and propane efficiency; landfill gas capture and combustion; methane capture from animal operations; forestation of non-forested land; reductions of sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) emissions from electricity transmission & distribution equipment; and reductions in fugitive emissions from natural gas transmission and distribution systems. RGGI expects to add project categories over time [9].

The RGGI offset categories are not necessarily the right categories for a national program; they make sense for RGGI because RGGI only covered power plants. Offsets should be in source categories not covered by the cap-and-trade program; therefore, once the scope of the trading program is determined, one can evaluate which offsets are appropriate.

Clarifying Questions 2e

       Special considerations for fossil-fuel producers?

  • Would some upstream fossil fuel producers be unable to pass the cost of purchasing permits or allowances through in fuel prices if they are the regulated entity?
  • Is there a sufficient policy rationale for addressing these costs to justify the complexity of setting up and administering an allocation system for these entities?
  • What other options exist to address the inability of fossil fuel producers to pass through these costs?

Clarifying Questions 2f

       Allocations for downstream electric generators?

  • Should electricity generators be included in the allocation if they are not regulated?   (Clarification:  We mean to ask if an electric generator should be included in the allocation if the greenhouse gas regulation occurs at a point of regulation that is upstream or downstream from the generator, but not the generator itself.)
  • What portion of the total allocation should be granted to the electric power sector?  Should it be based on the industry’s share of greenhouse gas emissions or some other factor?
  • Should generators in competitive and cost-of-service markets be treated differently under an allocation scheme?
  • How should permits or allowances be distributed within the electric sector?   Should it be based on historic emissions? Electricity output?  Heat input? 

Pew Center Response

The Pew Center disagrees with the white paper’s assertion that “All told, these costs would be offset completely by an allocation of roughly 5 to 10 percent of the total permit or allowance pool to fossil fuel producers,” and would support a much larger free allocation, as described at the beginning of the response to Question 2.

The Pew Center supports allocating most allowances at the same point that regulation takes places in order to compensate those who are required to comply.

Power companies with a relatively low-carbon fuel mix prefer allocation based on electricity output. Power companies with a relatively high-carbon fuel mix prefer allocation based on historic emissions. Some manufacturing companies agree with the latter approach, based in part on their interests as large power users and depending on the carbon intensity of the generators supplying their electricity. Power companies in both camps indicate a willingness to consider compromise approaches depending on other aspects of a regulatory design package. They also generally agree that the most critical goal in reducing power sector GHG emissions in the medium and long term is to facilitate new plant investment in low-carbon and no-net-carbon technology, and many agree that the system should aim to phase out the highest-carbon plants in the generating fleet.

One utility notes that a compromise approach might involve beginning with a relatively input-focused allocation that transitions over a period of years toward a more output-based allocation. This sort of approach is one under consideration by a number of industry players. Another utility points out the importance of fairly reconciling differences between regions and economies dependent on coal and regions with abundant natural gas.

Clarifying Questions 2g

Allocations for energy-intensive industries?

  • Is there a sufficient policy rationale to have an allocation to selected energy-intensive industries? What industries should be included in the allocation?
  • What portion of the overall allocation framework should be reserved for these industries?
  • What are the appropriate metrics for determining allocations across different industries?

Pew Center Response

Allocation as a policy vehicle can serve multiple purposes – reducing costs, motivating and compensating early action, addressing transition issues, etc. However, it will also likely be the most contentious element of the trading system development. Implementation may be made more straightforward by using a consistent rule for allocation across all sectors. On the other hand, sectoral tailoring may be necessary to address concerns about global competitiveness. Allowance allocation may be a particularly effective way of accounting for the relative price insensitivity of different sectors.

For vulnerable stationary sources that face intense competition that could lead to offshoring (and even higher GHG emissions), allowances can be provided to help ease the transition of capital stock to newer, more efficient technologies and cleaner fuels.

In transportation, while there is no clear consensus on how to reduce emissions from private vehicles, many observers believe that demand from U.S. private vehicle drivers is inelastic in the short term, i.e., that vehicle drivers will be willing to pay a very high price for gasoline without significantly modifying their travel behavior (with the exception of short term reaction to dramatic price spikes) or vehicle preferences. One serious negative effect of this price inelasticity is that if vehicle drivers are essentially included in a national cap-and-trade program — for example, by requiring allowance submission by the importers and refiners of petroleum products burned for transportation — they might bid the emissions allowance prices very high, to the detriment of the more price-sensitive manufacturing sector. As is the case with any potential damage to certain industries, allowance allocation might be a mechanism to make whole those requiring relief — and to do so in a way that changes over time to increase pressure for those industries to reduce emission at a pace they can afford.

Clarifying Questions 2h

Allocations to other industries/entities?

  • What other industries/entities (e.g. agriculture, small businesses, etc.) should be considered in the allocation pool?
  • What should be the basis for their share of the total allocation as well as for the distribution among such industries/entities?

Pew Center Response

Please see response to Question 2g.

 


[1] For example, if allowances are distributed per kwh of generation, that would provide an incentive to increase generation, lowering electricity prices and encouraging fuel switching and plant efficiency over end-use efficiency. Some argue that, if allowances are allocated based on average emission rates, updating would not encourage generators with high emissions rates to generate more because they would still have to buy additional allowances to cover their incremental emissions.

[2] Further analysis on allocation can be found in Nordhuas, R. 2003. Designing A Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program for the United States. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, pgs. 27 – 29.

[3]The 10-50 Solution: Technologies and Policies for a Low-Carbon Future”. Washington DC, March 25-26, 2004.

[4] Alic, J.; D. Mowery; E. Rubin. 2003. U.S. Technology and Innovation Policies: Lessons for Climate Change. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.[2] Goulder, L. 2004. Induced Technological Change and Climate Policy. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

[5]A technology prize grants a monetary award for a specific goal in R&D to spur innovative step-changes in technologies. The best-known example has been the 2004 “ANSARI X PRIZE,” which was awarded for the first successful private space flight.

[6] “The 10-50 Solution: Technologies and Policies for a Low-Carbon Future”. Washington DC, March 25-26, 2004.

[7] Barrett, J. 2001. Worker Transition & Global Climate Change. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change

[8] Greenwald, J.; B. Roberts; A. Reamer. 2001. Community Adjustment to Climate Change Policy. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change

[9] Further information on offsets can be found in “Summary of RGGI Stakeholder Workshop on Greenhouse Gas Offsets”, accessed at http://www.rggi.org/docs/offsets_workshopsummary.pdf.

Question 1 - Point of Regulation

Pew Center on Global Climate Change Response to:

"Design Elements of a Mandatory
Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System"

Issued by Sen. Pete V. Domenici and Sen. Jeff Bingaman
February 2006

 


Question 1: Who is regulated and where?

Clarifying Question 1a

Is the objective of building a fair, simple, and rational greenhouse gas program best served by an economy-wide approach, or by limiting the program to a few sectors of the economy?

Pew Center Response
Download Response to Question 1 (pdf)

The Pew Center’s responses to these questions draw from two sources:

  1. An extensive body of analysis, conference and workshop proceedings, and other work undertaken by the Pew Center from 1998 to the present with input from the Center’s Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC) [1], leading scholars, policymakers, and stakeholder groups.  This work provides the foundation for the Pew Center’s positions on these design questions.  Documentation of this work is available at the Pew Center website
     
  2. Opinions expressed to the Pew Center in dozens of hours of discussion over several years with over 30 large corporations regarding design elements of a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade program.   The companies include several large utilities as well as companies in other sectors, ranging from primary fuels to manufacturing to retail.  Although the Pew Center and the companies with which the Center has discussed design elements agree on the broad outlines of a cap-and-trade program, individual company opinions may or may not agree with the Center’s positions on particular issues.


As reflected in the Center’s 15-point Agenda for Climate Action, the Pew Center believes that mandatory GHG mitigation measures must cover the economy as a whole, equitably spreading responsibility for reducing emissions among large emitters, the transportation sector, and households. The companies surveyed unanimously supported this position.

Because emissions from electricity generation and transportation make up approximately 40% and 30% of U.S. GHG emissions respectively, it is critical to address these sectors sooner rather than later. However, these emissions need not be covered through the same system.

Large stationary sources should be addressed through a cap-and-trade program [2]. A cap on emissions would send an economy-wide signal favoring reductions, and emissions trading would ensure that reductions are achieved at the lowest cost possible. Such a program should cover all GHGs in all major emitting sectors and include all measurable, verifiable reductions and offset measures, without restrictions on trading. An absolute cap for the national program should be set to achieve a modest level of emission reductions and announced sufficiently far in advance to allow for planning (e.g., a return to current levels within a five- to ten-year period). Further reductions should be phased in over time as new technologies come online and capital stock turns over. Because individual sectors have different sensitivities to the price of carbon and are growing at different rates, sector-specific emission limits or allowance allocations within the overall cap could be established.

At the end of a year, each emitter would be required to surrender allowances equal to its emissions. Emitters whose cost of abating emissions was lower than the allowance price could sell allowances or “bank” them for future use. Emitters whose cost of reducing emissions was more than the price of an allowance could buy allowances. This flexibility would allow for the most cost-effective emissions reductions.

The transportation sector is difficult to incorporate into a downstream cap-and-trade program, and should be addressed through requirements on vehicle manufacturers, for example by converting the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program into strengthened, tradable corporate average CO2 (or GHG) standards. Average fuel economy standards under the current CAFE program could be replaced by corporate average CO2 emission standards for each manufacturer’s combined sales of cars and light trucks. A manufacturer that “overachieves” (whose average emissions are below the standard) in a given year would earn allowances based on the reduction in projected lifetime emissions from vehicles produced in that year. These allowances could be banked, sold to other manufacturers or sold into the broader, economy-wide GHG cap-and-trade program. A manufacturer that does not meet its CO2 standard would purchase allowances to cover its shortfall.

In order not to penalize any vehicle manufacturer at the start, efforts of those who invested early and exceeded standards would be recognized (for example, through credit allocation) with adequate time provided for other companies to catch up, recognizing the time needed to develop and market new vehicles. Concerns about a lack of price-responsiveness within the transportation sector driving up costs of allowances for stationary sources could be addressed by keeping this program separate from the stationary source cap-and-trade program, or by requiring a certain amount of reductions from within the sector.

Since the energy services required by residential, commercial and industrial buildings produce approximately 43% of U.S. CO2 emissions [3], a comprehensive climate program must address this sector. Measures such as upgraded building codes and appliance efficiency standards are an important complement to a large-source cap-and-trade program. Incentives for technologies such as combined heat and power could move the country toward net zero-energy buildings.

While it is important to cover all major emitters, policies may address some sectors first – for example, by implementing cap-and-trade for the electric power sector before other sectors. Some of the utilities surveyed indicate a willingness to consider such an approach, provided the design of regulations is sensible and fair, in exchange for the regulatory certainty that a program would provide. Similarly, some companies state that, although GHG legislation ultimately needs to cover the economy as a whole, a cap-and-trade program initially needs to be as straightforward and easy to implement as possible. At least two major utilities, however, say they oppose a bill that excludes buildings and transportation. They state that the program otherwise would create a distortion that moves electricity generation away from the sector most able to make low-cost reductions to captive generation by large electricity users. Almost all the utilities note they have extensive experience and internal capacity gained over many years of compliance with other air regulations and, in many cases, are also experienced in emissions trading of other air pollutants, so they are well prepared to work within a GHG cap and trade system.

Finally, while the objective is to build “a fair, simple, and rational” program, it is important to recognize possible tensions between “fair” and “simple.” The Pew Center and all of the companies with which we have discussed design elements agree that fairness calls for all sectors to bear a fair share of the emissions reduction burden. However, implementing a cap and trade bill for large emitters could be a simpler first step than covering other sectors in the same bill. Establishing a large emitter cap and a U.S. GHG trading market could provide a simple, effective platform for integrating transportation, buildings, and other sectors into a GHG regime over time, rather than undertake measures for all sectors simultaneously.


Clarifying Question 1b

What is the most effective place in the chain of activities to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, both from the perspective of administrative simplicity and program effectiveness?

Pew Center Response

The Pew Center and most of the companies surveyed believe that allowance submission should be required “downstream” at the point of emission from large stationary sources, rather than “upstream” (e.g., on producers of coal, oil, and natural gas). To many, a program that applies a cap and trade to upstream producers functions for all practical purposes like a carbon tax, rather than a robust market. Moreover, some research suggests that carbon taxes must be very high and continuous to motivate a significant market response. It is more useful to apply regulation to those in a position to alter the behavior that results in emissions, rather than to apply a tax on firms that have no technology or process options to reduce emissions.

Regarding the special case of transportation emissions, the Pew Center recommends a focus on vehicles – changing the CAFE standard to a tradable emissions approach, as discussed in response to the Question 1a.



[1] The BELC is the largest U.S. based association of corporations focused on addressing the challenges of climate change, with forty-one members representing $2 trillion in market capitalization and over 3 million employees.

[2]See also: Claussen, E., and R. Fri, co-chairs. 2004. A Climate Policy Framework: Balancing Policy and Politics. Ed. J. Riggs. Report of an Aspen Institute Climate Change Policy Dialogue, November 14-17, 2003. Washington DC: The Aspen Institute.

Nordhaus, R., and K. Danish. 2003. Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program for the U.S., Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

[3] Brown, M., Southworth, F., Stovall, T. 2005. Towards a Climate-Friendly Built Environment, Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

 

Response to Domenici-Bingaman White Paper

The Pew Center on Global Climate Change Response to:

"Design Elements of a Mandatory Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System"

Issued by Sen. Pete V. Domenici and Sen. Jeff Bingaman
February 2006

In February 2006, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R - New Mexico) and top Democrat Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D - New Mexico) issued a white paper on Design Elements of a Mandatory Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System, which posed several detailed questions about the design of a GHG cap-and-trade system.

The committee invited all interested parties to respond to the questions by March 13. Read a summary of our response below and the full response using the navigation bar in the top right corner of this page. You may also download the entire response (pdf) or sections of the response below.

Selected respondents were invited to attend the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee's conference-style hearing, or "Climate Conference", on April 4. Read Pew Center President Eileen Claussen's opening statement given at the Climate Conference. Read also Eileen Claussen's statement on the event of the Climate Conference.

Summary of Response to "Design Elements of a Mandatory Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System" from Eileen Claussen, President, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

Pew Center applauds the Senate Energy Committee for its continued efforts to address the critical issue of climate change. The Center is responding to all four main questions, and submitting additional information on cost containment and recent climate science. Responses draw from an extensive body of analysis, conference and workshop proceedings undertaken by the Center with input from the Center’s Business Environmental Leadership Council, scholars, policymakers, and stakeholders; as well as opinions expressed to the Center in discussions with over 30 large corporations. Please note that the Center and most companies surveyed believe that, rather than focusing on any one design element in isolation, any bill must be evaluated as a whole, especially in minimizing the costs to covered entities and the economy.

1. Point of Regulation: Ultimately mandatory GHG mitigation measures should cover the economy as a whole, equitably spreading responsibility among large emitters, the transportation sector, and households. For large stationary sources, the submission of allowances would best be required “downstream” at the point of emission, rather than “upstream.” For the transportation sector, the Center recommends an approach that would cover vehicle manufacturers through use of tradable vehicle GHG emission standards.

2. Allowance Allocation: To assist with the transition to GHG regulation, a high percentage of allowances (e.g., 90% - 95%) should be allocated at no cost, rather than auctioned, at least in the initial years of a cap-and-trade system. A small initial auction can provide funds for transition assistance and technology deployment. Over time, the amount auctioned could increase. In providing federal funding for technology development, a competitive process, such as a “reverse auction,” allocating funding on the basis of emission reduction potential, can minimize costs. In the early years of the program, the highest priorities for allocation should be transition assistance and technology development; over time the priorities should shift toward rewarding low-emitting technologies and practices. Offsets are critical for minimizing program costs. Use of offsets to meet allowance submission requirements should not be restricted, as long as the offsets meet reasonable standards for real, verifiable emission reductions. Early action credit is important and could be provided by allowing emitters who document emission reductions earlier than the default baseline year to use an earlier baseline, resulting in a higher allowance allocation.

3. Linkage: A U.S. GHG program should be integrated with systems around the world. This is both environmentally and economically important. Linkage will minimize costs while expanding GHG mitigation and technology transfer opportunities. Use of a low safety valve will greatly complicate such linkage and minimize the incentive for technology transfer and innovation.

4. Encouraging Comparable Action: Different policies are needed to address two distinct but related objectives: (1) achieving adequate action by all major emitting countries, and (2) protecting U.S. firms in energy-intensive industries whose goods are traded internationally against competitiveness impacts. The first is best achieved through multilateral commitments; the second through overall cost containment and targeted support for the vulnerable sectors.

Additional Topics
Cost Containment: A “safety valve” is just one cost containment method. Costs to regulated entities can also be minimized through offsets, allocation, linkage, etc.

Climate Science: The evidence of globally-distributed climate change impacts is mounting.


Download Sections of Our Response (all pdf)
Summary
Question 1: Point of Regulation
Question 2: Allowance Allocation
Question 3: Linkage
Question 4: Encouraging Comparable Action
Additional Topics: Cost Containment & Climate Science
Additional Topics: Cost Containment Chart

Agenda for Climate Action

 

 Agenda for Climate Action cover

Agenda for Climate Action

Prepared by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change
February 2006

Press Release

Download report (pdf)

Download a brochure summarizing the report (pdf)

Foreword

Eileen Claussen, President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change

Over the past seven years, the Pew Center has published more than 60 reports on the science, economics, solutions, and policy options related to global climate change. Over that time, the scientific consensus on this issue has only strengthened, but there is, as yet, no consensus on the appropriate portfolio of policies that are required to address global climate change successfully. This Agenda for Climate Action is C2ES’s attempt to fill that gap. It takes a comprehensive look at a suite of climate, energy, and technology policies that could provide meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions throughout the economy.

This report finds six areas in which the U.S. must take action: (I) science and technology research, (II) market-based emissions management, (III) emissions reductions in key sectors, (IV) energy production and use, (V) adaptation, and (VI) international engagement. In the areas of science and technology research, we call for increased stable funding for both, along with innovative approaches to distribute funds efficiently. We propose a mandatory GHG reporting system, which can form the basis for tracking voluntary reductions, accompanied by a large-source, economy-wide cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases. This combination of technology investment and market development will provide for the most cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gases, as well as create a market for GHG-reducing technologies.

While these broader efforts are critical, sector-specific actions are also needed. To address emissions from the transportation sector, we propose converting the struggling Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program into a more ambitious but tradable GHG standard, along with increased support for low-emission vehicles and fuels. For the industrial sector, we encourage greater outreach and incentives for improvements in process efficiency and the manufacture of low-GHG products. In the agriculture sector, biological sequestration programs in Farm Bill legislation must receive proper funding and prioritization. Because energy is at the heart of this issue, we tackle this sector separately, making recommendations for each major energy source. To enable continued use of coal in a climate-friendly manner, we promote aggressive research and development on carbon separation and capture technologies, development of a regulatory framework for geologic sequestration, and advanced generation coal plants. Natural gas is an important transition fuel, and we support the expansion of natural gas transportation infrastructure and production. We propose extending incentives for renewable fuels and electricity generation, an increased focus on biomass, and federal-level support for renewable credit-trading programs. We also support continued use of nuclear power generation, pending resolution of issues such as safety and waste storage. There are vast opportunities for improving efficiency on an economy-wide basis, so we promote improved efficiency in electricity production (through distributed generation, combined heat and power technologies), in electricity transmission (through test beds for an advanced grid), and during energy use (through building codes, product standards, and manufacturing process improvements).

Because none of these efforts will fully prevent all potential effects of climate change (indeed, many impacts are already being observed), we propose the development of a national adaptation strategy and the funding of early warning systems. Last but not least, while the Agenda focuses on domestic actions, it argues for greater participation by the U.S. in international negotiations to engage all major emitters in a global solution.

Despite the specificity of many of the steps included here, there is still much room for ongoing refinement and elaboration of these recommendations. While we have consulted with many stakeholders in the development of this report, we look forward to building upon the suggestions described here through further outreach and consultation.

This report follows the publication of International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012: Report of the Climate Dialogue at Pocantico, an examination of options for advancing the international climate effort post-2012. Taken together, these two documents offer a promising path forward for the U.S. and the world in tackling global climate change.

Executive Summary

Climate change is one of the most complex issues that the world will face in this century. Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have already reached levels unprecedented for hundreds of thousands of years, causing changes not only in global temperature, but also in observable impacts throughout the world, and these changes are happening more quickly than expected.  The broad consensus of established scientific experts both internationally and domestically is that most of the warming in recent decades can be attributed to human activities.  In addition, the rate and severity of these changes will increase without significant steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).  Stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations will require a fundamental shift in our energy system, but this transition will have other benefits as well, including improved competitiveness, security, air quality, public health, and job creation. This transition will not be easy, but it is crucial to begin now. 

This Agenda is the Pew Center's attempt to develop and articulate a responsible course of action for addressing climate change.  It identifies fifteen actions that should be started now, including U.S. domestic reductions and engagement in the international negotiation process.  It includes both broad and specific policies, combining recommendations on technology development, scientific research, energy supply, economy-wide markets, and adaptation with critical steps that can be taken in key sectors. While reductions across sectors and sources of emissions are key, these steps are not likely to happen simultaneously, nor without costs.  However, these recommendations have been designed to be both cost-effective and comprehensive.

Recommendations:

Invest in science and technology research.

1. Ensure a robust research program though the Climate Change Science Program.

2. Offer long-term, stable funds—in the form of a reverse auction—to GHG-related technology research and development.

Establish mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions and harness market mechanisms for economy-wide reductions.

3. Create a mandatory GHG reporting system as a basis for an economy-wide emissions trading program.

4. Implement a large-source, economy-wide cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases.

Stimulate innovation across key economic sectors.

5. Transportation: Convert the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program into strengthened, tradable corporate average emissions standards. Support biofuels, hydrogen, and other low-GHG fuel alternatives.

6. Manufacturing: Provide outreach and incentives to manufacturers for improvements in industrial efficiency and low-GHG technologies, and support the production of low-GHG products.

7. Agriculture: Raise the priority and funding levels for Farm Bill programs and other federal initiatives on carbon sequestration.

Drive the energy system toward greater efficiency, lower-carbon fuels and carbon capture technologies.

8. Coal and Carbon Sequestration: Provide funding for tests of geologic carbon sequestration and for research, development and demonstration (RD&D) projects on separation and capture technologies, in combination with advanced generation coal plants. Establish an appropriate regulatory framework for carbon storage.

9. Natural Gas: Expand natural gas transportation infrastructure and production.

10. Renewables: Significantly “ramp up” renewables for electricity and fuels, including an extension and expansion of the production tax credit, a uniform system for tracking renewable energy credits, and increased emphasis on biomass.

11. Nuclear Power: Provide opportunities for nuclear power to play a continuing role in a future low-carbon electricity sector.

12. Efficient Energy Production and Distribution: Support the development and use of combined heat and power installations, distributed generation technologies, and test beds for an upgraded electricity grid.

13. Efficient Energy Usage: Reduce energy consumption through policies that spur efficiency, including appliance and equipment standards, building R&D and codes, and consumer education.

Begin now to adapt to the inevitable consequences of climate change.

14. Develop a national adaptation strategy through the Climate Change Science Program and Climate Change Technology Program, and fund development of early-warning systems for related threats.

Engage in negotiations to strengthen the international climate effort.

15. Review options for a new or modified agreement to ensure fair and timely action by all major emitting countries, and participate in negotiations to establish binding climate commitments consistent with domestic interests.

These fifteen recommendations are not the only means of achieving a lower-carbon future, but taken together, they would chart a climate-friendly path for the U.S.. Putting the Agenda into practice will take political will and policy action. All recommendations require government leadership, private sector commitment and time. Nonetheless, the details of specific recommendations in this Agenda are less critical than the compelling need to get started. Further delay will only make the challenge before us more daunting and costly.

Business Support

Agenda for Climate Action
Report Release
February 8, 2006
National Press Club, Washington, DC


Remarks made by business representatives at the release:

David Hone
Group Climate Change Adviser
Shell International Limited (pdf)

Melissa Lavinson
Director for Federal, Governmental and Regulatory Relations
PG&E Corporation (pdf)

Bill Gerwing
Western Hemisphere Health, Safety, Security, and Environment Director
BP (pdf)

John Stowell
Vice President of Federal Affairs and Environmental Safety
Cinergy (pdf)

Ruksana Mirza
Vice President, Environmental Health and Safety
Holcim (US) Inc. (pdf)

Tom Catania
Vice President, Government Relations
Whirlpool Corporation (pdf)

Supporting statements: Agenda for Climate Action

The Pew Agenda is an example of the kind of big picture, integrated thinking that is needed to tackle the climate issue.  We're pleased that the Agenda makes the point that climate solutions should be market based while covering all parts of the economy and resolving regulatory uncertainty.  These are all vital as the utility industry prepares to build the next generation of power plants needed by our growing economy.

James E. Rogers, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer
Cinergy Corp.


The changes needed in our energy infrastructure to meet future demand and respond to climate change will not happen by chance - a clear, long term framework will give business the necessary incentive and confidence to invest further.

John D. Hofmeister, President and US Country Chair
Shell Oil Company


Holcim is pleased with the leadership that the Pew Center has taken with regard to greenhouse gas reduction policies and the depth of research that comprises the foundation of this report. Importantly, the Pew Center recognizes the necessity of market-based solutions and that various sector needs must be taken into consideration if we are to have consensus in what must be done to contain and ultimately reduce the generation of greenhouse gases.

Patrick Dolberg, President & Chief Executive Officer
Holcim (US) Inc.


Through its association with the Pew Center, Alcan has identified another avenue through which to actively address climate change and its effects on the long-term sustainability of the Company. This report sends a clear message, calling on all stakeholders to broaden their investment in tackling the economic, social, and environmental issues that climate change presents.”

Daniel Gagnier, Senior Vice President, Corporate and External Affairs
Alcan Inc.


Intel supports Pew's efforts to advance the national discussion on climate change by proposing options that merit careful consideration. Intel agrees that climate change is a serious issue, and has been actively working to mitigate its own climate impact through aggressive programs to reduce energy consumption and emissions of global warming compounds.

Dane Parker, General Manager of Environmental Health and Safety
Intel

0

Press Release: Agenda for Climate Action

Press Release
February 8, 2006

Contact: Katie Mandes, (703) 516-0606

PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RELEASES FIRST COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE

All Sectors Must Share in Solution

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Pew Center on Global Climate Change released the first comprehensive plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.  The Agenda for Climate Action identifies both broad and specific policies, combining recommendations on economy-wide mandatory emissions cuts, technology development, scientific research, energy supply, and adaptation with critical steps that can be taken in key sectors.  The report is the culmination of a two-year effort that articulates a pragmatic course of action across all areas of the economy.  

The report calls for a combination of technology and policy and urges action in six key areas:  (1) science and technology, (2) market-based programs, (3) sectoral emissions, (4) energy production and use, (5) adaptation, and (6) international engagement.  Within these six areas, the Agenda outlines fifteen specific recommendations that should be started now, including U.S. domestic reductions and engagement in the international negotiation process.  All the recommendations are capable of implementation in the near-term. 

The report concludes that there is no single technology fix, no single policy instrument, and no single sector that can solve this problem on its own.  Rather, a combination of technology investment and market development will provide for the most cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gases, and will create a thriving market for GHG-reducing technologies.  To address climate change without placing the burden on any one group, the report urges actions throughout the economy. 

“Some believe the answer to addressing climate change lies in technology incentives.  Others say limiting emissions is the only answer.  We need both,” said Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew Center.

Emissions in the United States continue to rise at an alarming rate.  U.S. carbon dioxide emissions have grown by more than 18% since 1990, and the Department of Energy now projects that they will increase by another 37% by 2030. 

Joining the Pew Center at the announcement were representatives from the energy and manufacturing sectors.  Speaking at the release were:  David Hone, Group Climate Change Adviser, Shell International Limited; Melissa Lavinson, Director, Federal Environmental Affairs and Corporate Responsibility, PG&E Corporation; Bill Gerwing, Western Hemisphere Health, Safety, Security, and Environment Director, BP; John Stowell, Vice President, Environmental Strategy, Federal Affairs and Sustainability, Cinergy Corp., Ruksana Mirza, Vice President, Environmental Affairs, Holcim (US) Inc.; and Tom Catania, Vice President, Government Relations, Whirlpool Corporation.

Recommendations:

While actions are needed across all sectors, some steps will have a more significant, far-reaching impact on emissions than others and must be undertaken as soon as possible. 

  • A program to cap emissions from large sources and allow for emissions trading will send a signal to curb releases of greenhouse gases while promoting a market for new technologies.
  • Transportation is responsible for roughly one-third of our greenhouse gas emissions, and this report addresses this sector through tradable emissions standards for vehicles.
  • Because energy is at the core of the climate change problem, the report makes several recommendations in this area: calling for increased efficiency in buildings and products, as well as in electricity generation and distribution.  Incentives and a nationwide platform to track and trade renewable energy credits are recommended to support increased renewable power.  In recognition of the key role that coal plays in U.S. energy supply, the report calls for the capture and sequestration of carbon that results from burning coal. Nuclear power currently provides a substantial amount of non-emitting electricity, and is therefore important to keep in the generation mix. The report recommends support for advanced generation of nuclear power, while noting that issues such as safety and waste disposal must also be addressed.
  • While most of the recommendations focus on mitigation efforts, the report acknowledges that some impacts are inevitable and are already being seen. As a result, it proposes development of a national adaptation strategy to plan for a climate-changing world. 
  • Finally, despite the importance of efforts by individual countries on this issue, climate change cannot be addressed without engagement of the broader international community.  The report recommends that the U.S. participate in international negotiations aimed at curbing global greenhouse gas emissions by all major emitting countries.

Other recommendations include: long-term stable research funding, incentives for low-carbon fuels and consumer products, funding for biological sequestration, expanding the natural gas supply and distribution network, and a mandatory greenhouse gas reporting program that can provide a stepping stone to economy-wide emissions trading. 

The full text of this and other Pew Center reports is available at http://www.c2es.org.  

###

The Pew Center was established in May 1998 by The Pew Charitable Trusts, one of the United States’ largest philanthropies and an influential voice in efforts to improve the quality of the environment.  The Pew Center is an independent, nonprofit, and non-partisan organization dedicated to providing credible information, straight answers, and innovative solutions in the effort to address global climate change.  The Pew Center is led by Eileen Claussen, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

Senator Lugar Praises Our Dialogue

In a major address before the UN Security Council on February 6, 2006, Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for the United States to return to negotiations under the Framework Convention on Climate Change to achieve a comprehensive international approach to global warming. He said a "roadmap to this outcome" is contained in the recent report of the Climate Dialogue at Pocantico convened by the Center.

Excerpt from Senator Lugar's address:

"...[Fossil fuel] dependence also presents huge risks to the global environment. With this in mind, I have urged the Bush Administration and my colleagues in Congress to return to a leadership role on the issue of climate change. I have advocated that the United States must be open to multi-lateral forums that attempt to achieve global solutions to the problem of greenhouse gases. Climate change could bring drought, famine, disease, mass migration, and rising sea levels threatening coasts and economies worldwide, all of which could lead to political conflict and instability. This problem cannot be solved without international cooperation.

The time is ripe for bold action by the international community because much has changed since talks first began in 1992 on what became the Kyoto treaty. For one, China and India, who won exemptions from the treaty’s emission-cutting requirements, have enjoyed rapid growth. They are now much greater sources of greenhouse gases than anticipated, but also far stronger economies, more integrated into the global system.

Our scientific understanding of climate change has also advanced significantly. We have better computer models, more measurements and more evidence -- from the shrinking polar caps to expanding tropical disease zones for plants and humans -- that the problem is real and is caused by man-made emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide from fossil fuels.

Most importantly, thanks to new technology, we can control many greenhouse gases with proactive, pro-growth solutions, not just draconian limitations on economic activity. Industry and government alike recognize that progress on climate change can go hand in hand with progress on energy security, air pollution, and technology development.

A roadmap to this outcome is contained in a recent report from the Center, a non-partisan organization, which assembled representatives from China, India and other countries and from global industrial companies, as well as from the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. This diverse group agreed on the need for fresh approaches beyond Kyoto. They said the U.S. must engage all the major economies at once, including India and China, because experience has shown that countries will not move unless they can be sure their counterparts are moving with them.

The United States, the world’s richest country and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, should seize this moment to make a new beginning by returning to international negotiations in a leadership role under the Framework Convention on Climate Change. I believe that the United States is prepared to do that. Our friends and allies should embrace this opportunity to achieve a comprehensive international approach to global warming...."

Full text of Senator Lugar's address to the Security Council

More on the report of the Climate Dialogue at Pocantico

Additional resources on international climate policy, including text of the Sense of the Senate resolution, S. Res. 312 (pdf), proposed by Senator Lugar with Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Delaware), calling for U.S. participation in international negotiations under the Framework Convention on Climate Change

Climate Debate in Congress

Nearly 230 bills focusing specifically on climate change have been introduced in the 113th Congress (2013-2014). Many more bills touched on energy, environment, transportation, agriculture and other areas that could have an impact on or be affected by climate change. The list below, however, contains for the most part only those bills whose authors explicitly reference climate change or related terms, such as greenhouse gases or carbon dioxide. (For brevity, all legislative proposals, including resolutions and amendments, are referred to here as "bills.")

While little climate-related legislation passed, this Congress introduced twice as many climate-related bills than in the previous Congress. A closer look reveals:

  • 233 climate-specific bills were introduced, surpassing the 113 introduced during the 112th Congress (2011-2012), and coming close to the 235 of the 110th Congress (2008-2009).
  • 144 of the bills (62 percent) support climate action in some way.
  • 48 bills are intended to build resilience to climate impacts, compared with nine introduced in the previous Congress.
  • 26 bills supporting climate action have bipartisan co-sponsorship. Nine of them promote energy efficiency.
  • 58 bills, 11 of them bipartisan, would block or hinder EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Four such bills passed the House, but none passed the Senate.
  • 16 bills supporting climate action were written by Republicans, while nine bills opposing climate action were written by Democrats, showing that while there are exceptions, climate issues continue to largely fall along partisan lines.
  • 19 bills would block or hinder federal agencies from using the social cost of carbon in federal rulemaking.
  • 4 bills seek to reduce short-lived climate pollutants.

Congress voted on 48 of these bills, three-quarters of these bills passed the House of Representatives, and nearly 35 percent of these bills would curb EPA’s greenhouse gas regulatory authority. Only three bills loosely related to climate change (though not directly referencing it) were passed and signed into law: the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act and the Hurricane Sandy Relief bills to cope with Hurricane Sandy’s aftermath; and Public Law 113-89, which reverses many of the provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, and was enacted into law despite being opposed by climate action and taxpayer advocates.

With lawmakers returning for a few weeks before the end of the current Congress, the most pressing issue they face is passing a Continuing Resolution (CR) to fund the government beyond December 11. Lawmakers will also have to decide whether to extend more than 50 tax provisions, including the production tax credit.

The bills, resolutions, and amendments of the 113th Congress dealing with climate change are divided into the following categories:

2005 Comparison of Climate Policy Proposals

Two proposals for mandatory programs on greenhouse gases have recently been discussed in the Senate. Their targets and likely effects are discussed here along with projections for the Kyoto Protocol and the existing Bush Administration Climate Change Plan, two commonly discussed alternative approaches. Senator Bingaman has offered a proposal based on recommendations made by the National Commission on Energy Policy. (See Summary of Bingaman Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005.) Senators McCain and Lieberman reintroduced a modified version of their Climate Stewardship Act. (See Summary of McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005.) A cornerstone of both proposals is an economy-wide tradeable permits system, which imposes mandatory targets for large emitters and a market based system for meeting those targets. Such a system was used by the Clean Air Act to deal with acid rain, and is central to the Kyoto Protocol. It is, however, not part of President Bush’s Climate Initiative, which relies on voluntary action and nonbinding targets.

Senator Bingaman’s proposal differs from previous proposals that sought to impose mandatory targets in two distinct areas. First, absolute emission reduction targets are set based on emissions intensity – emissions per million dollars of GDP. Initially the goal is to reduce emissions intensity by 2.4% per year until 2019, after which the target becomes more stringent and increases to 2.8%. Despite this reduction in intensity, absolute emissions would actually grow. The Climate Initiative proposed by President Bush also set an intensity target but did not translate this target into an absolute level of mandatory reductions. (See Analysis of President Bush's Climate Change Plan.) The McCain-Lieberman proposal, in contrast, has sought to stabilize emissions at a specific level – as such it requires a greater scale of reduction as our economy continues to grow. The second significantly different element in the Bingaman proposal is a “safety value”, or price cap on the cost of greenhouse gas permits. A cost (or price) cap ensures that large emitters with targets will not have to pay more than some specified price for permits. Bingaman’s proposal sets the price cap at $7/TCO2 initially but increases this cap by 5% nominally each year (assuming a 2% rate of inflation, this implies that the price would only rise by 3% in real terms). As a point of reference, permits in the European greenhouse gas market have been trading during the summer of 2005 for over $25 USD/TCO2. A price cap gives emitters with targets some assurance about the cost of compliance but like a tax, does not ensure any specific level of reduction will occur. The EIA projects that allowance prices would reach the safety valve by 2016, causing emissions to exceed the cap after this time.

Balancing the cost of a new policy while ensuring that sufficient reductions occur to address the issue is crucial for the selection of the appropriate climate policy approach for the U.S.. The various climate policy proposals that have come forward to date have a wide range in cost, but also considerable differences in the resulting emissions reductions. The following table compares and contrasts the significant elements of current proposals that include targets - the Climate and Economy Insurance Act (proposed by Bingaman), the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act (proposed by McCain and Lieberman), the Bush Climate Initiative, and the Kyoto Protocol. More detailed descriptions of these proposals as well as economic modeling cost projections are available on our website.

Climate Policy Proposal Comparison

Program Element/Result [i]

Bingaman Proposal [ii]

Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act

S.1151 [iii]

Kyoto

Protocol [iv]

Climate Initiative Bush Administration[v]

Mandatory / Voluntary

Mandatory

Mandatory

Mandatory

Voluntary

Target

Absolute based on 2.4% intensity improvement 2010-2018, after 2019 target increases stringency to 2.8%

Absolute emissions 2000 emissions level after 2010

Absolute

7% below 1990 levels by 2012

Intensity target goal 18% reduction by 2012

Offsetting Emissions Allowed for Compliance

Yes

Not to exceed 3%

Yes

not to exceed 15% of allowance allocation

Yes

no limits specified through Kyoto, though implementing countries have discretion

N/A

Cost Cap

Yes - $7

No

No

No

Stabilizes Emissions

No[vi]

(12% above 2010 levels in 2020)

Yes

Yes [vii]

No

(12% above 2000 levels by 2012)

EIA Estimated Emissions Reductions 2025

(MTCO2) [viii],[ix]

621

2180

3,800

400 (goal)

EIA Estimated Permit Price 2025 ($/TCO2)[x]

$8.73[xi]

$36

$354

N/A

EIA Estimated Impact on real GDP

2025 [xii]

-0.13%

($29 billion)

-0.4%

($89 billion)

-0.7%[xiii]

($135 billion in 2020)

N/A


Notes:

[i] This table compares EIA’s analysis of only the greenhouse gas-trading program contained in each policy options. It does not include other policy elements, like technology incentives, that may be contained in each proposal

[ii] As modeled by EIA in Impacts of Modeled Recommendations of the National Commission on Energy Policy, April 2005, for the Cap and Trade component of the NCEP proposal.

[iii] Because the bill does not change the significant provisions related to carbon limits, this review summarizes the analysis of the previous McCain-Lieberman proposal as voted on in the U.S. Senate on October 30, 2003, Amendment 2028: The Climate Stewardship Act of 2000. A summary of the bill is available at http://wwww.c2es.org/federal/analysis/congress/108/summary-lieberman-mccain-climate-stewardship-act-2003. Results are from EIA’s (2004), assessment of http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/sacsa/pdf/s139amend_analysis.

[iv] Described and analyzed by EIA (1998), Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity, Report SR/OIAF/98-03, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/pdf/sroiaf9803.pdf. Reduction and price estimates are taken from the “1990-3%” scenario and are based on an auction approach for GHG permits with revenue recycling through tax policy.

[v] As announced on February 14, 2004, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html

[vi] The Bingaman (NCEP) proposal calculates the target level of reductions in terms of emissions intensity based on expected future GDP growth; this target, however, is translated into an absolute emission target but because it is based on a growing economy the target grows over time. Should GDP differ from the forecasted level, the target is not affected. Utilization of the safety valve, in addition, will result in emissions above the target level of emissions reductions.

[vii] Assuming that the U.S. could meet some of its target through the use of biological sinks, the numbers represented here are those associated with EIA’s modeling of 3% below 1990 emission levels.

[viii] Estimated emission reductions have been adjusted to reflect a consistent baseline using EIA’s AEO2005 baseline assumptions. Adjustments are based on predicted percentage change applied to AEO2005 baseline levels. For example, EIA analysis suggested that McCain Lieberman reductions in 2025 would be 7,997 (-22%) million metric tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e) below their AEO2003 base case level of emissions. Utilizing the lower AEO2005 emissions baseline and assuming that a reduction of 22% implies emissions are reduced by approximately 2,180 MMTCO2e.

[ix] To convert from MTCO2 to MTC divide by 3.67.

[x] All dollars converted to $2004 constant dollars utilizing CPI.

[xi]The safety-valve permit price rises from $6.26 per metric ton in 2010 to 8.73 in 2025 (in 2004 dollars).

[xii] According to AEO2005, reference forecasted GDP in 2025 is $20,292 Billion (2002 dollars). AEO2005 is available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/appa.pdf.

[xiii] Table 29 Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity, Report SR/OIAF/98-03. Assuming revenue recycled through an income tax rebate.

Syndicate content