Copenhagen

“Verifiable.”  That is arguably the most important word in the Bali Action Plan, the agreement two years ago that launched the global climate negotiations about to culminate in Copenhagen.  Our future climate commitments and actions, governments agreed, must be “measurable, reportable and verifiable.”

This construct is critical because, done right, “MRV” offers the promise of a global climate agreement in which countries can confidently ascertain whether others are doing what they promised.

Yet many governments now seem decidedly uncomfortable with the concept.  Developing countries say MRV shouldn’t apply to any actions they take on their own, only those receiving international support (a point underscored last week by China when it announced its new carbon intensity target).  In the case of a country like China, that means virtually none of its actions would be subject to international verification.

The United States, for its part, has offered up an MRV proposal that avoids the term verification altogether.  This is a worrisome omission, one that underscores perhaps the most glaring weakness in the U.S. position going into Copenhagen – its absolute silence on the question of compliance.

This post originally appeared in Yale Environment 360.

Two years ago in Bali, climate negotiators set an extremely ambitious goal for Copenhagen that quickly came to be viewed as a deadline for achieving a new, ratifiable global climate agreement. Striking such a deal is certainly in line with what the science says is urgently needed. But political realities, not the science, dominate global climate negotiations.

And the political reality is that many of the major players are not yet ready to sign a binding deal.  Many, including the United States, China and India, are making encouraging progress domestically.  Yet there remain wide differences among parties on many of the core issues – the nature of parties’ commitments, how they will be verified, how to generate new public and private finance, etc.  So the objective in Copenhagen must be a strong interim agreement that captures what progress has been achieved and creates fresh momentum toward a full and final deal.

Two major components involve carbon cuts and money. On emissions, a probable Copenhagen deal includes pledges from developed countries to meet reduction targets and pledges from major developing countries (e.g., China, India, Brazil) to meet  other mitigation actions such as carbon intensity goals. On finance, developed countries would pledge near-term funding to help developing countries adapt to climate change and develop low-carbon strategies. It’s also imperative that Copenhagen produce a clear deadline for concluding a final legal agreement, with the December 2010 Mexico City climate summit providing a reasonable timeframe.

A Copenhagen deal should also go as far as possible in outlining the architecture of a legally-binding treaty. This includes: the nature of commitments for developed and major developing countries; how to verify that countries are complying with their commitments; and new financial mechanisms.

Achieving strong national pledges of action and making available some quick-start money to address immediate climate-related needs for developing countries will represent genuine progress, and will help bridge the gap between developed and major developing countries. But to be a true success, Copenhagen must be a springboard toward a legally-binding agreement in 2010. 

Read more here.

Eileen Claussen is President

BARCELONA -- Will the U.S. bring numbers to Copenhagen?

That is the question most on the minds of negotiators here in Barcelona as they struggle to chart a path toward success at the upcoming climate summit in Copenhagen.  And with good reason – what can be achieved next month in the Danish capital will depend in large measure on what the United States brings to the table.

Every developed country except the U.S. already has formally adopted or proposed emission targets for 2020.  (According to a compilation by the U.N. climate secretariat, these numbers amount to a collective reduction of 16 to 23 percent below 1990 levels.)  U.S. negotiators are being very coy about whether they will be able to add theirs by the time of Copenhagen.

While a host of other issues bedevil these talks, there is no question that the lack of U.S. numbers severely constrains the range of possible outcomes.  Indeed, it’s difficult to imagine even a solid political deal coming together in Copenhagen if the U.S. is unwilling to, at least provisionally, lay out its intentions on the emissions front.

At the same time, it’s understandable why the U.S. might hold back.  It would be pointless, and potentially disastrous, for the administration to put forward numbers that Congress would not in the end support.  And while the House of Representatives has passed a comprehensive climate bill, the Senate process is just now beginning and won’t conclude before Copenhagen.  So it’s hard to say just where Congress will come out.

Under these circumstances, venturing forward with numbers carries certain risks.  First, there are risks to the domestic climate process:  If too many on Capitol Hill feel the President is getting out ahead of Congress, that could make it harder to build the bipartisan support needed to get legislation done.  Second, there are risks to the international process:  If the U.S. dangles numbers it can’t ultimately sign on to, any interim deal in Copenhagen will unravel, and the negotiations could wind up back at square one.  Finally, if the U.S. puts forward numbers yet no agreement is reached, both the domestic and the international processes could suffer.

Beyond these questions of risk, there are some serious substantive issues:

• What numbers?  Clearly, any numbers would have to reflect those now under discussion in Washington.  The most obvious are the proposed cap-and-trade targets, ranging from President Obama’s initial proposal (14 percent below 2005; or 1990 levels), to the House-passed bill (17 percent below 2005; 4 percent below 1990), to the Kerry-Boxer bill proposed in the Senate (20 percent below 2005; 6 percent below 1990).  The House bill and Senate proposal contain provisions that would deliver additional reductions, but there is no saying now how they will ultimately fare.
• In what form?  As we have argued before, and as prominent voices now concur, any likely outcome in Copenhagen would be a political, not a binding, deal – as a basis for then negotiating a legal instrument with binding commitments.  In that event, any numbers agreed in Copenhagen would be provisional.  And without final U.S. legislation, presenting a range would be far wiser than presenting a single number (though the aim in a final legal agreement should certainly be a specific target).
• What’s the framework?  There are significant differences between the U.S. and other parties on the nature of a future international framework – for instance, would developed country targets be verified according to national or international accounting rules?  If it’s not possible to bridge those differences by Copenhagen, there will be some ambiguity around any targets on the table there.

What’s more, the prospects for a Copenhagen deal hinge as well on a second set of numbers: financial contributions to support developing country efforts.  At this point, there are huge estimates of need but no firm offers from any developed countries.  A deal presumably would require clear numbers from all, including the United States.

Whether the U.S. comes to Copenhagen with numbers is a political judgment that can be made only by President Obama.  In our view, he should send numbers only if he is confident that he will be in a position to convert them into a binding commitment (pending ratification) within the timeframe agreed in Copenhagen for reaching a final legal agreement.  His ability to deliver on that will depend on when Congress completes its job; that, in turn, depends at least in part on how vigorously the President chooses to engage in the legislative process.  (His engagement is a necessary condition for – but by no means a guarantee of – legislative success.)

So in the end, the President’s call on numbers for Copenhagen will rest on his judgment of where Congress is, where other parties are, and whether his active engagement can get the job done in 2010.

BARCELONA -- The two men perhaps best qualified to judge have now openly declared that they do not expect next month’s Copenhagen climate summit to produce a legally binding agreement.

That is the sober assessment offered in separate briefings over the past couple of days by Yvo de Boer, executive secretary of the U.N. climate secretariat, and Michael Zammit Cutajar of Malta, who for the past year has chaired the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen. (There are two negotiating tracks: one under the Kyoto Protocol, the other under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which includes the United States. Zammit Cutajar chairs the latter.)

Both were speaking to NGOs tracking the final week of pre-Copenhagen talks underway here in Barcelona.  And both cited similar reasons: a lack of time, and a lack of consensus among parties that a new legal instrument is necessary or desirable.

To those who believe nothing short of a final legal deal in Copenhagen is acceptable, their pronouncements are a betrayal.  But to those of us who have previously offered similar assessments, the two men’s courageous candor injects a badly needed sense of realism into a process that has been plagued by – and could ultimately be doomed by – unreal expectations.

Neither de Boer nor Zammit Cutajar is calling for decisions to be put off.  Both emphasized that they see Copenhagen as a critical moment when governments must seal the best deal they possibly can.  In their estimation, that would be a political deal laying out government’s intentions and the elements of a new international climate architecture.  It would be a prelude to – and emphatically not a substitute for – a legally binding agreement sometime in 2010.

Both envision a Copenhagen outcome comprised of a set of “decisions” by parties – well more than a political declaration or communiqué, but without the binding character of a treaty.  De Boer believes the package should include a mandate to translate its content into a legally binding instrument; Zammit Cutajar agrees, but said he doesn’t yet see a consensus for that among parties.

De Boer’s more detailed vision includes a “functioning architecture” and annexes listing: individual emission targets for all developed countries; actions to be undertaken by major developing countries (quantifying how much they will reduce emissions below business as usual); individual contributions by developed countries of “prompt-start” (immediate) funding for developing countries; and a cost-sharing formula for future developed country financial contributions.

Though still short of legally binding, getting even this far is a monumental undertaking in the mere month remaining.  Although other developed countries have put emission numbers on the table, the United States has not; none have tabled numbers on finance.  And while developing countries are showing a greater willingness to act, none have shown a readiness to reflect their actions in a form that would ultimately translate into an international commitment.

In broad stroke, the proposals by de Boer and Zammit Cutajar correspond to the type of outcome we recommended.  They also echo the types of ideas now being floated by the Danish government, which will host the Copenhagen summit.  One difference is that the Danes have taken to characterizing their preferred outcome as “politically binding,” a novel term that appears intended to convey more than is really there.

It’s understandable, now that the Danes have enticed a growing number of heads of state to attend, that they might be tempted to inflate the significance of whatever agreement is reached.  Better, we think, to be realistic about the best that can be achieved and, when it’s achieved, to call it what it is.  A binding agreement must remain the ultimate goal.  A solid political agreement in Copenhagen would put that within reach.  

BANGKOK -- It’s no surprise, in the pre-Copenhagen posturing, that the United States is once again seen by many as the single greatest obstacle to an effective global climate effort.  The truth, though, is that the U.S. is hardly alone.  On all the key issues – emission targets, developing country commitments, and finance – other key players aren’t ready to strike a final deal either.

In his address last week to a high-level UN climate summit, President Obama offered an impressive list of early accomplishments.  Yet as was painfully evident, absent comprehensive legislation from Congress, the administration comes to the negotiating table with loads of good intention, but not yet prepared to take on binding international commitments.

Other countries, meanwhile, appear to be showing some movement. 

Both China and India, long viewed as the other principal barriers to agreement, are signaling a new willingness to act - at least domestically.  President Hu Jintao told the UN summit that China will set a goal to reduce its carbon intensity by a “notable margin.”  India’s government is talking about setting domestic goals to limit its greenhouse gas emissions.  These steps are encouraging, and may help inoculate the two countries against blame in the event Copenhagen is a failure.  But in neither case has the government offered specific numbers or said it is prepared to translate its actions into international commitments.

Yukio Hatoyama of Japan did come to the summit with a number.  Two weeks earlier, fresh from his landmark election victory, the new prime minister had set aside the previous government’s goal of reducing emissions 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, a target roughly in line with the numbers being debated in Washington.  In its place, he declared a far more ambitious goal of 25 percent below 1990 levels – provided other major economies pony up their fair share. 

Whenever the UN climate change negotiations convene these days, as they will again later this month in Bangkok, an oversized digital timer glares at delegates from the front of the hall, methodically counting down the days, hours, minutes, even seconds until the upcoming climate conference in Copenhagen.  (The online version at the website of the UN climate secretariat reads at this writing 81:13:02:28.)

This staged countdown is a stark, if superfluous, reminder of the expectations looming for Copenhagen, arguably the most pivotal moment in climate diplomacy since Kyoto 12 years ago.  With the dangers of global warming more clear and present today than any had foreseen then, countless are not only eager but desperate for Copenhagen to deliver what Kyoto did not – an effective global response.

But with the days quickly ticking away, it is becoming clearer to all that the time is too short.  A blitz of high-level diplomacy might yet conjure a miracle, but less than three months out, the odds of a final, ratifiable deal by the time the clock hits zero appear virtually nil.